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Introduction: 
Ebola: Implications for Global Health Governance 
 
Joshua Busby, Karen A. Grépin and Jeremy Youde 
 
 
In March 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) was officially notified about 
cases of the virus in Guinea,i however, it was not until early August 2014 that the WHO 
declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.ii As of 
February 17, 2016, there have been more than 28,000 cases of the disease and over 
11,000 deaths.iii  
A belated international response headed off worst case scenarios, but that effort 
was seen by many to have been too slow.iv While West Africa is now virtually Ebola-free, 
with occasional cases popping up now and then, the region’s weak health infrastructure 
makes it susceptible to the recurrence of Ebola and other potential disease outbreaks. 
The Ebola crisis has highlighted global disparities in health resources, both 
human and financial,v as well as the need to reform the global health governance system 
to be better able to respond to future outbreaks.vi And although Ebola is the most 
prominent disease to catch international attention, other outbreaks, such as the current 
cases of MERS and the Zika virus also pose important threats to global health 
governance.vii  
There have been no less than six reviews that have tried to assess what went 
wrong during the Ebola crisis including one by Harvard/London School of Hygiene & 
Tropical Medicine, an independent panel commissioned by WHO itself, and a review by 
a special UN panel.viii Many of them point to the need for important reforms to both the 
WHO, the International Health Regulations, and wider system of global health. These 
recommendations include creating new politically-insulated offices and committees to 
assess health emergencies, establishing funds to permit rapid emergency responses, 
incentivizing states experiencing disease outbreaks to report to WHO in a timely 
manner, and creating financing facilities to encourage treatment and pharmaceutical 
research.ix  
At the 2015 World Health Assembly meeting, some of these reforms were set in 
motion, namely creating a $100 million emergency response fund (funded by voluntary 
donations from member-states) and directing the Director-General to form and 
coordinate a global health emergency workforce. As Mackey and Clift note in their 
contributions to this issue, some of the major recommendations, including an increase 
in the assessed dues to the WHO, were explicitly rejected by member-states. This leaves 
the WHO with the perennial problem of being dependent on voluntary contributions 
from donors for their pet projects and priorities, leaving the essential functions of global 
health surveillance potentially underfunded.  
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WHO REFORM - DISAPPOINTING RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Despite the time and energy put into the various review efforts, the likelihood of seeing 
meaningful and far-reaching changes being implemented is negligible at best. Most of 
the recommendations offered by the review panels are either unworkable or unlikely to 
be implemented. Director-General Chan called for member-states to increase their 
assessed contributions by 5 percent. This would be the first increase in mandatory dues 
since the early 1980s, and it would give WHO significant fiduciary flexibility to set its 
own budgetary priorities. During the 2015 World Health Assembly, though, member-
states rejected this modest increase in assessed contributions. While they did permit an 
increase in the organization’s overall budget, they mandated that this rise be financed 
only through voluntary contributions.x  
Another proposal called for the creation of a WHO Centre for Emergency 
Preparedness and Response to develop and coordinate efforts to address health 
emergencies. This would seemingly duplicate existing efforts and offices, both within 
and outside WHO, and add additional layers of bureaucracy without appreciably 
increasing the organization’s response capabilities. It might give the appearance that the 
organization was “doing something,” but it would likely complicate the ability to 
implement timely responses. Furthermore, many of the suggestions designed to increase 
WHO’s emergency response capabilities proceed from a narrow definition. They 
prioritize responses to actual infectious disease outbreaks, but they neglect 
strengthening the underlying health systems themselves. In general, the 
recommendations themselves are not bad, but they may overlook the political context 
and fail to appreciate the processes by which any such reforms would actually be 
implemented. 
Particularly absent is a serious discussion of strengthening underlying health 
systems. These, and not an emergency operations fund or a rapid deployment of health 
workers, are the real first lines of defense against the emergence and spread of an 
infectious disease outbreak.  The crisis has been seen as a failure of the global 
community to provide sufficient support of strengthened health systems and has led to 
calls for Universal Health Coverage, but as Harman argues below this movement has not 
been privileged in the past relative to other priorities and is unlikely to generate 
sufficient political priority going forward to make any meaningful change.  McCollum 
and Taegtmeyer’s perspective supports this argument in that a previously devastating 
outbreak of cholera in Sierra Leone led to similar calls but that the lessons from that 
outbreak were largely ignored and that led to the same mistakes being repeated again 
this time around. 
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WHO LEADERSHIP TRANSITION 
 
Margaret Chan’s second five-year term as Director-General will expire in 2017, and the 
selection of the organization’s next leader will say much about its future trajectory.xi 
Chan has received significant criticism for her failure to bolster the organization’s 
legitimacy. Given how dependent WHO is on voluntary contributions, it faces a perilous 
future unless it can convince the international community that it possesses the authority 
and legitimacy to effectively coordinate and lead responses to the health concerns facing 
the world. The next director-general must inspire confidence, demonstrate a level of 
political savvy, and maintain the trust of a sprawling organization whose effectiveness is 
dependent upon the good relations between the central office in Geneva and the six 
autonomous regional offices. 
Like other UN specialized agencies, WHO follows an informal process of regional 
rotation in selecting its leadership. All of the Director-Generals since 1973 have come 
from either Asia or Europe, so there may be strong pressure to select someone from 
Africa or Latin America. Michel Sidibé, the executive director of UNAIDS, and Awa Coll-
Seck, the Senegalese Minister of Health and executive director of the Roll Back Malaria 
Partnership, have both been mentioned as possible candidates. Another person whose 
named has been mooted who has expertise and credibility is Agnes Binagwaho, 
Rwanda’s Minister of Health. There may be a desire for someone with more experience 
in politics in the hopes that that person could have more influence with government 
officials in member-states, particularly with donors. Graçea Machel, who chairs the 
Partnership for Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health and who has chaired the GAVI 
Alliance Board, might be an intriguing choice with such stature.  
Whoever is appointed to lead the organization going forward, that person has to 
make the case to the international community that WHO merits more regular and 
reliable sources of funding for the core functions like disease surveillance and early 
warning that only a global organization can carry out. At the same time, WHO’s new 
leader needs to make the case that global investments in health systems strengthening 
beyond West Africa are necessary to ward off the next possible global pandemic. If past 
experience is any guide, these sorts of reforms and legitimacy rebuilding require a leader 
who both possesses a level of comfort with the dynamics of global public health and has 
the political savvy to work with policymakers from around the world to acquire more 
core contributions to WHO’s budget. Finding both in a single leader can be tricky, but it 
is not impossible. Gro Harlem Brundtland, who served as Director-General between 
1999 and 2003 and had a medical background before entering electoral politics, may be 
the model for what the World Health Organization needs in a leader over the next five 
years.  
The urgency of this has been underscored by the rapid emergence of the Zika 
virus. Zika went from an obscure mosquito born virus affecting Brazil to being declared 
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by the WHO a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in February 
2016, because of the disease’s rapid spread throughout the Americas and its association 
with microcephaly, a birth defect affecting the head and brain size of babies in the 
womb.xii  
Beyond health systems strengthening, the Zika crisis underscores the need for 
finance for health technologies for emergent global health threats. The Flannery et al. 
contribution to this volume provides a set of criteria by which to think about which 
health threats should receive priority finance. They focus on those that are easily 
transmissible through the air or through human-to-human contact, that could kill large 
numbers of people, and for which there are market failures that impede technology 
creation in the absence of public action. Interestingly, Zika, because it does not kill large 
numbers and is largely transmitted by mosquitoes, would not fulfill their criteria, 
though birth defects arguably provide a reason for its inclusion but potentially opens up 
demands for finance for many other insect-borne diseases. 
 
THE SPECIAL ISSUE 
 
In this special issue, we bring together academics and experts to think critically about 
what the Ebola outbreak and the response to it tell us about global health governance 
and its future. The authors take on a variety of different elements, looking at the 
International Health Regulations, the role of regional organizations, encouraging 
international cooperation on health emergencies, the role of the military, and the 
lessons we can learn from other disease outbreaks. We put forward no specific answers, 
and we took a decidedly catholic approach to this issue, but we aim to generate 
discussion and deep thinking about what the international community can learn from 
this outbreak so that it does not repeat the same mistakes and shortcomings in the 
future. 
 
Sophie Harman - “Norms won’t save you: Ebola and the norm of global health 
security” 
 
In this commentary, Sophie Harman argues that stronger norms in support of the 
International Health Regulations (IHR) would not necessarily have prevented the Ebola 
crisis nor would they shield the world from future crises. She notes that norms exist in a 
global hierarchy of other normative commitments and that some are more resourced 
than others. For example, efforts to supply anti-retroviral drugs were also championed 
by norms entrepreneurs, and that campaign has generated significant flows of resources 
to support universal access, a material sign of its status in the hierarchy of global norms. 
Other norms-driven health causes such as the Millennium Development Goals and polio 
eradication also are privileged relative to support for IHR compliance. The WHO, she 
argues, is too weak to generate political (and therefore material) support for health 
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systems strengthening, at the heart of IHR compliance, leading to the conclusion that 
norms won’t save people suffering in health crises. 
 
Andrew Price-Smith and Jackson Porreca - “Fear, Apathy, and the Ebola Crisis (2014-
15): Psychology and Problems of Global Health Governance”  
 
Price-Smith and Porreca offer a unique perspective on the problems facing global health 
governance structures by adding a psychological component to the equation. The 
institutional impediments that block a more effective response to global health 
emergencies, they argue, arise out of what they term the “fear/apathy cycle.” Epidemic 
outbreaks breed a high degree of fear, which leads to inappropriately draconian policies 
and ostracization of those afflicted. When the emergency passes, though, the 
international community retreats into a sense of complacency. We lurch between the 
extremes of responses rather than finding some sort of consistent vigilance that would 
provide the global health governance architecture with the strength and resilience 
necessary to respond to any unforeseen emergencies. Their argument suggests that 
many, if not all, of the reform proposals being put forward to improve future responses 
to disease outbreaks will have little purchase because they fail to address this underlying 
psychological conundrum.  
 
Charles Clift - “Ebola and WHO Reform” 
 
Drawing on his extensive experience working with governments and international 
organizations on global health matters, Clift’s commentary highlights structural flaws 
within the World Health Organization. In particular, he focuses on the complications 
that emerge from having a lead organization simultaneously coexist with strong, 
autonomous regional organizations. One of the key flaws in WHO’s Ebola response was 
the failure of cooperation between WHO’s central headquarters in Geneva and the 
Regional Office for Africa. Looking at the various reform proposals that have come out 
so far, he laments the fact that they fail to resolve this underlying tension and instead 
attempt to bypass the structures altogether. He raises a question that few member-states 
appear willing to address: does WHO’s decentralized structure inhibit the organization’s 
ability to be effective? 
 
Maryam Deloffre - “Human Security Governance: Is UNMEER the Way Forward?” 
 
In her article, Deloffre explores the differences between a traditional state-centric 
response to security and a human security one. She then analyzes the extent to which 
the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) constituted one form or 
another.  Human security responses tend to be people-centric and focus on a wider 
range of threats than state security approaches, bringing in a wider number of actors 
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through bottom-up processes of consultation than top-down state security efforts. 
UNMEER facilitated an unprecedented array of cooperative activities, but Deloffre 
argues that the specific health security frame conformed to more traditional state-
centric notions that made coordination more of a challenge and that perhaps foreclosed 
some bottom-up measures that could have ameliorated impacts on vulnerable 
populations and brought human rights concerns more to the fore.  
 
Timothy Mackey - “Lessons from Liberia:  Global Health Governance in the Post-Ebola 
Paradigm” 
 
In this commentary, Mackey examines the experience of Liberia in confronting the 
Ebola crisis and the implications for the WHO, the International Health Regulations, 
and global health governance going forward. He concludes that the Inter-Agency Health 
Team, a multi-stakeholder partnership, was quite helpful in coordinating the response 
between Liberia’s government, different actors in the U.S government, and the WHO. 
However, this mechanism was created as an ad hoc response, lacking a formal process 
for generating such partnerships if needed in the future. Liberia’s weak health system 
made the country vulnerable to Ebola, and insufficient support from the WHO for IHR 
compliance did not shore up this weakness. Mackey concludes the piece with five 
important reflections and observations on progress (1) on the need for a more flexible 
WHO budget with resources for emergencies, (2) that WHO’s decentralized structure 
needs remedies that do not appear to be on the agenda as yet, (3) that the criteria for 
declaring a PHEIC be revised including a possible intermediate alert, (4) that more 
resources and attention be paid to compliance with the IHR, particularly on disease 
detection, reporting, and rapid response, and (5) finally, that resources be made 
available for an emergency workforce that can be tapped as needed. 
 
Rosalind McCollum and Miriam Taegtmeyer - “Let’s not make the same mistake 
again:  A political economy analysis of Sierra Leone’s Cholera and Ebola epidemic 
responses” 
 
McCollum and Taegtmeyer draw parallels between the Ebola outbreak and a recent 
outbreak of cholera that infected over 25,000 people in Sierra Leone (and bordering 
Guinea) in 2012.  Using a political economy issue analysis, they identify structural issues 
that were common to both outbreaks.  While they identify weak health systems as a key 
factor that led to both epidemics, McCollum and Taegtmeyer argue that many of these 
issues were related to structural weaknesses, such a weak public management system 
and a lack of trust of citizens, within the health system rather than simply a low level of 
total resources to support the health system.  To learn from these lessons, they argue 
that the government needs to find ways to better engage with communities and to 
strengthen accountability for health service delivery.  
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Jessica Flannery et al. - “A Process for Defining Priority Diseases for a Research and 
Development Financing” 
 
Flannery et al. note that until the 2015 crisis, the Ebola virus received insufficient 
attention in terms of disease diagnostics and therapeutics.  There have been calls for the 
creation of an international financing facility that might generate health technologies for 
diseases in the future. She and her colleagues identify the criteria that would make a 
disease eligible for inclusion in the financing facility’s purview, namely that there are (1) 
high fatality rates, (2) the disease is easily transmissible, and (3) that there are 
insufficient market incentives to provide technologies because the disease 
disproportionately affects communities with low purchasing power and in cyclical 
outbreaks. In their review of a variety of lists of diseases, Flannery et al. conclude that in 
addition to Ebola, the diseases in scope for inclusion are the Machupo virus, Marburg, 
MERS, the Nipah virus, and SARS. These criteria would largely exclude neglected 
tropical diseases and a number of other diseases such as dengue and Chikungunya. 
 
Alexandra Kaasch - “The Ebola crisis and health systems development” 
 
Kaasch analyzes the early donor contributions to the Ebola outbreak and notes that 
while there is nearly universal agreement that weak health systems contributed to the 
outbreak and that many high level declarations have been made about the importance of 
strengthening health systems, most of the aid provided to heavily affected countries in 
the immediate aftermath of the outbreak likely did very little to support health systems 
in the long run.  She argues that current donor support mechanisms are likely 
inadequate to deal with health system strengthening needs and instead argues that new 
financing structures, which could operate at different levels are more likely to be 
successful in addressing future threats. 
 
 
 
Joshua Busby is an Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the 
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International Security and Law.   
 
Karen Grépin is an Assistant Professor of Global Health Policy at New York 
University. 
 
Jeremy Youde is a fellow and senior lecturer in the Department of International 
Relations in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National 
University. 
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Norms won’t save you: 
Ebola and the norm of global health security 
 
Sophie Harman 
 
 
If the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone tells us anything about 
global health politics, it is that there is a distinct difference between normatively 
agreeing to act on an issue (in this case a public health emergency of international 
concern) and the will or ability to act. One point of agreement across the range of 
actors in global health is that the 2014 Ebola outbreak was a crisis that could and 
should have been prevented. Structures and processes had been created at the global 
level of health governance to help states and non-state actors report outbreaks of 
infectious diseases such as Ebola. Members of the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
had committed to a new system of disease outbreak preparedness through the 2005 
International Health Regulations (IHR2005). The boom time of global health 
financing from 2000 - 2010 had afforded health a priority position in many low and 
middle-income countries. For some the combination of commitment to the IHR2005 
and the boom in financing had created a new normative agenda within global health 
in which institutions such as the WHO could harness to secure the health of the world’s 
population.1 However, come the 2014 Ebola outbreak, such normative commitment 
appeared to be an empty gesture for Guineans, Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. This 
short commentary argues that events in West Africa demonstrate that norms are not 
enough to promote global health security because they exist in a system of global 
health governance that is defined by a financially-incentivised hierarchy of norms and 
institutional weakness of norm custodians. These two issues demonstrate normative 
agendas as political processes that have more to do with institutional finance and 
donor state priorities than a collective will to act.   
 
 
NORMS, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE AND IHR 2005 
 
For many scholars social norms have become the key drivers of global health 
governance. These social norms range from health-as-security that have underpinned 
the IHR2005 process,2 health-as-foreign-policy,3 and the right to health.4 Combined, 
these norms have driven an increase in development assistance to health, led to a range 
of institutional partnerships, and the consolidation of soft and hard legal commitments 
to the improvement of mental and physical health.5 Following a social constructivist 
logic, processes of global health governance have been understood through the lifecycle 
of norms: norms are formed by a confluence of social, political and economic factors, 
key individuals or an institutional norm entrepreneur; norms are then debated, adopted 
and embedded within a key institutional actor such as the WHO that then cascade the 
norm to member states, partners and key personnel within the institution. The lifecycle 
of norms is mutually reinforcing by a range of actors until it is adopted into their 
everyday practices and policy processes. 
Norms and the impact of the norm lifecycle has become a dominant means of 
explaining the reform of the IHRs in global health governance. Here the norm of health 
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security emerged from the entrepreneurship of key actors within the WHO, and reached 
a tipping point in the aftermath of SARS.6 IHR2005 encompass the ‘new norms of global 
health security’7 in which member states acknowledge their obligations and 
responsibilities to provide health security in a globalised world and the need for a 
collective outbreak response.8 Attached to the normative commitment is a set of core 
requirements for all member states to adopt with regard to building state capacity,9 
outbreak detection, confirmation and notification, provision of public health assistance, 
and port authority control and assistance.10 The purpose of which is to identify, detect 
and act on a potential threat to global health security, preferably before it becomes a 
public health emergency of international concern. In short, the intention of IHR2005 
was to minimise the risk of disease outbreaks to global health security. However, nearly 
ten years on from IHR2005, such normative commitment was found wanting when it 
came to Ebola in West Africa.  
 
EBOLA AND TWO PROBLEMS WITH NORMS 
 
Much of the commentary on the failings of the Ebola response has concentrated on 
IHR2005 and the need to strengthen the normative commitment to health security in 
global health governance.11 The logic here is if implemented correctly and if states 
showed a full normative commitment, IHR2005 would work as intended and disease 
outbreaks would be containable rather than devastating. The emphasis here is to embed 
norms around global health security in structures of global health governance as a 
means of generating greater normative commitment that will in turn lead to state 
action. However, such an emphasis overlooks two outstanding problems with the 
politics of global health: norm hierarchies and the weakness of global norm custodians 
such as the WHO.  
The first problem with norms, that the Ebola outbreak brought to light, is that 
norms exist within a hierarchy. Not all norms have equal value or importance within the 
wider system of global health governance or international relations. There are a number 
of issues or priorities that global institutions and states should act on – for example, 
hunger, maternal mortality, torture – however political-economic factors shape how and 
why states do or do not act in these areas. Global health encompasses a range of issues 
that are important and arguably many individuals, states, and institutions (to a greater 
or lesser extent) agree should be acted on even if they are not the ones to do so. 
IHR2005 compete with normative commitments to a range of disease-specific issues 
such as those associated with the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – reduce 
child mortality, reduce maternal mortality, and combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases – 
and those prioritised by high-profile eradication campaigns such as Polio. These issues 
attain greater value and normative commitment than IHR2005 in global health 
governance partly because they pre-date the reform of the IHRs, but mainly because of 
the financial commitment attached to such issues. Money and development assistance 
for health creates a hierarchy of norms within global health governance: states – 
principally low and middle income states – ascribe greater value, and thus prioritise, 
those norms that come with financial assistance. While states may commit to wider 
global health norms such as IHR2005, these norms do not transfer into action unless, 
first there is finance attached to them, and second, such finance is commensurate with 
or exceeds financial commitment to other normative concerns. In the hierarchy of global 
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health norms, IHR2005 core capacities occupy a position beneath the MDG health goals 
and high-profile eradication campaigns because there is not the commensurate financial 
incentive to transfer commitment into action. As Davies et al argue, consistently the 
WHO reports suggest that compliance with the IHR2005 is a big problem, particularly 
in the Africa and Asia-Pacific regions.12 Findings from the WHO’s 2013 IHR Core 
Capacity Implementation Survey suggests that states in the Africa region are either 
unable to provide data on compliance or fail to meet the 75-100% progress target in any 
of the core capacity areas.13 In the hierarchy of global norms, global health does not take 
priority and is quite low on the foreign policy agenda of most states, with issues such as 
international finance, trade, human rights, conflict and peace-building all taking 
precedence.  
As signatories to the MDGs, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone all prioritised the 
three health goals within their health sector over pandemic preparedness and health 
system strengthening.  This is not because these three countries did not value pandemic 
preparedness and health systems but because of the low level of development assistance 
for health in these areas.14  As low income, aid-dependent states, the health sectors of 
these countries are dependent on the priorities of health donors and therefore lack the 
funds to develop the health sector beyond international priorities.  
Domestic health sectors have a degree of agency in setting their own agendas but 
this exists in a narrow and poorly funded policy space. The three MDG goals have 
received significant financing from global health actors and thus shaped health sector 
planning in these countries. As the example of Sierra Leone represented in Graph 1 
demonstrates, the majority of development assistance to health between 2002-2013 was 
allocated to HIV/AIDS and reproductive health. 
Hence it is deeply concerning, but not unsurprising that when the Ebola outbreak 
happened there was a lack of health sector capacity despite these countries being 
signatories to the IHR2005. Normative commitment to the notion that everyone has a 
common interest in global health security is all well and good, but it gains little traction 
in a finance-driven hierarchy of global health norms. 
Norm hierarchies are defined by where development assistance to health is 
channelled, and crucially the priorities of the high-income states that provide the aid. 
International donors finance vertical, disease-specific health issues over horizontal 
health surveillance systems for a variety of reasons. First, the norm of the MDGs takes 
priority over IHR2005 in the wider hierarchy of international norms and thus most 
attention to health is organised around the three health-related goals. Second, while 
building health system and surveillance capacity in developing countries promotes 
global health security in the long term, it is a harder sell to domestic populations with 
regard to their perceptions on immediate threats to state and individual security. Third, 
health security has been used as a justification for action on a variety of health issues to 
the point that it has become an empty rhetorical device for eliciting normative state 
action in high income countries. Finally, development assistance is increasingly 
attached to performance measurement indicators which can be more clearly articulated 
and achieved in vertical health programmes. It is international donors that privilege 
certain norms over others and thus it is these states that shape norm hierarchies. 
Source: OECD/QWIDS Aid Data: Development Assistance for Health Sierra Leone 2002 
– 2013. 
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The second problem with global health norms has to do with the agency of the 
norm custodians in not only setting but delivering on normative agendas. The WHO is 
arguably the central agent for ensuring the norm of global health security through the 
adoption and implementation of IHR2005. However, the Ebola response showed how 
weak the WHO is as a custodian and promoter of the norm. As an agent responsible for 
providing and diffusing the norm of global health security through IHR2005, the WHO 
failed to assist low and middle income countries in developing the capabilities needed 
for effective health systems and pandemic preparedness. The WHO had a role to 
facilitate high income country spending in this area in-keeping with the IHR2005 
agreement but failed to create the policy space to deliver this normative agenda. This 
was in part because of the hierarchy of norms as discussed above, but also in part 
because of the lack of confidence in the WHO to deliver on this agenda by member 
states.15 
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The WHO was slow to act on Ebola, showed lack of communication between 
headquarters and the infected African states, and had little in-country or international 
presence in leading the response as one would expect from the supposedly lead 
institution in global health.16  The WHO has recognised this.17 Part of the problem with 
Ebola was over who had the responsibility and will to act. Throughout the early stages of 
the Ebola response there was a shift in blame and responsibility between global actors 
and between international institutions and the state. Everyone agreed that someone 
should do something to protect the norm of global health security but the actor with the 
responsibility to do so – the WHO – did not act. The fumbled response of the WHO 
suggested that the norm of global health security was weak in the very institution in 
which it was established. This sent a contradictory message to the wider global health 
community and member states that the WHO was dependent on to finance and assist 
with the outbreak. For the WHO, the inability to act on Ebola was in part a collective 
action problem – it needed to respond to and work with member states in the response. 
However, there was (albeit delayed) political will to act by some of the main powers in 
contemporary global politics – the United States and China – and through global 
financing mechanisms – the World Bank and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
The problem here was not collective action, the problem was concern over collective 
action through the WHO as it had shown little political will to act on the norm and, as a 
consequence, lost the support, trust and confidence of member states and partner 
institutions in both the institution and the norm of global health security. 
 
CONCLUSION: NORMS WON’T SAVE YOU   
 
The flawed global response to Ebola 2014 shows that norms alone are not enough to 
deliver global health security. The problematic Ebola response highlights two limits to 
the power of norms in global health governance: the hierarchy of competing norms in 
global health where norms are given value through financial assistance, and the 
weakness of institutional norm custodians in delivering on their own agenda. Defenders 
of the response to Ebola frame it as a classic collective action problem of devolved 
responsibility and the reliance of international institutions on member state action: 
however Ebola was different in that, albeit delayed, key states and institutions did 
demonstrate a will to act and to do so separately from the custodian of the norm of 
global health security, the WHO. Normative commitment to global health security is 
undermined when the very institution that is seen to have created the norm shows little 
political will to safeguard it. Norms alone will not save people from diseases such as 
Ebola: political will to act, financial assistance for delivering health security, and 
institutional leadership that is not afraid to admit to mistakes will.   
 
 
 
 
Sophie Harman is Reader in International Relations in the School of Politics and 
International Relations, Queen Mary University of London. 
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Fear, Apathy, and the Ebola Crisis (2014-15):  
Psychology and Problems of Global Health Governance  
 
Andrew Price-Smith and Jackson Porreca 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
In March 2014 an 18 month-old boy died of the Ebola Zaire virus in the town of 
Meliandou, Guinea, near the porous borders of Sierra Leone and Liberia. The virus 
would soon spread inexorably throughout these three nations, moving from rural 
areas to the major cities, and rapidly overwhelming the health care system in these 
nations. The Ebola epidemic also constituted a significant threat to governance in the 
affected polities, and the chaos that the virus generated was ultimately deemed to be 
a threat to national security by policy elites in the region, and to international 
security by powerful actors including the USA and the United Nations Security 
Council. The Ebola epidemic of 2014-15 also generated considerable socio-political 
destabilization throughout West Africa. From the index case in Guinea the contagion 
spread rapidly throughout West Africa, and thereafter it generated a sub-epidemic in 
Nigeria (20 cases), sparked minor outbreaks in Mali, Senegal, and resulted in small 
clusters of cases in Spain and the USA. While the international spread of the virus 
has now been largely contained, the diffusion of cases to Europe and North America 
illustrates the complexities of global health in the age of complex interdependence. 
As of September 9, 2015, the international community had witnessed 28,141 cases of 
Ebola, and circa 11, 291 deaths attributed to the virus.i   
Problematically, the virus appears to be endemic to portions of sub-Saharan 
Africa, a zoonosis that appears to exist in reservoirs of bats that range in a belt from 
West Africa through the DRC over to Uganda.ii  Thus, Ebola cannot be ‘eradicated’ 
from the region in any conventional sense of the term, and one may reasonably 
expect sporadic epidemics of the virus in the years to come.  
 The epidemic revealed many cracks in the systems responsible for global 
health governance. We argue that persistent problems in global health governance 
emanate from psychological processes that often affect structural and institutional 
responses, processes revealed in the Ebola epidemic of 2014-15. Specifically, we 
argue that effective political responses to contagion are often limited by the 
Fear/Apathy Cycle, an incessant oscillation between fear-induced (and often 
draconian) responses to emergent pathogens, and subsequent periods of apathy 
wherein policy makers (and civil society) become excessively sanguine about threats 
to public health. We argue that the Fear/Apathy Cycle contributed to the deficient 
initial response of many international organizations (particularly the World Health 
Organization), and that the Cycle also contributed to profound problems of 
governance within affected states during the Ebola epidemic of 2014-15.   
 
THE FEAR/APATHY CYCLE 
 
Fear and other powerful affective states tend to overwhelm the rational centers of the 
mind.iii  Thus, people frequently exhibit highly irrational responses to epidemic 
disease, driving them to engage in behavior ranging from denial, to hoarding, to 
rioting and violence. Humans seem to display a perennial psychological oscillation in 
their attitudes towards epidemic disease; exhibiting long periods of apathy towards 
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the microbial realm (and global health preparedness), only to be followed by affect-
induced panic and despair when an epidemic finally manifests among us. Ultimately, 
as the epidemic in question abates, the level of fear declines and is once more 
replaced by a widespread state of apathy. It is interesting then, that the influence of 
psychology, and particularly the influence of emotion (particularly fear), has received 
so little attention in the scholarship on global health governance. As such, we 
propose a new agenda regarding the effects of psychology upon global health 
governance, with particular application to political responses to epidemics.  
As a defining characteristic of the international system, anarchy has often 
contributed to fear of the ‘other,’ particularly as one could not know the intentions of 
the other. The history of international relations is replete with references to fear, and 
the powerful and negative effects that such emotion can have upon decision-making. 
Thucydides argued that it was Spartan fear of the rising power of Athens that 
ultimately led to the Peloponnesian War.iv  Similarly, the superpowers’ mutually 
expressed fears of the other led to the destructive era of the Cold War. This was 
expressed by the political scientist Thomas Schelling who wrote that fear of the 
‘other’ could result in disastrous consequences that neither party desired.v  This fear 
reached its zenith during the Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962 wherein the world 
faced the specter of nuclear annihilation at the hands of the superpowers.vi   In the 
domain of theory, Herbert Simon began to question the orthodoxy of rational 
decision-making by policy elites during the 1950s.vii  The political scientist Robert 
Jervis questioned the orthodox narrative of decision-maker rationality in the mid-
1970s, arguing that perception and misperception could alter political calculations, 
but also arguing that affective states (i.e. emotions) could alter elite decision-making 
in a negative fashion.viii During the 1990s social scientists began to explore the 
implications of hot-cognitive models of decision-making, wherein affect could alter 
decision-making in multiple ways.ix  After the attacks of September 11th 2001 the 
politics of fear were manifest among US decision-makers.x  In this case the 
ubiquitous fear of further terrorist attacks, coupled with a desire for revenge against 
the perpetrators, led the United States into a series of unfortunate wars in 
Afghanistan (2001) and then in Iraq (2003).xi 
 
FEAR AND PSYCHE 
 
Fear seems to be an evolutionary response that often contributes to the survival of 
the organism in question. In humans, fear appears to be a response produced in the 
region of the brain that tends to govern emotions, known as the amygdala.xii  
Emotions can produce a significant (and often counterproductive) effect on decision-
making and judgment, and thus we increasingly utilize affect-laden models of hot 
cognition that inform the decision-making calculus of policymakers. Human 
cognition appears to be subject to ‘dual processing’; such that people process 
information through two distinct cognitive systems. The primary processing system 
appears to be associated with intuition, and the secondary system is associated with 
reasoning.xiii  In addition, the primary system appears to be highly associated with 
experience, such that people experiencing problems or stimuli develop reflexive or 
automatic mechanisms for processing information, or heuristics.xiv  This is consistent 
with the ‘cognitive miser’ hypothesis that individuals frequently use heuristics to 
process information rapidly.xv  Consequently, one starting point for understanding 
the fear that epidemics produce, and their effects on decision-making, is the 
availability heuristic.xvi  According to this heuristic, or mental rule of thumb, people 
base their decisions in the present upon the lessons they have derived from past 
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experiences. The legal scholar Cass Sunstein argues, “…the problem is that the 
availability heuristic can lead to serious errors of fact, in term of both excessive 
reactions to small risks that are cognitively available and insufficient reactions to 
large risks that are not.”xvii  In the domain of international politics the availability 
heuristic is often associated with the ubiquitous problem of reasoning by false 
analogy, wherein policymakers inaccurately compare a current crisis to those of the 
past, and consequently err in their assessment of the problem, and in their 
recommendations for alleviation of said problem. 
 The availability heuristic seems to have contributed to the mismanagement of 
the ebola crisis of 2014-15.  This results from the fact that prior epidemics of ebola 
zaire exhibited certain properties of limited duration, and rapid containment, 
properties that led policymakers to expect that these patterns would be replicated 
once again during the crisis of 2014-15. For example, prior epidemics of ebola zaire 
exhibited a pattern of extreme pathogenic virulence, which resulted in the rapid 
mortality of the infected. The rapid and exceptional mortality generated by the 
disease did not allow for rapid geographical expansion of the epidemic beyond the 
immediate epicenter of original transmission.xviii  As such, most prior epidemics of 
the virus were contained with a relative degree of ease (at least vis-a-vis the epidemic 
of 2015), and policymakers may have assumed that the future would look like the 
past. As a result, the availability heuristic may have led policymakers in the WHO 
(and elsewhere) to initially assume that the Ebola epidemic of 2015 would not spread 
beyond the confines of West Africa, and that it would be contained with a modicum 
of effort.  
 Fear-induced miscalculations may also derive from “probability neglect,” 
wherein decision-makers neglect the probability that the worst case of a given 
scenario will actually occur.xix  Probability neglect is bi-modal, in that it can 
contribute to both excessive fear or to apathy, and thus it pervades the entirety of the 
Fear/Apathy Cycle. 
Probability neglect is a cognitive bias that is exacerbated by conditions of 
uncertainty, wherein decision-makers tend to exhibit a curious manner of thinking 
that emphasizes the poles at either end of a continuum of possibilities.xx  Thus, when 
confronted by epidemic disease, decision-makers tend to embrace the most extreme 
positions when it comes to probability, either that the epidemic will not occur (or 
that it will be utterly inconsequential), or the other extreme wherein the epidemic 
will be utterly devastating, exhibiting properties of extreme lethality coupled with 
rapid geographical spread. Thus, decision-makers tend to ignore the vast range of 
probabilities between these two poles, which consequently leaves them vulnerable to 
the fear-apathy cycle. Cass Sunstein argues that “when intense emotions are 
engaged, people tend to focus on the adverse outcome, not its likelihood. They are 
not closely attuned to the probability that harm will occur. They emphasize worst-
case scenarios. The result is to produce serious distortions for both individuals and 
societies.”xxi  He continues, “…when emotions are intense, calculation is less likely to 
occur, or at least that form of calculation that involves assessment of risks in terms of 
not only the severity but also the probability of the outcome.”xxii   
 Consequently, then, the availability heuristic would seem to reinforce patterns 
of probability neglect. When humans are confronted by an epidemic, particularly one 
that involves an emergent pathogen that we have not seen before (or a novel variant 
of a known pathogen), the population will tend to focus on scenarios of mass 
mortality, rapid global spread, economic turmoil, and political chaos, even though 
the actual probability of such an eventuality is usually remote. These distortions are 
probably aggravated by what we might call the Hollywood effect, wherein films such 
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as “Outbreak” and “Contagion” depict mass deaths resulting from some previously 
unknown virus. Given that most political decision-makers lack any substantive 
knowledge in the domains of microbiology or public health the availability heuristic 
comes into play, and that heuristic may be based upon inaccurate information that 
people have gleaned from news media. Thus, the availability heuristic reinforces the 
bi-modal response consistent with probability neglect, a response of either apathy or 
fear. The problem with the latter response is that intense fear and panic may 
contribute to excessive (even draconian) responses by certain polities in an attempt 
to contain the epidemic, and to contain social destabilization generated by the fear. 
Consequently the state may engage in securitization of the epidemic, the suspension 
of human rights, and the overt use of force against a given population, in order to 
maintain cordons sanitaires and quarantine. Such draconian responses were 
observed in West Africa during the Ebola epidemic of 2014-15, when the 
international medical community could not provide sufficient control of the 
pathogen at the outset of the epidemic. 
 
APATHY 
 
In the early years of the twenty first century the dominant mode of conceptualizing 
global public health (at least for the vast majority of people) is apathy. Most people in 
the developed nations feel that they are largely immune to the ravages of infectious 
disease, largely as they assume that antibiotics, antivirals, and the (relatively) robust 
health care infrastructures of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) nations mitigate the spread of epidemics.  
Apathy is consistent with probability neglect, in that decision-makers exhibit a 
bi-modal conceptualization of possible outcomes, but this tends to be weighted 
towards the pole that conceptualizes the most benign outcome. Apathy is also 
consistent with the availability heuristic, in the sense that we conceptualize the 
probability of future epidemics based upon recent ones, with which we have 
familiarity. Given that the SARS epidemic occurred in 2003 and exhibited low 
mortality, the other most familiar epidemic to decision-makers in 2014-15 was that 
of the ‘swine flu’ epidemic of 2010, which also exhibited much lower mortality than 
projected by the WHO. Unfortunately, most policymakers held that the global health 
community, and particularly the WHO had overreacted to the swine flu epidemic. 
Consequently, the availability heuristic dictated that decision-makers would initially 
see the ebola epidemic as easily contained and inconsequential. As a result of the 
availability heuristic, modern humans may be pre-disposed towards an initial base 
state that emphasizes the excessively benign (or minimalist) pole of the distribution 
of possibilities, wherein epidemics are thought to be rare, and typically 
inconsequential. Thus, probability neglect may also contribute to a state of apathy 
among policymakers regarding the containment of epidemics.  
 
FEAR AND DISEASE 
 
One significant problem with emergent pathogens is that the exact probability of 
virulence, transmissibility, and potential for genetic mutability are essentially 
unknown.xxiii  The inability to accurately estimate probability contributes to 
uncertainty, and then to fear. This often results in the widespread use of the 
availability heuristic in combination with probability neglect to generate a bi-modal 
response, one of denial and apathy, or of fear and overreaction. 
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Historically, human beings have often exhibited curious (and often highly 
irrational) reactions to outbreaks of infectious disease. The manifestation of an 
epidemic would induce panic in the afflicted population, and yet when the affliction 
had passed the populace would soon return to life as if nothing untoward had 
occurred. This hoary phenomenon, this perpetual oscillation between apathy and 
fear, can be traced back as far as Thucydides’ chronicle of the Plague of Athens, 
which struck during the Peloponnesian War.xxiv  He documents the hysteria and 
chaos generated by ‘the plague’ as it struck Athens in 430 BC, stating, “The bodies of 
the dying were heaped one on top of the other, and half-dead creatures could be seen 
staggering about in the streets….For the catastrophe was so overwhelming that men, 
not knowing what would next happen to them, became indifferent to every rule of 
religion or law. Athens owed to the plague a state of unprecedented lawlessness.”xxv   
 The Black Death (yersina pestis), as it struck polities across Europe and the 
Levant during the Middle Ages (post-1347), also wrought panic wherever it 
manifested,xxvi  and the ravages of the plague are documented in the writings of 
Niccolo Machiavelli who endured the contagion as it struck Florence.  
 
Our pitiful Florence now looks like nothing but a town which has been 
stormed by the infidels and now forsaken. One part of the inhabitants…have 
retired to the distant country; one part is dead, and yet another part is 
dying. Thus the present is torment, the future menace, so we contend with 
death and only live in fear and trembling. The clean fine streets which 
formerly teemed with rich and noble citizens are now stinking and dirty…. 
Shops and inns are closed, at the factories work has ceased, the law courts 
are empty, the laws are trampled on. The squares, the market places… have 
now been converted into graves and into the resort of a wicked rabble.xxvii   
 
 Historians have also chronicled the fear and chaos that gripped Europe as the 
Second cholera pandemic swept across the Continent in the 1830s. The cholera 
epidemics led to pathos, to widespread scapegoating of ‘the other’ as a vector of 
contagion, and to hysteria and violence. Richard Evans notes that the march of 
cholera across Europe was “marked by a string of riots and disturbances in almost 
every country it affected.  Riots, massacres and the destruction of property took place 
across Russia, swept through the Habsburg Empire…and spread to Britain next 
year.”xxviii   Similarly, the historian Roderick McGrew argues “the hysteria focused on 
particular scapegoats. The most popular villains were Polish agents and foreigners in 
general, though both physicians and government officials were also included. By 
mid-summer a mass phobia had set in which affected the educated and the illiterate 
alike…. For the masses a spirit of evil had entered the land, and no one was 
immune.”xxix  
 This hoary phenomenon of fear-induced socio-political and economic 
destabilization is not relegated to the dustbins of the past, indeed the fear that is 
generated by epidemics cuts across time and across cultures, and it seems to be 
global in its manifestation. Case in point, the fear associated with the initial 
emergence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the early 1980s resulted in the significant 
and widespread stigmatization of minorities, and in the creation of frequently 
oppressive policies towards infected peoples. The SARS epidemic is also illustrative 
as the emergent coronavirus struck the Pacific Rim nations in 2002-03. Fear induced 
destabilization was apparent again during the SARS event, and it resulted in the 
widespread stigmatization of minorities, particularly those of Asian descent.xxx  Fear 
also functioned as the principal mechanism to derail trade between nations of the 
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Pacific Rim in the spring of 2003, which in turn generated circa $50 billion in 
economic damage.xxxi  Ultimately the destabilization generated by SARS would 
eventually spur the revisions of the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 
2005.xxxii  However, the lessons of the SARS epidemic: that emerging viruses 
continued to threaten prosperity and governance, and that the OECD nations needed 
to invest in global disease surveillance capacity, and in the public health 
infrastructure of the developing world, were largely forgotten by policymakers in 
2014. 
Despite the fact that SARS resulted in the reformation of treaties such as the 
IHR, it did not result in a substantive shift of resources from the OECD nations to the 
least developed countries (LDCs) in order to improve public health infrastructure, 
and this is particularly true of the impoverished nations of West Africa. This is likely 
due to policymakers’ reversion to the minimalist or apathetic state, as they dismissed 
the probability of another severe international epidemic. Thus, while international 
law proceeded to integrate nations in the domain of global health, this concord was 
not matched by substantive flows of resources from the OECD nations to augment 
surveillance capacity, or to create a robust and resilient domestic health care 
infrastructure in impoverished nations (beds, nurses, physicians, supplies) so crucial 
to the containment of emerging infectious diseases.  
 Humans are shocked out of their apathetic state by epidemics (e.g. ebola and 
SARS), and are often overwhelmed by fear (particularly as it is stoked by 
unscrupulous actors in the media). However, once the contagion has passed it fades 
quickly in peoples’ memories, the lessons gleaned from past epidemics are quickly 
forgotten, and investments in global health infrastructure and personnel are fleeting. 
In order to illustrate this point, we conducted a brief review of the way in which three 
select pathogens were covered in international print media and explored by the 
academic community. Using LexisNexis, a well-known online database of major print 
media outlets from around the globe, the terms “Ebola”, “severe acute respiratory 
syndrome” (SARS), and “bird flu” were searched to gain an idea of the number of 
articles covering these pathogens printed in each given year for the time period 1995-
2015. The three terms were then entered into Academic Search Complete, an online 
indexing and abstracting service published EBSCO, in order to approximate the 
number of peer-reviewed articles published on these subjects in each given year for 
the same twenty year period, 1995-2015. Although many databases like it exist, 
Academic Search Complete was an obvious choice because it contains references 
from 10,110 peer-reviewed journals in a wide variety of humanities, science, and 
social science fields.xxxiii  Admittedly these databases do not encompass all possible 
publications on infectious disease,xxxiv  but our objective was to demonstrate broad 
trends that reflect the persistence of the Fear/Apathy Cycle, and not to provide a 
precise count of every article ever published on Ebola, SARS, or avian influenza. 
 Our hypothesis, that media is primarily interested in the threat of dangerous 
pathogens as an acute threat, was clearly supported by the data. Indeed, mainstream 
print media provided little coverage of pathogens such as Ebola, SARS, and avian 
influenza until an outbreak occurred, at which point they began covering these 
pathogens extensively, but for a bounded period of time. Following the containment 
of a given outbreak, media interest again declines significantly. Ebola is perhaps the 
most striking example of this trend, as the LexisNexis search identified only nineteen 
news articles written on the pathogen prior to February 2014, and 972 published 
since the West African outbreak began. As the scatter plot below illustrates, the news 
media was apathetic to the threat of all three pathogens prior to the onset of an acute 
epidemic. As expected, coverage of the SARS coronavirus was vast following the 
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disease’s discovery and initial outbreak in 2003-2004 (801 articles published during 
that biennium), but quickly dropped off in 2005, when only 11 articles appear to have 
been written on the subject. Indeed, (aside from SARS) the news media exhibited 
apathy on the topic of lethal coronaviruses until late 2012, when MERS, a 
coronavirus with a genetic profile that is relatively similar to SARS, began stoking 
fears as it emerged in the Arabian peninsula.xxxv   Avian influenza (H5N1) also follows 
this trend, with little media coverage prior to the pathogen’s spread to Europe in 
2005 (forty-nine articles written 1995-2004), after which it was widely written about 
until the outbreak was contained (637 articles written 2005-06). A plateau in 
coverage set in from 2007 to 2012-13 when coverage once gain increased to reflect 
mounting cases of bird flu in Asia (193 written 2007-present). The plot on the 
following page provides a telling graphic of these trends.xxxvi  
 Discouragingly, academia seems similarly prone to the psychological 
oscillations inherent in the Fear/Apathy Cycle. Our review of articles published by 
Academic Search Complete demonstrated that academic studies regarding ebola, 
SARS, and H5N1 avian influenza occurred with much higher frequency in the years 
immediately following an outbreak (with lag time resulting from the peer review 
process). While Ebola’s unique properties and highly pathogenic profile resulted in a 
degree of scholarly interest prior to the 2014 outbreak, the scope of this scholarship 
pales in comparison to the wave of publications we have observed in the past two 
years. Academic Search Complete revealed 1,101 references containing “ebola” from 
1995-2013, an average of approximately 61 publications per year. This scholarship 
increased by an order of magnitude following the epidemic in West Africa, as 646 
publications focused on Ebola in 2014, and 988 references have already been 
cataloged for 2015. Analysis of scholarly work concerning SARS and avian influenza 
unsurprisingly also conformed to trends consistent with the Fear/Apathy cycle, with 
references to SARS diminishing greatly and relatively consistently as time passed 
following the 2003 outbreak. Spikes in scholarly work regarding avian influenza 
occurred in 2006 (following the European outbreak of 2005), and again in 2013, 
although the academic community has remained more engaged with this topic than 
ebola and SARS. Presumably this is due to the sustained history of recent human and 
animal outbreaks of avian influenza.xxxvii  
 Thus, the print media and the academic community would seem to approach 
the issue of dangerous pathogens in the bi-modal manner that is consistent with the 
Fear/Apathy Cycle. During times of epidemic disease the general population typically 
takes its cues from the media as to what constitute threats to their security at a given 
moment. Thus, the bi-modal response of the media contributes to a similarly bi-
modal attitude (apathy or panic) among the general population, which may then 
influence elected representatives in a similar manner. Policymakers often determine 
the saliency of topics based upon the magnitude of media coverage that the issue 
attracts, and those issues that rise to the top of the media agenda are often placed 
high on the calendar of discussions in Congress, and in the Executive branch.xxxvii 
Furthermore, policymakers often rely on the research generated by academics in 
order to formulate effective public policies and govern effectively.xxxix Thus, if 
variance in academic publication reflects the Fear/Apathy cycle it may act as a 
mechanism to influence policymakers in a similar manner, one that reflects the bi-
modal patterns delineated by the Cycle.xl 
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Table 1.1: Incidence of News Reports on Select Pathogens, 1995 to the Present  
 
 
Table 1.2: Incidence of Peer-Reviewed Articles on Select Pathogens, 1995-Present  
 
 
 One must be cautious in interpreting the above data. The oscillation in both 
media attention, and academic investigation, is to be expected to a degree in the 
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wake of a global health crisis. While the data above is suggestive that the 
Fear/Apathy cycle holds across the separate domains of academe and journalism, we 
cannot conclude a priori that this effect automatically influences the domain of 
political decision-making to the same extent. However, given that the political sphere 
is highly influenced by academic experts, and by media coverage, we hypothesize that 
the Fear/Apathy Cycle should result in similar patterns in public policy-making as 
well. We leave this particular empirical investigation to subsequent research teams, 
as it is beyond the scope of this particular essay. In the sections below we do 
investigate the effects of fear and apathy upon decision-making in the domain of 
health at the domestic and international levels. 
 
EBOLA, FEAR AND PROBLEMS IN GOVERNANCE (DOMESTIC LEVEL) 
 
Although the psychology of epidemics has long been an area of interest to historians 
it has yet to be seriously addressed by political scientists working in the domain of 
health governance. There are several mechanisms that may play a role in the socio-
economic destabilization that occurs at the domestic level during a particularly 
intense epidemic, such as the Ebola epidemic of 2014-15. Fear of disease may become 
exacerbated as a result of social cascades. Cass Sunstein argues that through such 
cascades “people pay attention to the fear expressed by others, in a way that can lead 
to the rapid transmission of a belief, even if false, that a risk is quite serious. Fear, 
like many other emotions, can be contagious; cascades help to explain why.”  In the 
case of the Ebola epidemic, social cascades would seem to have played a role in the 
propagation of fear, both within communities and between nations.xli   During the 
epidemic social cascades were amplified by the international media, and by social 
media, contributing to the formation of in-group/out-group dynamics, which 
frequently resulted in the denigration or even demonization of ‘the other.’ This led 
many outside the African context to mistakenly scapegoat all West Africans as 
vectors of ebola transmission. Simultaneously, in the afflicted nations of West Africa 
rumors were rife that foreigners were deliberately spreading the virus in an effort to 
wipe out local populations. Ultimately, such fears of the ‘other’ contributed to 
physical assaults on aid workers throughout the region, and led to the murder of a 
team of 11 aid workers in Guinea.xlii   
 At the turn of the century certain political scientists warned that epidemic 
disease could produce a range of negative externalities that could undermine state 
capacity, and radiate across nations to generate considerable political, social, and 
economic instability.xliii   Fear was recognized in this literature as a principal driver of 
socio-political and economic destabilization. Historically, such fear-induced 
instability often manifested in the form of demonstrations and rioting against the 
state, particularly as the intensification of the epidemic resulted in the populace 
questioning the legitimacy of political elites, and questioning the ability of the 
government to provide public goods.xliv  Price-Smith (2001, 2009) argued that severe 
epidemics could foster widespread internal political and economic disruption, to the 
extent that political elites might see disease as an existential threat to the security of 
their nations. Such threats might then motivate political elites to employ strategies of 
social distancing, and in extreme cases to use military forces to maintain ‘order’ and 
to fight the contagion.xlv   The Ebola epidemic of 2014-15 empirically demonstrated 
that fear and panic could generate widespread destabilization in affected polities, and 
that such polities would consequently employ contagionist and often draconian 
mechanisms in an attempt to restore political order, and to slow transmission of the 
pathogen.  
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 The ebola epidemic also brought to light significant problems associated with 
widespread perceptions of governmental illegitimacy in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and 
Liberia.xlvi For example, both Sierra Leone and Liberia have been bedeviled with 
problems of governance that emanate from the legacies of civil war, and social 
segmentation, that have dominated those polities over the past 30 years.xlvii   Guinea 
has been dominated by draconian governments that have yet to earn the trust of the 
population as well, and like its neighbors, the country has been plagued with violence 
since gaining independence in 1958.xlviii   Thus, in these nations governmental elites 
suffer from perceptions of corruption and illegitimacy, which consequently makes it 
difficult for the government to communicate effectively with the population during 
times of crisis.xlix   On a psychological level the pervasive mistrust of the state would 
seem to have contributed to problems in communication between the government 
and the population during the Ebola crisis, which magnified levels of uncertainty and 
consequently amplified the level of fear in the region. 
  During the Ebola epidemic we observed a pernicious feedback loop wherein 
low levels of endogenous state capacity (poor healthcare infrastructure) allowed for 
the flourishing of a dangerous pathogen which in turn eroded state capacity even 
further, necessitating external intervention by the international community in order 
to stem the cycle of destruction. Ebola eroded state capacity in these polities through 
a number of mechanisms. First and foremost, the Ebola virus degraded the already 
flimsy health care infrastructure in these affected countries, by sickening and killing 
doctors and nurses,l  by generating such fear that health providers fled their posts,li  
and by the diversion of scarce health care resources to the treatment of Ebola (and 
away from other health concerns).lii  Hospitals frequently came to be seen as 
abbatoirs, and not places of healing. While the erosion of state capacity during a 
crisis is problematic, the deaths of physicians and nurses (coupled with the fear-
induced desertion of their posts) amplified the fear of the disease among the general 
population. 
Although their responses varied slightly during the crisis, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea (what we shall call the GSLL countries), all employed social 
distancing strategies as a means to limit the transmission of the virus. This entailed 
the mass closure of schools and churches, suspension of sporting events, closure of 
public areas (e.g. beaches), and even the closure of certain businesses. Moreover, the 
GSLL governments employed draconian means to stem the spread of the epidemic, 
specifically employing quarantines and cordons sanitaires in order to limit the 
movement of citizens that may have been infected with the virus.liii  Such draconian 
policies were put in place to slow the movement of the pathogen through the 
population, but these heavy-handed responses often served to amplify the fear and 
societal disorder that was observed in the GSLL nations. Further, these restrictions 
often exacerbated the extant mistrust between the populace and the state, and 
resulted in widespread rioting in urban centers such as Monrovia and Freetown.liv  
The economic cost of infectious disease outbreaks is driven primarily by 
aversion behavior (fear), which is comprised of both individual actions undertaken in 
order to avoid infection and actions taken by investors outside the zone of exposure 
in anticipation of these individual choices. The recent Ebola outbreak provides an 
example of aversion behavior as it compromises the economic vitality of an afflicted 
polity or region. Interestingly, aversion behavior seems to exhibit a greater long-term 
effect on investors than upon those individuals directly exposed to infection. Thus, 
even as workers return to their jobs and micro-level economic activity resumes, the 
major investments needed to spur full recovery remain elusive. Those who live and 
work well outside the zone of exposure have little incentive to re-engage with the 
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area, even as the situation improves. One example of this phenomenon is the 
negative effect that Ebola has had on tourism revenues, in both West Africa and the 
continent at-large. Although not a single case of Ebola Zaire has been recorded in 
Gambia, the government reported that 65 percent of hotel bookings and 50 percent 
of incoming flights were cancelled in the first quarter of 2015. Other popular 
destinations far from West Africa such as Tanzania, Kenya, and South Africa also 
experienced widespread cancellations, to the degree that the World Bank projects 
$550 million in foregone GDP for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2015.lv  Even as the situation 
on the ground in the E3 countries improves and those in the immediate vicinity 
rationally decide to return to work, many throughout the world seem likely to 
continue avoiding engagement with the region. 
 The Ebola epidemic also generated widespread declines in agricultural 
production, among the GSLL countries. Moreover, the fear-induced quarantines and 
cordons that were implemented by the respective GSLL governments prevented the 
movement of peoples, and this meant that many agricultural laborers were unable to 
get to their jobs in the fields. As a result, many of the crops in the region rotted, or 
had not been cared for, leading to enormous losses for the agricultural sector. A 
February 2015 survey conducted by the World Bank Group in Liberia indicated that 
nearly 65 percent of agricultural households expected their harvest to be smaller 
than it was in the previous year. The cultivation of traditional cash crops such as 
rubber and cocoa have been particularly hard hit by the epidemic, with only about 
half of Liberian households that harvested rubber in the previous year indicating that 
they have been able to do so at all since the start of the Ebola outbreak.lvi  Another 
significant shortcoming of the regional quarantines was that they restricted the 
movement of food throughout restricted regions, such that families within the 
quarantine zones were often deprived of food. This insecurity of food supply seems to 
have magnified the fear that people experienced, as they grew concerned about both 
the virus and starvation. 
 Food security and the provision of basic services remains fragile throughout 
the region as a result of both diminished incomes, and the lack of availability of 
goods due to the decline in agricultural production. Since the epidemic began, more 
than circa 90 percent of households interviewed by the World Bank in the GSLL 
countries cited food insecurity as a concern, and nearly 85 percent of respondents in 
Liberia indicated that they had engaged in costly coping strategies such as selling 
assets, borrowing money, delaying investments, spending savings, or even sending 
children to live elsewhere.lvii   
 Trade also declined as the fear of contagion drove neighboring countries (e.g. 
Cote D’Ivoire) to close their borders to goods and personnel coming from the GSLL 
nations, and many ships declined to dock in GSLL ports. Collectively, this fear-
induced behavior led to widespread economic stagnation, and even contraction, of 
the economies of the GSLL in 2014, and is predicted to generate significant and 
negative effects through early 2015 as well. Indeed, the World Bank argues that the 
epidemic cut the growth rates of the GDP of the GSLL nations by more than half in 
2014. Full year 2014 growth fell by an estimated 0.5 percent from a pre-outbreak 
estimate of 4.5 percent in Guinea, to 2.2 percent from an expected 5.9 percent in 
Liberia, and most strikingly, to 4.0 percent from an expected 11.3 percent in Sierra 
Leone. Even as infection rates declined and workers returned to their jobs, this 
economic contraction eroded the confidence of investors, and the World Bank 
projects that growth rates in the GSLL countries for 2015 will be -0.2 percent in 
Guinea, 3.0 percent in Liberia, and -2.0 percent in Sierra Leone.lviii   
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FEAR, APATHY AND PROBLEMS IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: 
 
Given that the Fear/Apathy Cycle appears to undermine effective governance within 
states afflicted by serious epidemics, we posit that it may also generate negative 
effects upon global health governance. The cycle would seem to negatively affect the 
decision-making capacity of elites in regards to epidemics. This seems to have led 
decision-makers to adopt a Manichean perspective during the Ebola epidemic; one 
consistent with probability neglect and the availability heuristic, a bipolar 
distribution of probabilities with an emphasis on the event (a serious epidemic) 
either not occurring at all, or being of little consequence.  
The Director General of the World Health Organization, Margaret Chan, 
appears to have succumbed to the two specific dimensions of the Fear/Apathy Cycle 
that we have identified above, notably to the availability heuristic, and to probability 
neglect. In fact, multiple sectors of the WHO seem to have been vulnerable in this 
regard. For example, both decision-makers in AFRO WHO and in WHO Geneva 
seem to have succumbed to the availability heuristic and probability neglect during 
the early weeks of the epidemic. An estimation of Ebola based mortality and 
geographic spread, as based on the patterns exhibited in prior Ebola Zaire epidemics, 
contributed to thinking that the epidemic would simply burn itself out, or that it 
would not become a significant threat to global health. Thus, in this case the 
availability heuristic led policymakers to the inaccurate conclusion that the present 
epidemic would emulate the past. However, the Ebola epidemic of 2014-15 did not do 
so, as mortality rates were somewhat lower (which presumably allowed for wider 
distribution of the pathogen by infected hosts), and thus the absolute scale of 
infection and geographic spread were at least an order of magnitude greater than 
previously observed Ebola epidemics. Consequently, the obvious problem for policy 
makers is that the future may not look like the past, particularly when dealing with 
pathogens that exhibit a substantive capacity for genetic variance (such as influenza 
filoviruses). Our assumptions of the behavior of natural systems may be based upon 
what we see as linear trends, when in fact natural systems are often chaotic and non-
linear, and may shift rapidly to new equilibria, ones that we have not seen before. 
The WHO leadership, in both Geneva and Brazzaville, failed to include such a ‘Black 
Swan’ event within their calculations.lix  In addition it would seem that the decision-
makers in WHO collectively engaged in probability neglect, holding that the most 
probably manifestation of Ebola Zaire would occur at the minimalist pole of the 
distribution of probabilities. In other words, probability neglect combined with the 
availability heuristic to generate the conclusion that the epidemic would be brief, and 
largely inconsequential. 
 Furthermore, the Fear/Apathy Cycle appears to undercut the resources 
allocated by policymakers to deal with pathogenic threats to global health. As a 
consequence of the apathy generated by the Cycle the WHO has been subject to 
serious budget cuts over the past decade, particularly since the global economic 
contraction of 2008-10. Moreover, in terms of the funding that WHO does receive 
(from member states and wealthy individuals) the allocation of resources (in terms of 
funding and staff) within WHO has shifted towards chronic illness, and away from 
control of communicable diseases.lx  This is consistent with the dynamics of the 
Fear/Apathy Cycle as policymakers minimize or neglect the probability of a serious 
epidemic that constitutes a threat to global public health. In addition, this shift in 
resource prioritization of chronic disease reflects the interests of the OECD nations 
that had come to feel insulated from the specter of infectious disease. Policymakers 
in the developed world would seem to have discounted the probability of a serious 
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Ebola epidemic emerging, of the probability that said epidemic could spread rapidly 
via airplane, and that such an epidemic would resist containment at its epicenter for 
some period of time. 
 Barring some dramatic institutional change, as the ebola epidemic recedes in 
time the Fear/Apathy Cycle will once again lead to a decline in funding for WHO staff 
dedicated to the surveillance and containment of emergent pathogens at the 
international and regional levels. Consequently, the Cycle may undermine global 
health governance through its negative long-term effect on resource flows to global 
health infrastructure, to the WHO, through bilateral grants to receiving states, and 
through NGOs. Fortunately, the WHO Executive Board met on Jan 25th, 2015, and 
approved a $100 million contingency fund for epidemic response, and the 
establishment of a permanent global health emergency workforce.lxi   The formation 
of the contingency fund will remove some of the fiscal encumbrances that inhibited 
the mobilization of the WHO during the early months of the epidemic, and the 
organization can now be proactive about raising funds for emergencies instead of 
having to go cap in hand to donor states at the height of a crisis.  
 The Fear/Apathy Cycle may also undermine effective compliance with the 
International Health Regulations. As the availability heuristic leads policymakers to 
expect epidemics that resemble past manifestations, and probability neglect leads 
policymakers to a Manichean manner of thinking that typically emphasizes the most 
benign scenario, we expect that the attention of policymakers to global public health 
will wane once again in a few years. While the initial response to the Ebola epidemic 
will be to ramp up investments in global health, we expect this to be short-lived, and 
to gradually decline once more, resulting in a dearth of surveillance and response 
capacity throughout much of the developing world. Thus, it is problematic to simply 
rely on international norms, regulations and treaties to alleviate global health crises 
resulting from epidemics. Clearly the efficacy of treaties like the International Health 
Regulations are compromised when the Fear/Apathy Cycle erodes sustained 
resource flows to the states of the developing world in order to build adequate 
pathogenic surveillance and response capacity.lxii    
 A caveat here, it is not just surveillance and laboratory capacity that is 
required for effective response to epidemics like Ebola; the polity in question must 
possess a robust and resilient health care infrastructure replete with hospitals, beds, 
nurses, physicians, medicines and supplies. In the case of the Ebola epidemic 
endogenous surveillance capacity would not have been enough to contain the spread 
of the pathogen, as the dearth of health infrastructure in West Africa facilitated the 
spread of the virus throughout the populations of the GSLL nations. While Paul 
Farmer argues that such inequities in capacity are primarily structural, a direct result 
of the crushing poverty that encumbers the peoples of the least developed economies, 
we argue that the Fear/Apathy Cycle is a psychological variable that may combine 
with these structural problems to impede sustained development of global public 
health infrastructure.lxiii   
 It would seem that the Fear/Apathy Cycle contributes to a Punctuated 
Equilibrium (PE) pattern of institutional development in the domain of global health 
governance. Within this PE model of institutional change, one sees a phase of apathy 
(equilibrium 1), which is destabilized by an exogenous shock (epidemic), this phase 
of turbulence is then followed by a wave of institutional building (or upgrading) 
which then leads to another period of rough stasis (equilibrium 2) that is once again 
characterized by apathy.lxiv   The PE model is not orthagonal to functionalist modelslxv  
that describe an incremental process of institution building (muddling through), 
although the functionalist processes will typically be observed during phases of 
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equilibrium in the PE model. Thus, we propose a model of both rapid and slower 
phases of institutional change, one that is moderated by the Fear/Apathy Cycle to a 
degree. The political scientist Stephen Krasner cast doubt on the incremental 
functionalist position when he argued, “studies of political development point to 
differential rates of change in social and political structures over time.”lxvi   Further 
support for such models comes in the work of Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones 
who argue that PE models effectively explain the rate and magnitude of change in the 
domestic political institutions of the USA.lxvii  The political economist Douglass North 
has also remarked upon such discontinuous change in processes of institutional 
transformation.lxviii  
 In this model of behavior, epidemics of disease act as exogenous shocks to 
both afflicted polities, and to the international system in its entirety. The fear-
induced destabilization that results from these epidemic shocks then generates a host 
of adaptive behaviors ranging from institutional development to often significant 
shifts in resources towards the development of national and international 
surveillance capacity and public health infrastructure. The International Sanitary 
Conferences that began in 1851 were initiated at the behest of the French, primarily 
as a response to the shocks of the Second cholera pandemic that began in 1829 and 
swept across Europe throughout the 1830s.lxix  The Draft Sanitary Conventions (1851) 
and draft International Sanitary Regulations which contained 137 articles,lxx  appear 
to be the first significant example of this model of institutional development and 
change in the domain of global health governance.  Ultimately, continued epidemics, 
and subsequent conferences led to the adoption of the International Sanitary 
Conventions that were signed at Paris in 1903.lxxi  
 In the twenty-first century, the case of SARS is illustrative of such punctuated 
equilibrium dynamics. As noted above, the SARS epidemic generated considerable 
fear, social destabilization (particularly in China) and widespread economic damage, 
to the nations of the Pacific Rim. Following the SARS epidemic the international 
community made significant revisions to the International Health Regulations 
(2005)lxxii,  prioritized the enhancement of global pathogen surveillance networks,lxxiii  
and briefly shifted economic resources towards international organizations like the 
WHO. In addition, the international community founded the Global Fund for 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria as a mechanism to improve global access to 
treatment for those diseases. Unfortunately, this heightened state of awareness and 
institution building only persisted until circa 2006, whereupon policymaker interest 
in global health drifted back towards an apathetic state. A degree of policymaker 
concern about H5N1 influenza arose in 2009-10, but it dissipated rapidly after the 
short-lived ‘swine flu’ epidemic of 2009-10. At that point policymakers in the USA 
and Britain openly criticized the WHO for ‘over-reacting’ to what they considered an 
inconsequential pathogen. lxxiv 
 Aside from the persistent influence of the Fear/Apathy Cycle, it would seem 
that a threshold effect also moderates this system. The epidemic shock in question 
must be powerful and temporally bounded, and it must threaten the interests of 
economic and/or political elites in order to galvanize the necessary institutional 
changes at the international and/or domestic levels. Diseases that fail to meet this 
threshold of elite interest do not seem to generate substantive institutional change, in 
and of themselves. One example of this dynamic is malaria, which tends to afflict the 
most impoverished nations, but rarely threatens the interests of global economic and 
political elites. While the SARS crisis motivated policymakers to substantively revise 
the IHR, and to create the Global Fund, it is doubtful that significant institutional 
change would have occurred in the absence of the SARS shock. This nascent model 
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assumes that the ebola crisis of 2015 will generate a modest increase in resources 
directed towards the surveillance and containment of emergent pathogens. However, 
it remains to be seen whether the epidemic is perceived as threatening to the 
interests of economic and policymaking elites, such that it results in significant 
institutional change at the international level, or results in a substantive shift in 
resources from the OECD nations towards the construction (and maintenance) of 
public health infrastructure within the least developed countries. We present this 
preliminary argument in the hope that others will explore the theoretical 
ramifications of political psychology and the Fear/Apathy Cycle for the conduct of 
global health governance. 
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Ebola and WHO Reform 
 
Charles Clift 
 
 
The World Health Organization’s (WHO) programme of reform, begun in 2010, did 
not prevent the WHO from failing in getting to grips with the Ebola outbreak in 2014. 
At the root of its problems in fighting Ebola was the dysfunctionality inherent in its 
three-tier structure including six self-governing regional offices and 150 country 
offices. The reform programme has failed so far to address adequately this aspect of 
WHO governance. In the absence of fundamental reform, there are proposals to 
institute a ‘command and control’ structure which bypasses the WHO’s decentralized 
governance structure in the event of emergencies. It is not clear that the specific 
reform proposals on these lines made by the five panels that have reported to date on 
the lessons to be learned from Ebola are capable of being implemented by the WHO, or 
that member states as a whole really want to see the fundamental changes being 
advocated for the WHO’s emergency work.  
 
 
In January 2010 Margaret Chan, the WHO’s director-general (DG), called  member 
states together to discuss the future of financing at the WHO. This meeting was 
precipitated not so much by fears about overall funding levels in the wake of the 
financial crisis as by concerns about the WHO’s reliance on uncertain and inflexible 
funding – notably the roughly 20/80 split between mandatory assessed contributions 
from member states, and voluntary contributions, overwhelmingly earmarked for 
specific activities, provided by member states and other funders. Since funding cannot 
be considered separately from issues to do with priorities, efficiency and effectiveness, 
this meeting was the origin of the WHO’s so-called reform programme, still ongoing in 
2016.  
Surprisingly the report of the 2010 meeting suggested that in ‘some areas of work 
- particularly in relation to global norms and standard setting, surveillance and the 
response to epidemics and other public health emergencies…WHO performed 
effectively (underlining added) and there was little disagreement that these areas should 
remain key elements of the Organization’s core business’1  This was in spite of the fact 
that the meeting followed immediately on the experience of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, 
which had raised several questions about the WHO’s performance, subsequently 
analysed in detail in the report of the IHR Review Committee.2 . Perhaps it was this 
complacency that caused the WHO to cut its budget for outbreak and crisis response by 
half in its 2014/15 budget (Butler, 2014).3 As many have since pointed out it took the 
Ebola crisis for the WHO and its member states to consider implementing two of the 
most important recommendations from the IHR Review report - the global health 
emergency workforce and a $100 million contingency fund.  
The Ebola crisis of 2014 focused international attention on the fact that the 
WHO’s reform programme, four years on, had demonstrably failed to improve its ability 
to address health emergencies. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and others working to 
combat Ebola on the frontline criticized WHO’s slow response.4 They said that it should 
have taken decisive action much earlier than it did in mobilizing funding and personnel 
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from other international actors, as well as intensifying its own efforts to support 
governments with technical assistance and expertise.  
Others blame the WHO’s sluggishness and lack of leadership on its fundamental 
structural problems, which the reform programme launched by Margaret Chan in 2010 
had failed to address. These structural problems include both its funding and its unique 
structure of regional offices which elect their own leaders. Much adverse comment was 
directed at the role of WHO’s Africa regional office in Brazzaville5, the alleged lack of 
good cooperation between Brazzaville and Geneva and the failure of the WHO’s country 
offices to play a useful role, or even to play a counterproductive one. It is reported that 
the WHO Guinea office blocked visas for an expert team and $500,000 in aid.6 
These criticisms of the WHO reflected issues raised in a 2014 Chatham House 
report based on the deliberations of a high-level working group.7  One relevant 
recommendation in the report (whose writing preceded knowledge of the Ebola 
outbreak) was that the WHO’s core functions should include ‘promoting and 
maintaining global health security’ with specific reference to fighting global health 
emergencies. However, a main focus of the report was the inefficiencies and incoherence 
arising from the WHO’s three-tier governance structure based on the six self-governing 
regional offices associated with 150 country offices. In this structure, each regional 
director (RD) is effectively beholden to the regional member states they were elected by, 
not to their nominal chief, the DG. Although in WHO’s constitution (Article 35) she is 
responsible for appointing all WHO staff, including RDs when the regional committees’ 
nomination is endorsed by the WHO’s Executive Board (EB) (Article 52),  the political 
reality is that she and the EB defer to the regional committees’ choice of RD.8 This 
means that she can only seek to persuade her six RDs to do what she wants– she and the 
EB choose not to exert their constitutional authority over them or to replace them if they 
fail to perform.  
Reflecting the many inconclusive debates on this question which have arisen 
since the WHO’s establishment in 1948,9 the working group considered two mutually 
exclusive options for fundamentally changing the regional structure:  
 
 Unitary - making the WHO like other UN organizations by abolishing self-
governing regional offices with Geneva determining the best regional and country 
office structure 
 Decentralized – applying the model of the Pan-American Health Organization 
(PAHO), the only WHO regional office principally dependent on contributions 
from its member states, to the other five regional offices by making their 
continued existence dependent on direct contributions from their member states. 
 
Neither of these options has filtered through into the formal member state 
discussions about reform – presumably because they are put in the ‘too difficult’ box. 
Yet again and again some member states refer to the difficulties caused by the WHO’s 
three-tier structure, and argue that the absence of governance reform threatens the 
overall WHO reform programme and its operational effectiveness.  
That is why member states established in early 2015 a consultative member state 
process on governance reform to consider ‘concrete ways to improve the alignment of 
the governance of all three levels of the Organization, so as to improve accountability 
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and effectiveness.’10 It seems highly unlikely that this group, due to report to the World 
Health Assembly (WHA) this year, will recommend radical reforms on the lines 
proposed in the Chatham House report. Its latest meeting, in March 2016, failed to 
resolve the difficulties in respect of the alignment issue, where regional member states, 
particularly those from PAHO, resisted proposals, mainly from the European donor 
nations, to increase the accountability of RDs to the director-general and the EB.   
This ambivalence about the WHO’s regional structure and the correct response to 
it was reflected in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s address to the WHA in May 2015: 
It is, I am sure, an advantage for the World Health Organization to have 150 
country offices and six regional offices in addition to its headquarters – a 
decentralized structure with strong local links is important. But let’s be honest. 
Decentralized structures can also impede decision-making and hinder good 
functioning. Therefore the advantages of having a decentralized organization 
must be harnessed in a way that links the three levels on which the WHO 
operates through clear hierarchies, so that, ultimately, everyone knows who has 
the say in any given situation, who has reporting obligations, and who has to 
carry out the work. This is, of course, easier said than done. But I think that 
right now, when we are trying to learn lessons, it is important for everybody to 
make a special effort, to accept this challenge, and thus together to come up 
with something better.11 
A strong theme in the response of the WHO and its member states to its failures 
over Ebola was to focus on establishing a ‘command and control’ structure for 
emergencies, which would somehow bypass the established decentralized structure 
deemed to have been at the root of the Ebola failures. In her speech to the WHA, 
however, Margaret Chan demonstrated that she had not quite understood this point:  
Concerning command and control, I have an excellent cabinet in my six 
Regional Directors. They advise. I listen. I decide.12  
Few believe this is how it works now or could work in the future. Rather, 
Margaret Chan is a prisoner of the politics of a governance structure that limits her 
control of what happens in the regional and country offices. In the absence of 
fundamental reform of the WHO’s regional structure that will always be the case.  
In essence, the WHO’s problems with the Ebola response lie in the realms of 
political economy rather than of finance and human resources. In the case of Ebola, the 
WHO was generally unwilling to upset affected member states who were reluctant to 
admit the scale of the outbreak they faced, their difficulties in dealing with it, and fearful 
of the economic consequences of disclosure. Because the WHO country and regional 
offices are close to national ministries of health they failed to take the independent 
stance which the situation demanded. This was in stark contrast to the SARS outbreak 
of 2003 where the then director-general, Gro Harlem Brundtland, was prepared to take 
immediate and bold steps to alert the world to the threat: 
…bold because they were made purely on the basis of rapidly accumulating 
scientific evidence, because they put concerns for public health first and 
foremost, and because they were made despite concerns about potential 
political pressures.13  
There are circumstances in which determined leadership can overcome structural 
obstacles to putting public health priorities first, but determined leaders are few and far 
between. Underlying the WHO’s relationship with its member states is a lack of trust in 
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the WHO secretariat’s ability to deliver. That is why member states, with few exceptions, 
refused to countenance the 5% increase in assessed contributions (amounting to less 
than $25 million annually) that the WHO had proposed for its 2016/17 budget. That is 
why the major member states are content that the WHO’s resources are mainly provided 
in the form of earmarked voluntary contributions that fit their priorities and over which 
they have more direct control.  
Meanwhile, the vast majority of member states, in low- and middle-income 
countries, pay a little over $60 million annually in contributions. In return, the WHO 
provides a regional and country office infrastructure, mainly for their benefit, which 
costs over $1.3 billion and employs 75% of the WHO’s permanent staff and several 
thousand more staff on short-term contracts. There are benefits to public health – but 
close to the interests of many ministries of health is the opportunity to obtain 
employment on UN salary scales in regional and country offices and the patronage this 
offers to those in governance positions in the regions. There are therefore, for diverse 
reasons, very strong interests on the part of almost all member states in maintaining the 
status quo.  
This is the reason that the attention of member states is now focused on devising 
ways in which the WHO can operate in one way in emergencies (‘command and control’) 
and in the traditional manner, for all its flaws, in the rest of its business.  
As of March 2016 there have been five reports on the lessons to be learned from 
the Ebola episode commissioned by the WHO, the UN or independently.14 15 16 17 18 All of 
them have made similar recommendations to the effect that the WHO should establish a 
unified centre or programme for outbreaks and emergencies which would have a single 
line of authority, including the ability to control activities at regional and country level 
where necessary. Four of the reports favour a Centre which would have an independent 
Board to emphasise that it will have separate modes of operation and accountability 
from the rest of the WHO, including a unified command structure at all three levels of 
the organization.  
The WHO itself has initiated a Programme for Health Emergency Management19 
with many of the same proposed features as a Centre but uncertainty remains about how 
far the DG is prepared to go in disrupting her relationship with her RDs by insisting on 
unified control from Geneva during emergencies. She seems to resist the idea of a 
Centre, rather than a Programme, precisely because it connotes independence from 
established WHO programmes and ways of working.  
Her advisory group on outbreak and emergency reform endorsed the idea of a 
Programme while agreeing with the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel20 that a “single 
merger [of organizational units within WHO] will not suffice – it will need new 
organizational structures and procedures”.  In essence therefore it wanted a Centre in all 
but name:  
WHO must have a single Programme for its work in outbreaks and 
emergencies, with a single budget, a single workforce, a single line of authority, 
a single operations support system, and a single set of business processes…”21  
The question remains whether a unitary outbreak and emergency entity, 
operating with different budgetary, recruitment and procurement rules, and governance 
arrangements can operate effectively within the WHO’s long-established bureaucratic 
and decentralized governance structure. The inability of member states to agree more 
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generally on governance reform, and the DG’s reluctance to challenge the WHO’s 
existing ways of working, suggests that this remains a very pertinent question.  
 
 
 
Charles Clift is a Senior Consulting Fellow at the Centre on Global Health Security at 
Chatham House. 
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Human Security Governance:  
Is UNMEER the Way Forward? 
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United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2177 (2014) was politically 
salient because it labeled the Ebola crisis as a threat to international peace and 
security and created UNMEER, the first-ever UN system-wide emergency health 
mission. This article considers the implications of the UNSC’s resolution and 
establishment of UNMEER for the future of humanitarian action. It conceptualizes 
national and human security approaches to humanitarian intervention, discusses 
the implications for policy and then examines UNMEER using this lens. It finds that 
while the UNSC’s securitization of the Ebola outbreak incentivized cooperative 
behavior, UNMEER used a traditional security approach in its response to the 
Ebola outbreak: it was primarily organized around a health mandate and focused 
on the technical and medical aspects of disease containment; major donors 
contributed significant amounts in bilateral assistance to affected countries; and it 
emphasized compliance with financial and legal accountability standards. 
UNMEER’s exceptional power to assign responsibilities to implementing partners, 
fund mission critical activities, and maintain an accountability chain, nonetheless 
granted it the authority to both lead and oversee the intervention. Better 
coordination and standardization between health and humanitarian sectors, 
development of mutual accountability principles, and integration of a human rights 
perspective would improve human security outcomes in future global responses. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The 2014 Ebola outbreak in the West African countries of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone overwhelmed national healthcare systems, caught the international 
humanitarian-health system off guard, caused widespread panic across the globe and 
claimed 11,315 lives.1 As of this writing, the region is close to being declared Ebola-
free, but the political, economic, psychological and social aftershocks continue to 
reverberate throughout the region. From the perspective of humanitarian 
governance, the global response to the Ebola outbreak exposed both deep 
inadequacies in the global systems tasked with safeguarding global public health, and 
opportunities for developing better tools of global governance.  
 A well-noted inadequacy was the inability of the global system to quickly 
diagnose and react to the outbreak. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared 
a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) in August 2014, months 
after Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières-MSF) warned of the 
unprecedented nature of the crisis.2 The United Nations (UN) publically pushed for 
global action on September 18, 2014 when the Security Council (UNSC) adopted 
Resolution 2177 stating, “the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.”3 This resolution galvanized 
a global response and led to the creation of the United Nations Mission for Ebola 
Emergency Response (UNMEER), the first-ever UN system-wide emergency health 
mission.4  
 The UNSC is mandated with maintaining international peace and security 
through a variety of mechanisms including humanitarian intervention—where 
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external state actors intervene militarily in another state to prevent, alleviate, or 
arrest a humanitarian crisis resulting from conflict—and peacekeeping missions—
designed to stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire and assist in implementing 
comprehensive peace agreements. Not since UNSC resolution 1308 (2000), which 
identified HIV/AIDS as a security risk in Africa, has the UNSC considered a health 
issue as a security threat. , The establishment of UNMEER was an unprecedented 
innovation that neither conformed to the mandate of a traditional peacekeeping 
operation nor to a political mission. Might the UNSC resolution and the creation of 
UNMEER herald an expansion of the UNSC’s view of security and a diversification of 
its toolkit for ensuring stability? How do national and human security approaches to 
humanitarian-health crises differ and what lessons from UNMEER could be applied 
to future health missions? 
I begin by differentiating between national and human security approaches to 
humanitarian-health crises using four guiding questions: security for whom, from 
what, by whom and how? Using this lens, I show that the Ebola emergency 
constitutes a threat to human security. Major UN agencies and governments 
acknowledged the outbreak’s widespread human security effects, which complicated 
subsequent policy planning because the crisis did not conform to conventional 
categories of humanitarian intervention.  Next, the article uses the framework to 
analyze UNMEER and determine what lessons might be drawn for future health 
missions.  
It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about UNMEER because data and 
evaluations are only now becoming available. Nevertheless, the article examines 
available evidence and finds that in contrast to previous research, the UNSC’s 
securitization of the crisis increased rather than decreased global cooperation. 
Another finding is that UNMEER’s overall approach to the Ebola outbreak was 
rather traditional: it was primarily organized around a health mandate and focused 
on the technical and medical aspects of disease containment; major donors 
contributed significant amounts in bilateral assistance to affected countries; and it 
emphasized compliance with financial and legal accountability standards. However, 
UNMEER was successful in stamping out the outbreak and important innovations 
incentivized cooperative behavior. UNMEER’s exceptional power to assign 
responsibilities to implementing partners, fund mission critical activities and 
maintain an accountability chain, granted it the authority to both lead the 
intervention and galvanize the global response to the outbreak.  
 
UNPACKING HUMAN SECURITY 
 
National and human security approaches to health threats produce different policy 
prescriptions for global institutions.  Most notably, a national security approach 
requires isolating, containing and eradicating a specific pathogen to stabilize a crisis 
situation, while a human security approach prescribes a dual-pronged approach that 
both contains the disease and addresses the underlying sources of insecurity. This 
section compares national to human security using four guiding questions: (1) 
Security for whom? (2) From what? (3) By whom? and (4) How? to organize the 
discussion. Following Paris, I view human security as a broad category of research 
that is a distinct branch of security studies and not a concept intended to usurp or 
replace national security.5 While Paris and other scholars’ work on human security 
often address the questions of security for whom and from what to distinguish 
between national and human security, less attention is paid to the questions of by 
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whom and how? I show that security by whom and how supply important insights 
for global policymaking on humanitarian-health crises. 
 
SECURITY FOR WHOM? 
 
Traditional definitions of national security are state-centered where the main 
objective is the protection of the state from real or perceived external security 
threats. National security requires the protection of national borders, populations, 
and territories from external threats; the state is most often, but not always, the 
principal actor that provides and ensures national security.  Since the end of the Cold 
War, the field of security studies has both broadened to consider nonmilitary security 
threats, and deepened to include the security of groups other than the state.6  
Human security considers security from the vantage point of the individual, 
expanding the notion of security beyond safety from violent threats to include 
economic, health and food security. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) defines human security as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, 
disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the 
patterns of daily life” in the areas of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, 
community, and political security.7 The Commission on Human Security (CHS) 
defines human security as “the protection of the vital core of all human lives from 
critical and pervasive threats” where the rights and freedoms constituting the vital 
core pertain to survival, livelihood and basic human dignity. 8 King and Murray 
suggest that human security has four essential characteristics: it is universal, its 
components are interdependent, it is best ensured through prevention, and it is 
people-centered.9 This people-centered focus is in theory what distinguishes human 
security from traditional security paradigms.10 However, shifting the reference point 
of security from states to people does not diminish the role of the state in providing 
security, particularly in response to terror threats or food insecurity.11  
While holding the UNSC presidency in 1999, Canada suggested a widening of 
the jurisdiction of the UNSC to include human security as well as national security.12 
Since then, Martin and Owen find that support from the primary proponents of the 
human security agenda, particularly the UN and the Canada, has waned. By 2005, 
UN Secretary General (UNSG) Annan stopped employing the term, referring instead 
to the responsibility to protect, and the UNSC paid less attention to HIV/AIDS as a 
core security issue, focusing on more traditional national security threats such as 
terrorism.13  
 
SECURITY FROM WHAT? 
 
How human security identifies the source of a threat is both its most defining and 
contested feature. The original UNDP report identified seven distinct dimensions of 
human security—economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and 
political—defining human security both as a “freedom from fear” and “freedom from 
want.”14 Proponents of a broad definition of human security suggest it entails more 
than safety from violent threats (“freedom from fear”) to include chronic threats 
(“freedom from want”).15  
 Scholars advance several critiques of the broad definition of human security. 
First, the broad definition generates a litany of possible threats, which diminishes its 
analytic value and makes prioritizing political action challenging.16 Joshua Busby 
argues that non-traditional security threats are not unique to human security and 
shows that some non-military phenomena, like climate change, constitute national 
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security threats in their speed, intensity and ability to cause large-scale destruction 
and death.17 The U.S. and European countries approached Ebola as a national 
security risk to some extent, and implemented quarantine, containment and crowd 
control policies to protect national borders and citizens from infection.18 
Second, critics of the broad definition argue that empirical research is 
inhibited by apparent circular reasoning: human security is necessary for human 
development but the obverse is also true making it difficult to tease out how changes 
in socioeconomic factors might impact human security.19 King and Murray propose 
however that the relationship between human security and human development is 
mutually reinforcing not causal; human security is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
precondition for human development.20 
Narrow definitions of human security convey the urgency typically associated 
with security threats, but limit threats to their severity, rather than their cause.21 
Owen suggests that focusing on “critical and pervasive threats” establishes 
immediacy and scope and limits policy attention to those threats that become severe 
enough to warrant the ‘security’ label.22 Focusing on critical threats differentiates 
between long-term structural problems, typically considered development issues, 
and sudden crisis-like disruption. Pervasive threats rise from and impact multiple 
areas of human security. Take the example of Ebola, political and economic factors 
like state incapacity and uneven development created conditions conducive to the 
spread of the disease and the pandemic impacted multiple areas of human security 
beyond health. 
A final defining characteristic is vulnerability, defined by King and Murray as 
the number of years of future life spent outside a state of “generalized poverty;” 
security is based on the risk of severe deprivation and thus depends heavily on the 
concept of poverty.23 Suhrke offers three categories of “vulnerable” populations, 1) 
victims of war and internal conflict, 2) those who live close to the subsistence level 
and thus are structurally positioned at the edge of socio-economic disaster and 3) 
victims of natural disasters.24 In sum, a human security threat is a critical and 
pervasive threat to the lives of vulnerable populations. 
 
SECURITY BY WHOM? 
 
The question security by whom might be understood in two ways, who securitizes 
and who provides security?; each interpretation will be discussed in turn. If security 
remains dominated by states and associated with their self-interested motivations, 
then who labels an issue a security concern matters because it determines which 
issues appear on the global agenda.  
For example, in the case of health, threats to the security of developed 
countries and their citizens are frequently prioritized in the international agenda.25 
Breslin and Christou suggest that some diseases (HIV/AIDS, SARS, etc.) only 
garnered global political attention when they traversed borders from the developing 
to the developed world.26 Framing health crises as human security issues solely when 
developed countries are at risk shines inordinate amounts of attention on infectious 
and communicable diseases to the detriment of programs designed to address non-
communicable health concerns and structural problems in health care systems. 
Securitization of infectious diseases such as H1N1 has also backfired, incentivizing 
non-cooperative behavior based on narrow calculations of national interest over 
international collaboration on health.27 Finally, several negative repercussions might 
result from securitizing health issues such as HIV/AIDS: the public good might 
supplant the rights and civil liberties of individuals; securitizing an issue might draw 
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more resources and attention, but might shift resource allocation away from those in 
need to elites, armed forces and politically powerful groups; and finally, securitizing 
disease might generate new stigmas where disease-affected populations might be 
considered both health and security risks.28  
Who provides security? Traditional views of security focus on using the 
military to ensure the territorial integrity of sovereign states and thus securitization 
is often associated with militarization. The real analytic value of human security is 
that it broadens consideration of who provides security—states and inter-
governmental organizations as well as non-state actors, such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), multi-national corporations, and diaspora groups—and how—
through the fulcrum of human rights.  
 
SECURITY HOW? 
 
Human security’s focus on the individual implies a rights-based approach to security, 
which proposes that human security can be achieved through human rights. Human 
security therefore suggests that multiple actors provide security based on a moral 
and legal obligation to uphold and protect human rights. While critical of human 
security, Howard-Hassman offers that “insofar as human security identifies new 
threats to well-being, new victims of those threats, new duties of states, or new 
mechanisms of dealing with threats at the inter-state level” it can add to the human 
rights regime.29 She cautions that in order to uphold and not undermine human 
rights, states must protect the rights of their individual citizens and should not 
violate the civil liberties and rights of some individuals in the name of protection of 
the collective.30 Moreover, human security enlarges states’ responsibilities to include 
non-citizens, potentially enhancing human rights for stateless peoples who are no 
longer under the legal purview of a state.31 
 Human security implies mutual vulnerabilities and obligations and thus 
requires collective action. Axworthy articulates, “our own security is increasingly 
indivisible from that of our neighbors—at home and abroad. Globalization has made 
individual human suffering an irrevocable universal concern.” 32 Viewed in this way, 
securitizing health enables and advances the human rights agenda by providing an 
opportunity for developing appropriate global governance solutions to ensure human 
security.  Table 1 summarizes the discussion of the four guiding questions in this 
section and reflects general understandings of national and human security 
approaches to humanitarian-health crises. 
 A human security approach to humanitarian-health crises requires a systems-
level response which coordinates the efforts—particularly information sharing, 
project planning, and needs assessment—of multiple actors based on actual human 
needs and human rights; encourages consideration and protection of the most 
vulnerable parts of the population—women, children, the disabled and the elderly—
and emphasizes empowerment, which suggests a bottom-up approach that enables 
people and communities to act on their own behalf.33 On this latter point, former UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata states “[Human security] is 
concerned not just with protection, but also with empowerment—making it possible 
for people to take an active role in making their lives and communities more 
secure.”34  
 Human security and national approaches will also differ in their funding 
allocation and accountability mechanisms. When states design humanitarian 
activities aligned with their national security objectives, they channel funding 
through their own military, aid agency or national NGOs; prioritize bi-lateral aid; or 
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earmark aid for activities important to the national interest (i.e. vaccine 
development). A representative model of accountability, which requires elected 
officials to answer to their constituents and to adhere to legal standards, informs 
accountability systems in a national security approach.35 For example, implementing 
bureaucracies, such as USAID or CDC, answer to Congress, which is accountable to 
the American electorate.  
 
Table 1: Humanitarian Action Viewed through National and Human Security Lenses 
 
 National Security Human Security 
Security for whom? States People 
Security from what? Traditional and non-
traditional threats to the 
state 
Critical and pervasive 
threats to vulnerable 
populations 
Security by whom? State military and police 
forces 
States, international 
organizations, NGOs 
Security 
how? 
Objectives Military action & health 
services in line with 
national security concerns 
Military action & health 
services designed to 
stabilize situation; in line 
with the assessed needs 
of affected populations  
 Principles Aligned with national 
security agenda; collective 
rights supersede human 
rights 
Humanitarian 
imperative, humanity, 
independence, 
impartiality; human 
rights respected 
 Military role Minimal coordination 
between foreign and 
national militaries; “top-
down” 
Foreign militaries 
coordinate with local 
military and 
government; “bottom-
up” 
 Funding Bi-lateral funding; 
earmarked funding  
Pooled funding 
disbursed in function of 
community needs 
 Accountability Democratic/political Mutual 
 
 A human security approach to humanitarian-health crises requires pooled 
funding, via mechanisms such as a global fund, consolidated appeal, or trust fund 
that facilitate rapid disbursement in response to community needs not in service of 
national security interests. We would expect funding to be allocated to projects 
serving highly vulnerable populations and those demonstrating the greatest need. 
Accountability relationships in a human security approach reflect a model of mutual 
accountability defined as “accountability among autonomous actors that is grounded 
in shared values and visions and in relationships of mutual trust and influence.”36 
Mutual accountability relationships involve the input of all parties, including affected 
populations and communities, in a multi-party social action.  
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UNMEER: GAME CHANGER OR MORE OF THE SAME? 
 
The empirical case uses the four guiding questions from the previous section: 
security for whom, from what, by whom and how, to analyze and draw lessons from 
UNMEER. The UNSC declaration elevated the Ebola crisis to a security issue that 
demanded global attention; this was a watershed moment, but as the following 
discussion shows, the UN mission primarily espoused a traditional approach in 
responding to the crisis.37  
 
SECURITY FROM WHAT? 
 
How global actors define a security threat shapes their level and type of policy 
response. The UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2177—co-sponsored by 130 
states—on the Ebola crisis in West Africa marking only the second time that it 
considered a public health problem and the first time a public health crisis was 
labeled a threat to international peace and security.38 Samantha Power, U.S. 
Ambassador to the UN, remarked “Today’s resolution has the most sponsors ever for 
any Security Council resolution in the history of the United Nations…” indicating “a 
degree of unanimity and unity that we rarely see.”39 Burci and Quirin contend that 
the resolution “represents the most cogent recognition to date of the security 
implications of widespread outbreaks of lethal infectious diseases.”40 In her address 
to the UNSC, WHO Director-General Dr. Margaret Chan acknowledged the 
pervasiveness of the threat, “None of us experienced in containing outbreaks has ever 
seen in our lifetimes an emergency on this scale, with such a degree of suffering and 
such a magnitude of cascading consequences. This is not just an outbreak; this is not 
just a public health crisis. This is a social crisis, a humanitarian crisis, an economic 
crisis and a threat to national security well beyond the outbreak zones.”41 
 In subsequent UNSC meetings, Tayé-Brook Zerihoun the Assistant Secretary-
General for Political Affairs and Marjon Kamara, Liberian Ambassador to the UN, 
expressed growing concern about the impact of the Ebola outbreak on regional peace 
and security.42 Individual UN agencies and the EU also noted the pervasiveness of 
the threat, recognizing that the West African countries’ recent history of conflict 
made them particularly vulnerable in multiple areas of human security.43 The World 
Food Programme (WFP) warned of a major food crisis triggered by disruptions in 
regional aid, travel bans, quarantines, and farm laborer deaths, and distributed food 
aid to alleviate food insecurity.44 Likewise, the World Bank highlighted the economic 
impact of the crisis, which increased economic insecurity by slowing economic 
growth, damaging key industries such as mining, agricultural and services, and 
raising prices of staple goods.45 
 As the outbreak progressed, it was essential for the UN to take highly visible 
action to galvanize the global community, generate political and financial support, 
prompt the deployment of military personnel, and intensify responses from UN 
agencies.46 The subsequent establishment of UNMEER, as the first ever UN 
emergency health mission was a significant, but unprecedented innovation that 
neither conformed to the mandate of a traditional peacekeeping operation nor to a 
political mission.47 Although the UNSC resolution labeled the crisis as a security 
threat, it was variably referred to as a ‘health event’ or a ‘humanitarian disaster,’ 
which provoked competing and uncoordinated responses to the crisis.48  
 Inconsistent labeling caused confusion as to which agency should lead the 
response and created a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities. Although the 
UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) mandate is to 
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coordinate coherent responses to humanitarian emergencies, it did not lead in the 
initial stages of the outbreak.49  OCHA viewed the Ebola crisis as a “systemic medical 
issue,” while the WHO—the global health arm of the UN charged with coordinating 
global health emergencies and head agency of OCHA’s global health cluster (GHC)—
argued that the crisis demanded a response beyond its technical expertise.50  
 The cluster system includes 11 clusters—groups of humanitarian 
organizations, both UN and non-UN—in each of the main sectors of humanitarian 
action (i.e. health, emergency shelter, logistics). The objective of the cluster approach 
is to strengthen partnerships among these organizations to enhance the coordination 
of emergency response activities. The UNGA’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
(IASC) designates global and country-level leadership in each cluster that is 
responsible for coordinating all available capacity and expertise. The WHO, in its 
role as head of the GHC, which includes over 30 partners, was in a prime position to 
leverage existing capacities and partnerships to accelerate the response.51 Instead, 
the WHO’s response was hampered by budget cuts, skewed donor priorities, 
weakened capacity, a decentralized organizational structure with highly autonomous 
regional offices and bureaucratic in-fighting and is widely viewed as having failed.52 
Evaluations of the response find that while the WHO provided high-level technical 
and strategic input and advice, its organizational culture was not adapted to 
coordinating large-scale, long-term, multi-country emergencies or to challenging its 
member states on non-compliance with International Health Regulations.53 
Furthermore, many UN agencies and INGOs possessed specialized knowledge of 
either health emergencies or humanitarian crises, but lacked crosscutting 
understandings across the two systems.54 Despite an existing UN presence in the 
region, individual agencies were not equipped to respond; for example, the UN 
mission in Liberia (UNMIL) neither had a health services mandate nor training for a 
public health operation.55  
 Recognizing the failed leadership of the WHO, the UNSG created UNMEER to 
implement a system-wide response to the outbreak. The following section describes 
the main components of UNMEER and considers to what extent it might model a 
national or human security approach to humanitarian-health crises. 
 
SECURITY BY WHOM AND HOW?  
 
UNMEER was established in September 2014 following the unanimous adoption of 
both General Assembly resolution 69/1 and UNSC resolution 2177 (2014), as a 
temporary measure to provide leadership, operational direction and support to meet 
immediate needs related to the unprecedented fight against Ebola. Intended as a 
system-wide UN response, UNMEER bypassed OCHA, the UN’s typical body for 
emergency coordination, and focused on the goal of containing the outbreak.56 
UNMEER streamlined the response by advancing and adopting a “health security” 
frame to guide intervention planning and deployed financial, logistical and human 
resources to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone with the singular objective of 
containing the spread of the Ebola virus.57 UNMEER established headquarters in 
Accra, Ghana and was comprised of four primary administrative pillars: (1) medical 
response; (2) operational coordination and planning; (3) essential services response; 
and  (4) an in-country crisis response team in each country led by an Ebola Crisis 
Manager.58  
 UNSC Resolution 2177 granted UNMEER with both the authority and the 
ability to lead and coordinate the global response.59 One month after its 
establishment, UNMEER convened the UN Ebola Response Operational Planning 
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Conference in Accra, Ghana to devise a plan for scaling up the United Nations-
system response.60 Development of the strategic plan reflects a top-down rather than 
bottom-up approach to planning because it was developed with input from the UN’s 
Special Envoy for Ebola and representatives of the WHO but few representatives 
from the affected countries.61  
To coordinate an efficient, coherent and comprehensive response, UNMEER 
detailed four Critical Actions and five Enabling Actions (Table 2) and assigned 
responsibility to a lead agency (WHO, International Federation of Red Cross, United 
Nations Children’s Fund, WFP, UNDP and UNMEER) for each activity. For example, 
the WFP led the Logistics Cluster and provided services, such as storage, transport, 
coordination and information management, for the mission. UNMEER’s five 
objectives and mission critical activities focused on stopping the spread of the virus 
and reflect a technical, medical oriented approach to achieve this mandate.62 
Framing the outbreak as a health crisis had significant implications for the 
overarching response strategy; for one, UNMEER objectives primarily focused on 
implementing and funding health programs designed to end the Ebola outbreak at 
the expense of investing in health infrastructure or treatment for non-communicable 
or other infectious diseases. Ten out of the thirteen MCAs (Table 2) focus directly on 
disease containment and treatment and operational support. A technical and clinical 
approach dominated the early response with a heavy focus on measurable outputs 
such as constructing Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs), increasing bed capacity and 
fulfilling the 70-70-60 benchmark (70% of patients isolated and receiving care; 70% 
safe and dignified burials within 60 days of UNMEER roll out).64 Moreover, the 
dominant health security frame meant that non-Ebola related assistance and 
protection activities for vulnerable populations, such as pre-natal and maternal care 
and child protection services, were not prioritized.  
The global response to the Ebola outbreak included activity by a panoply of 
actors: bi-lateral aid agencies such as the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID); domestic and transnational NGOs; private foundations; multi-
national corporations; intergovernmental organizations such as the WHO, the World 
Bank and the UN; and advocacy groups. UNMEER’s strategic plan enabled 
coordination of these various actors by assigning agencies with mission critical 
activities to which they were held accountable. For instance, the WHO led Case 
Management, which meant assigning responsibility to implementing agencies for 
each mission critical activity related to case management; overseeing 60 ETUs across 
the three affected countries as well as an estimated 2,500 international personnel 
deployed from more than 40 organizations and 58 foreign medical teams to operate 
the ETUs. 65 WHO also partnered with ministries of health and thousands of national 
staff to fulfill the requirements of this activity.  
INGOs were important implementing partners and worked closely with UN 
agencies. Arriving first on the scene, MSF’s experience and expertise in supplying 
acute medical assistance in crisis situations and developing countries was invaluable. 
MSF’s safety protocols were relatively successful in protecting medical staff and 
patients and informed the development of operational standards and procedures 
used by U.S. AFRICOM troops.66 Yet overall, the Ebola response involved a much 
smaller INGO presence than is typically the case in humanitarian emergencies, with 
a majority of staff recruited locally.67 Several factors contributed to low levels of 
INGO presence; first, many emergency relief INGOs lacked the required medical 
knowledge, technical expertise, capacity to provide healthcare and necessary medical 
supplies. Second, for INGOs that specialize in emergency relief but not healthcare, 
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such as Oxfam, the convoluted framing of the crisis created confusion, and they 
struggled to find a constructive role in what was initially considered a medical 
emergency.68 Finally, INGOs scrambled to recruit qualified individuals to deploy to 
West Africa with humanitarian personnel more willing to accept assignments in Iraq, 
Syria, Somalia and Afghanistan.69 
 
Table 2: Overview of UNMEER63 
 
Main Activities Enabling Activities Objectives (STEPP) 
Mission Critical 
Actions (MCA) 
1. Case finding 
(contact tracing, 
laboratory 
surveillance) 
2. Case management 
3. Community 
engagement & social 
mobilization 
4. Safe & dignified 
burials 
1. Logistics 
     
2. Staffing and human 
resources 
     
3. Training 
     
4. Information 
management 
     
5. Cash payments and 
coordination 
 
 
Stop the outbreak 
    
1. Identify and trace  
people with Ebola 
2. Safe and dignified  
burials 
 
Treat the infected 
 
3. Care for persons 
with Ebola &  
infection control 
4. Medical care for  
responders 
 
Ensure essential services 
 
5. Provision of food  
security & nutrition 
6. Access to basic 
health services (non-
Ebola)  
7. Cash incentives for  
workers 
8. Recovery & economy 
 
Preserve stability 
 
9. Reliable supplies  
of materials & 
equipment 
10. Transport & fuel 
11. Social mobilization 
& community 
engagement 
12.Messaging  
 
Prevent further 
outbreaks 
 
 
 
13. Preventing spread 
 
Though initial INGO mobilization was disappointing, subsequent INGO 
programs fostered community-building and bolstered the capacity of affected 
communities to prevent and manage Ebola transmission. Oxfam was pivotal in 
helping communities in Sierra Leone form Community Health Committees that 
analyzed barriers to disease prevention, case management and safe burials and then 
designed programs to overcome these factors. 70 The International Rescue 
Committee oversaw community care centers, collected data on active case hotspots, 
increased monitoring and oversight in some hotspots and referred cases to ETUs.71 
INGOs were therefore instrumental in bridging UNMEER with local communities 
and implementing a “bottom-up” approach consistent with human security. 
UNMEER claims that the areas where the community was educated and actively 
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engaged in the intervention exhibited the most success in reducing and eliminating 
the incidence of Ebola.72 In a survey of 1,500 residents in Monrovia, Liberia, Tsai and 
colleagues found that community outreach had a positive impact on citizen 
cooperation and trust in state authorities.73 Citizens who experienced outreach were 
more likely to support control policies, adopt preventative measures and cooperate 
with state authorities 
The deployment of 2,900 AFRICOM military personnel from the US, 750 
from the UK as well as approximately 720 civilian and military health workers 
deployed by the African Union as part of Operation African Union Support to Ebola 
Outbreak (ASEOWA) positively impacted the mobilization of the global response.74 A 
MSF official, Brice de la Vingne states, "I will call it a game changer in the way that it 
helped trigger a bigger response from the international community, […] the mere 
presence of American troops dissuaded average Liberians from blaming the deaths 
on a government conspiracy or witchcraft.”75 National military forces worked 
alongside foreign contingents; the Armed Forces of Liberia joined US military 
engineers to build four ETUs. The UK military collaborated with the armed forces of 
Sierra Leone (RSLAF) to run District Ebola Response Centers (DERC), maintain 
order by supporting police contingents, and provide logistical support.76 DFID (UK) 
set up a joint military and humanitarian command and control hub–the Joint Inter 
Agency Task Force (JIATF)–to coordinate and collaborate with the Government of 
Sierra Leone to provide infrastructural support, commodities, training and 
management.77  
Military engagement symbolized the commitment of international resources 
and a demonstration of goodwill, halted the exodus of INGOs from the region, 
encouraged a professional response with structured command and control 
arrangements, and provided high-quality treatment facilities, which reassured 
international agencies that deployed professional staff to the region.78 In addition, 
militaries leveraged their comparative advantages and resources to build ETUs, train 
medical practitioners, coordinate responses, and supply essential 
telecommunications technology.79 The UK military deployed army medics to train 
local health workers (clinicians, logisticians and cleaners) to work in UK-managed 
facilities.80 The US military provided mobile health platforms, called mhealth, which 
use smart phone applications to collect, share and manage data for research and 
remote patient management; the Nigerian government has credited mhealth with 
enhancing its capacity to contain its Ebola outbreak.81  
Nevertheless, foreign military forces were deeply criticized for being risk 
averse and not providing direct patient care, for being slow to mobilize and even 
slower to construct the ETUs averaging about three months to completion.82 The 
tangible contribution of military forces to lowering transmission and infection rates, 
beyond the symbolic value of mobilizing resources, remains unclear. According to 
the WHO, illness rates began falling weeks before US troops completed their core 
missions of building ETUs and training staff, and the ten ETUs built by AFRICOM 
along with eight others funded by the US in Liberia went largely unused and some 
were even repurposed by the Liberian government.83  
According to Table 1, another area where we would expect empirical 
differences in national versus human security approaches to humanitarian 
intervention is funding. Activities driven by national security objectives emphasize 
bi-lateral and earmarked funding tightly coupled with national security interests. By 
contrast, pooled funding allocated through community participation better serve 
human security objectives. 
The international response to the Ebola outbreak received substantial funding 
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from multiple sources. As of January 31, 2015, USD 5.1 billion were made available to 
the Ebola intervention including contributions from governments (USD 3.2 billion), 
international financial institutions (1.6 billion), and private partners (USD 200 
million).84 Twenty-one private foundations contributed funding to the international 
response, five private foundations alone pledged USD 245 million.85 Actual rates of 
disbursement provide a better sense of funding available to an emergency than 
pledged funding. The UN Special Envoy reports a 43% disbursement rate of pledged 
funding by December 22, 2014, rising to 49% by January 31, 2015.86  As of November 
2015, the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of UN OCHA reports that USD 2.27 
billion were requested for the Response Plan and $1.56 billion was received (69% of 
requested Response Plan funding).87 According to the UN Special Envoy, the 
disbursement rate for the Ebola intervention is higher than in historical cases—for 
instance, the disbursement rate during the 2004 Asian tsunami was less than 30% 
after six months.88 
Top donors donated in line with strategic objectives, contributing a significant 
portion of their pledged funding through bilateral assistance to long-time allies and 
former colonies rather than to global or regional efforts. For example, the U.S. 
pledged USD 939 million total to the Ebola response including USD 644 million in 
direct bilateral support for Liberia and the U.K. pledged USD 553 million including 
USD 460 million in direct bilateral support for Sierra Leone.89 Governments and 
financial institutions allocated USD 1.4 billion to UN agencies and key INGOs to 
support global efforts. Compare this to the USD 1.12 billion in direct bilateral 
assistance the US and the UK allocated to Liberia and Sierra Leone alone.  
In line with a human security approach, two notable funding mechanisms, the 
Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) and Quick Impact Projects 
(QIPs), enabled a coordinated, flexible system-wide response, facilitated rapid 
disbursement of funds to areas of demonstrated need, and empowered affected 
countries in the decision-making process for funding allocation.90 The Ebola 
Response MPTF raised USD 140 million with main contributions from the UK (USD 
32m), Sweden (USD 13m), and Germany (USD 12m).91 Notably, the MPTF Advisory 
Committee, which makes decisions on funding allocation, includes both 
representatives of the three affected countries as well as donors (Sweden and the 
UK). 
 QIP funding was designed to provide flexibility to the response, adapt to needs 
as they arose and build district-level capacity towards stopping disease transmission. 
UNMEER developed comprehensive guidelines to plan, implement and monitor 
QIPs, which required the Ebola Crisis Managers in the affected countries to approve 
projects—for example, the provision of supply and condolence kits in Guinea, and 
strengthening local response capacity and information campaigns in Liberia—and 
sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with each implementing partner 
detailing project expectations. Completed monitoring forms were sent to the Chief of 
Mission Support who authorized payments.92 The MoUs and monitoring forms 
established a chain of financial and performance accountability to UNMEER.  
In sum, although disbursement rates indicate a notable level of financial 
mobilization and commitment, the majority of funding was allocated through bi-
lateral assistance, which is consistent with a national security approach to 
humanitarian crises. The MPTF and QIPs are notable funding mechanisms designed 
to meet human security objectives—principally community participation in funding 
decisions—but were marginally funded in comparison to bi-lateral aid 
A final difference in how national and human security approaches to 
humanitarian-health crises might differ is in their accountability systems. The 
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accountability mechanisms used by the UN and UNMEER conform to standard 
models of financial and performance accountability that emphasize reporting on 
short-term observable indicators of operational outputs and use of resources rather 
than long-term processes and impacts. A human security approach to humanitarian 
crises requires mechanisms and procedures of mutual accountability that emphasize 
the participation of all stakeholders—particularly affected populations and 
communities—in defining standards. 
UNMEER possessed the authority to assign critical activities to lead agencies 
and establish an accountability chain for monitoring and verifying fulfillment of the 
activity. The UNSG’s Chef de Cabinet, Susana Malcorra, chaired regular meetings 
with UNMEER, oversaw the activity of lead agencies and reported on the mission’s 
progress and challenges to the UNSG. An UN Office of Internal Oversight Services 
(OIOS) audit evaluated UNMEER in two areas—governance and monitoring 
mechanisms and regulatory framework—to assess performance on operational and 
managerial indicators of regulatory and financial accountability. OIOS initially 
awarded UNMEER a “partially satisfactory” rating and eventually a “satisfactory” 
rating after UNMEER responded with modifications to its human resources 
management. In sum, UNMEER’s reporting on compliance with financial, 
operational and regulatory standards emphasized traditional forms of representative 
or principal-agent accountability relationships—where government agencies report 
to their electorate and international organizations report to states—consistent with 
being accountable “up” the delegation chain, rather than “downward” to affected 
populations.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The unprecedented UNSC resolution recognized the urgency of the public health 
crisis in West Africa, elevated a health security concern to the realm of global politics, 
and established the first-ever health mission. This article considers the implications 
of the UNSC’s resolution and establishment of UNMEER for the future of 
humanitarian action. I conceptualize national and human security approaches to 
humanitarian intervention, discussing the implications for policy and then examine 
UNMEER using this lens. I find that UNMEER used a traditional security approach 
in its response to the Ebola outbreak: it was primarily organized around a health 
mandate and focused on the technical and medical aspects of disease containment; 
major donors contributed significant amounts in bilateral assistance to affected 
countries; and it emphasized compliance with financial and legal accountability 
standards.  
 Funding for the emergency shows progress towards better donor coordination 
around human security objectives; disbursement rates exceeded those in similar 
emergencies and together the MPTF and QIPs encouraged flexibility in programming 
and identification of community needs as they arose. Nevertheless, the majority of 
US and UK contributions still took the form of bilateral assistance to traditional allies 
rather than to the global efforts, suggesting that strategic interests drove some 
funding decisions. On balance, UNMEER was effective in meeting its mission of 
containing the Ebola virus and achieving zero new cases—as of this writing, the three 
affected countries were declared Ebola-free. UNMEER offers important lessons to 
guide and inform global responses to humanitarian-health crises.  
First, empowered leadership improved coordination, fostered collaboration 
and improved accountability. In large-scale humanitarian crises, a lack of global 
leadership often impedes swift, coordinated responses as the initial faltering of the 
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WHO and OCHA demonstrates. The UNSG empowered UNMEER with special 
authority—not typically afforded to existing UN agencies—to hire staff, transfer 
assets, purchase materials and take action, which positioned it well to coordinate UN 
agencies.93  This authority enabled UNMEER to catalyze financial and political 
support for a global response 
Second, initial confusion regarding how to label the crisis and UNMEER’s 
subsequent view of the outbreak as a public health emergency had several 
implications for coordination and leadership. For one, UNMEER focused narrowly 
on health targets providing much-needed standardization and professionalism; its 
STEPP approach viewed the crisis predominately through a public health lens. As 
such, it did not fully address a number of the wider social and economic 
consequences arising from the outbreak including the impact on food security and 
emergency shelter or the protection of vulnerable populations.94 Revelations of an 
increase in gender-based violence, rape, and teen pregnancies during the Ebola 
emergency are one example of the cost of not viewing the crisis from the vantage 
point of individual security and vulnerability.95 
Furthermore, the health security frame adopted by UNMEER sidelined use of 
a human rights-based approach to the crisis. The focus of the intervention and 
particularly the STEPP objectives was squarely on treating and containing individual 
cases of Ebola, which emphasized the technical, medical aspects of the emergency 
rather than humanitarian principles, individual rights and liberties, and culturally-
sensitive practices. National policies, such as quarantines, restricted people’s rights 
to liberty and freedom of movement and disproportionately impacted those unable 
to evade the restrictions, including the elderly, the poor, and people with chronic 
illness or disability.96 Moreover, evidence for whether services provided by foreign 
militaries aligned with the assessed needs of affected populations is mixed. Certain 
contributions by foreign militaries, such as rapid tests and laboratories, training of 
medical staff, and mobile communication technology filled urgent and immediate 
needs. Yet, the risk-averse policies of foreign militaries meant that the most urgent 
need for medical care was only partially filled and that solidarity with affected 
populations was tempered by concerns for the safety of Western staff and personnel.  
Third, engaging communities positively impacted intervention outcomes. The 
work of INGOs helped mobilize local communities, empowering them to design and 
implement programs, engage in critical public health education activities, 
disseminate information and incorporate local capacities into the global response. 
However, UNMEER inconsistently used a bottom-up approach. For instance, 
UNMEER’s accountability mechanisms verified compliance with financial, legal and 
procedural rules and regulations, which privilege accountability “upwards” to donors 
and political authorities rather than accountability “downwards” to affected 
communities and people. While it can certainly be argued that bottom-up 
approaches might be time-consuming, expensive and further slow down decision 
making, examples such as the unneeded ETUs and the initial reluctance of 
communities to believe, trust and follow public health protocols, indicate that 
effectiveness might be increased through communication, consultation and dialogue 
with local populations.97 
Why consider a human security approach to humanitarian-health crises and 
what does it bring to the policy table? It is important to note that I do not equate a 
human security approach with “good” and a traditional perspective with “bad” policy. 
Instead, the implicit assumption is that humanitarian-health crises will be a more 
common occurrence—as the ongoing Zika virus outbreak suggests—and thus require 
clear thinking about what kinds of global responses are needed. 
DELOFFRE, HUMAN SECURITY GOVERNANCE 55 
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, VOLUME X, NO. 1 (SPRING 2016) HTTP://WWW.GHGJ.ORG 
A human security approach both stabilizes a crisis situation and addresses the 
sources of insecurity.98 UNMEER impressively coordinated the technical and 
operational components of the global response to stabilize the situation, but did not 
adequately address the sources of insecurity. By drawing on the lessons learned from 
UNMEER and referring to existing initiatives in the humanitarian sector, the UNSC 
could further refine health missions to both stabilize crisis situations and address the 
root causes of humanitarian emergencies. These initiatives, including the Core 
Humanitarian Standard Alliance or the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
(2005), are rights-based approaches that advance collective standards to coordinate 
organizational behavior and empower affected populations with the intention of 
increasing program effectiveness.  
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Lessons from Liberia:   
Global Health Governance in the Post-Ebola Paradigm 
 
Tim Mackey 
 
 
Liberia is a country that has arguably borne the largest brunt of the 2014 Ebola 
Virus disease (EVD) outbreak, with the highest number of fatalities of all countries 
since the outbreak began in late March 2014. Though significant progress has been 
made in halting the spread of the disease, declarations by the World Health 
Organization that the country was “Ebola free” have been cut-short by detection of 
new cases, raising concerns that the country and greater region are still in ongoing 
danger during the post-pandemic phase of the outbreak.  More importantly, the 
unprecedented nature of the Liberian EVD outbreak provides a compelling case 
study exposing the fragilities of international responses to global public health 
emergencies.  Hence, this commentary will explore lessons learned from Ebola in 
Liberia and how they could affect the WHO, the International Health Regulations, 
and the future landscape of global health governance.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On May 9, 2015, the country of Liberia was first declared free of Ebola virus disease 
(EVD) transmission by the World Health Organization (WHO).1 The milestone 
declaration came after a forty-two day period of no new cases reported, following the 
burial of the last laboratory-confirmed case of the disease in March 2015.1,2 “Getting 
to zero” was a monumental task for a country whose public health system had 
suffered decades of neglect following civil war, political strife, and economic 
instability.3,4 However, the proclamation by WHO that Liberia was “Ebola free” 
turned out to be short-lived, with the detection of a new EVD-confirmed death on 
June 29th of a 17-year old boy in rural Margibi County and eventually detection of six 
new laboratory-confirmed cases .5  On September 3, 2015, Liberia was once again 
declared EVD transmission free by WHO.5,6  Yet, during the 90 day period of 
heighted surveillance that followed, this second declaration was also brief, with the 
Liberian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOH) confirming on November 20th 
that it has detected yet another group of three new EVD cases.7  On January 14, 2016, 
for a third time, WHO declared that known EVD chains of transmission in the 
country had come to an end, but cautioned that continued flare-ups were expected.  
Reflecting the unrelenting reality of the ongoing risk of re-emergence, in April 2016, 
a new case of EVD was detected in a 30-year old woman who died from the disease. 
 The repeated setbacks for Liberia in combating EVD present a compelling case 
study and metaphor for a global health governance system in need of serious reform. 
Specifically, the historic and unprecedented nature of the outbreak exposes the 
fragilities of current international responses to global public health emergencies, 
though these limitations had been evident in a 21st century that has been marketed 
by sentinel infectious disease outbreak events including SARS and the H1N1.  It also 
necessitates an analysis of how challenges experienced in local response efforts are 
impacted by systematic failures of global health coordination and governance of 
health.  This specifically includes assessing the impact of EVD on the future role of 
the WHO, an institution once at the center of international health but which now 
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finds itself the subject of widespread criticism regarding its leadership and handling 
of the outbreak.8-11   
 The outbreak also demands a review of how the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) has failed to deliver an international disease surveillance 
mechanism needed to protect global society in an era of a globalized pathogen.  The 
IHR, as revised in 2005 following the SARS outbreak, represents the chief normative 
international instrument tasked with responding to public health emergencies, such 
as EVD, but has had questionable effectiveness in adequately responding to novel 
and re-emerging infectious disease events.  This despite that fact that international 
recognition of the importance of the concept of “shared” global health security is at 
an all-time high.   
 Hence, this commentary explores lessons learned from the Ebola response in 
Liberia; how the country was impacted by macro failures of governance for global 
health, and how these lessons will affect the future of WHO, the IHR, and future 
global health governance reform. 
 
EVD IN LIBERIA 
 
On March 30, 2014, Liberia reported its first two positive Ebola cases from Lofa 
County, a region in the northernmost part of the country bordering both Guinea and 
Sierra Leone.12  In accordance with reporting obligations under the IHR, the MOH of 
Liberia communicated with WHO and neighboring countries in order to coordinate 
EVD outbreak response efforts in an effort to contain the early spread of the disease.  
In early May, Liberia reported only a few new cases and in the same month WHO 
declared that the outbreak was slowing down.1,13 However, a second wave of Ebola 
was emerging beyond the view of public health professionals, leading to the eventual 
spread of EVD to the capital, Monrovia (end of May), and to 10 of 15 counties (by 
August) culminating in a July 11 declaration by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), 
who had active personnel/operations on the ground, that the outbreak was spiraling 
out of control.9,12  What followed was the EVD death of one of Liberia’s most 
prominent physicians, medical evacuation of two U.S. healthcare workers infected by 
the disease, and a closing of border crossings, schools, and suspension of flights by 
certain airline carriers to the country.14,15  
 On August 8, 2014, nearly 5 months after international spread of EVD, the 
WHO declared a “Public Health Emergency of an International Concern” (PHEIC) 
under the IHR.3 WHO’s PHEIC declaration empowers the WHO Director-General, 
through consultation with the IHR Emergency Committee, to categorize an outbreak 
as an “extraordinary” public health event and issue temporary recommendations 
(e.g. health measures, health workforce issues, travel advisories, disaster/emergency 
response processes, border/travel screenings.)16  While multiple observers criticized 
the WHO for the PHEIC declaration delay, previous Ebola outbreaks had been 
effectively managed by localized humanitarian aid and public health responses, and 
hence, many global public health authorities did not view this Ebola outbreak as a 
viable pathogen source for a potential catastrophic global epidemic.  As a result, 
robust international response to the EVD outbreak in Liberia was fractured and 
delayed, leading to a peak transmission period of 300-400 new cases per week 
between August and September 2014, eventual transmission to all 15 Liberian 
counties, and several outbreaks in remote areas of the country.1,12,17 This was also 
accompanied by isolated incidents of violent protests, widespread quarantines 
(including a nationwide curfew), and shortages of fuel, food, and other basic supplies 
following suspension of flights/trade.18 
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 In order to effectively respond to the devastating and rapid escalation of the 
outbreak, massive deployment and rapid scale-up of response efforts commenced.  
This included a combination of constructing and staffing of Ebola treatment units 
(ETUs), use of community care centers, and use of isolation wards as an integrated 
strategy to improve clinical management, infection control, and outbreak control.19-21 
By November 2014, the number of newly reported cases began to decline, with 
reports of empty beds in treatment centers, with WHO and the MOH citing 
community engagement and health behavior change (including practicing safe 
burials and a government order to cremate victim remains) as likely reasons for the 
observed decline.22  Other studies have also indicated the important role played by 
changing cultural practices and beliefs through effective health promotion and 
education and conducting response activities transparently with active community 
engagement as essential in interrupting EVD transmission in the country.2,20,23,24  
These efforts led to a gradual waning of the outbreak, with reports from WHO and 
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in November 2014 that 
the number of new cases was experiencing evidence of decline nationally, and the 
restriction of new cases to two Liberian counties in January 2015.20 
 Fast forward to May 2015, with the first declaration by WHO that Liberia was 
“Ebola Free,” and the country appeared to finally be closing the chapter on this 
difficult period in its modern history.  However, the June and November 2015 
detections of new cases (including the death of the 15-year old boy diagnosed with 
the disease in November) and later detected cases, highlights the resilience of this 
devastating disease’s ability to re-emerge, and how much remains unknown about 
how it incubates in its host and remains transmissible.25  In total, the unresolved 
2014 Liberian EVD outbreak represents a critical setback in the country’s efforts 
towards achieving needed political reform, economic development, and has inflicted 
immense human suffering on this already fragile and war-torn country.4,26 With over 
10,000 cases (the second most cases behind Sierra Leone) and approximately 4,800 
deaths, Liberia has been disproportionately impacted by EVD, with the highest 
number of fatalities of all countries since the outbreak began in late March 2014.24,27   
 
LESSONS FROM LIBERIA  
 
A critical component of how Liberia successfully interrupted and contained the 
transmission of one of the most complex disease outbreaks in modern history was 
the “on-the-ground” US Government-Liberia-WHO global health partnership 
intervention that followed the peak of the EVD outbreak in Liberia.  Specifically, 
progress towards zero was achieved largely in part due to the establishment of an 
Inter-Agency Health Team (IAHT,) representing a partnership including the U.S. 
Department of State, the CDC, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), which worked directly with the 
Liberian MOH and WHO to provide technical assistance in addressing the outbreak 
and promoting full implementation of IHR 2005.  Partnership activities included 
development of a national strategy for the Rapid Isolation and Treatment of Ebola 
(RITE) targeted at addressing the unique challenges and complexities of outbreaks in 
remote areas through coordination of technical and operational assistance among 
partners.28 Other bilateral and multilateral technical assistance to MOH was also 
instrumental, including CDC field teams that provided support for logistics, CDC’s 
help in establishing and managing the outbreak through an incident management 
system, CDC support of multidisciplinary teams of domestic and international 
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partners for rapid response, and construction of treatment centers, setting up mobile 
laboratories and training of healthcare workers by the U.S. military,.29-32 
 However, despite the relative success of these multi-stakeholder partnerships 
involving the USG, Liberian government and WHO, the EVD outbreak nevertheless 
exposes inherent weakness of a fragile and underfunded health system that 
facilitated the spread of the outbreak as well as the lack of effective global health 
governance  needed to mobilize international action to prevent, control and combat 
infectious disease outbreaks in resource-poor countries.  Specifically, there remains 
no formalized governance mechanism to facilitate the mobilization of partnerships 
(such as the IAHT) needed to immediately respond to a public health emergency.  
Further, the critical need to build sustainable health system capacity in order to 
prevent and ensure that current and future outbreaks are properly controlled has yet 
to be appropriately addressed by a permanent and sustainable response apparatus 
within the WHO or broader UN system (though reform measures for WHO 
emergency response are underway.) Additionally, in the case of Liberia, the country’s 
health system infrastructure, logistics, surveillance, communication, laboratory 
capacity, medical and drug supply systems, and emergency preparedness plans all 
had limited capacity both pre and during the EVD outbreak.33  Hence, the 
combination of insufficient in-country health system capacity and difficulties in 
mobilizing an international response, provided a template for failure in containing a 
disease that previously was largely isolated to remote rural settings of Africa. 
 Specifically, from the perspective of national health capacity, health facilities 
in Liberia were inadequately equipped with occupational health and safety, waste 
management, personnel with necessary training, and adequate infection prevention 
and control measures to protect health workers and patients.33,34 Preparedness and 
response measures were poorly coordinated with national authorities and county 
Health Teams, which are responsible for managing health services, but had limited 
resources/capacity as needed to be effective. At the outset of the outbreak, the 
national laboratory system could not diagnose Ebola and contact tracing was often 
delayed allowing further disease spread.  During peak periods of the outbreak, 
international partners acted in haste to deploy treatment clinics and expand the 
number of beds needed to meet overwhelming demand to screen, treat, and 
quarantine suspected Ebola patients, with many of these facilities reaching capacity 
shortly after being opened. 
 The situation was made more precarious by the shortage of healthcare 
workers in the country (Liberia only had an estimated 130 doctors prior to the 
outbreak in 2006 to serve its population of 4.2 million.)35 From January 2014 to 
March 2015, 288 confirmed cases of EVD have been reported among Liberian 
healthcare workers with an estimated 71% who have died from contracting the 
disease (representing an estimated 8% of all healthcare workers.)36  This figure 
includes 83 doctors, nurses, and midwives that have lost their lives, resulting in 
models that show substantial increases (111% in Liberia) in future maternal mortality 
rates impending the country’s ability to meet future international development 
targets.36  This factor combined with limited supplies and lack of sufficient training, 
are key components in health system strengthening that remain serious obstacles 
and pose substantial risk for re-emergence of infectious diseases. Surveillance was 
also hindered by parallel, poorly-connected health information systems and 
underdeveloped vital statistics systems.37 While Liberia has received an increase in 
external aid in recent years, most resources have been targeted towards specific 
Millennium Development Goals and vertical disease programs (e.g. HIV/AIDS, 
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malaria, and tuberculosis), largely neglecting the development of Liberia’s health 
system.   
 Additionally, Liberia, as a WHO Member State, is party to the IHR and subject 
to its requirements to implement or meet certain core disease surveillance and 
response requirement.3 The revision to the IHR in 2005 was intended to modernize 
the instrument after the 2002 SARS outbreak, with the aim of preventing, protecting 
against, controlling, and providing a robust public health response to the 
international spread of disease.16 IHR requires State Parties to develop minimum 
core public health capacities and notify the WHO of events that may constitute a 
PHEIC according to defined criteria.16 State Parties were required to meet IHR core 
requirements by 2012, but that deadline has been extended until 2019 following 
Ebola.11  However, Liberia’s limited resources and the lack of a funding mechanism 
for State Parties to implement IHR’s requirements have delayed full 
implementation.38-40 Hence, even though the IHR was revised to specifically address 
the international rise and spread of infectious diseases (such as Ebola) by requiring 
countries to bolster disease surveillance and public health preparedness capacity, it 
has thus far failed to bolster Liberia’s health system capacity as necessary to prevent 
an epidemic.  
In response, post-EVD, the Liberian MOH is now prioritizing IHR core 
capacities in its health systems recovery plan with planned investment in the 
following areas: health workforce, medical supplies and diagnostics, infrastructure 
and technology, information and communication, epidemic preparedness and 
response, community engagement, quality service delivery, leadership and 
governance, and sustainable health financing.  The IAHT is a key partner supporting 
Liberia in developing core public health capacities in alignment with the IHR as well 
as the U.S.-led multi-stakeholder Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA).39,40  The 
rapid spread and devastating human toll of EVD in Liberia also demonstrates that 
the virulence and transmissibility of disease must be considered within the context of 
the limitations of the local public health infrastructure in which it appears when 
determining if an outbreak is at risk of becoming a global health security threat or a 
PHEIC. An IHR criterion that is often neglected, paying particular attention to cases 
that present in places needing external assistance to effectively respond, should be a 
key consideration when determining whether or not to declare a PHEIC in the 
future.Now, more than a year and a half following the first cases of EVD, Liberia 
continues to detect new cases, hampering its progress towards reaching and 
maintain zero cases.  Importantly, the continued persistence of EVD in Liberia may 
be emblematic of larger and more strutural challenges that are needed in global 
health governance that need to be addressed by the international community and 
cannot fall on the shoulders of individual states alone.41  Based on this case study, the 
major factors, from a governance perspective, that appear to have exacerbated the 
spread of EVD in Liberia are highlighted in Box 1 below.  In extrapolating lessons 
learned from Ebola in Liberia, this commentary now focuses on the liklihood that 
these failings will be addressed and the adequacy of recommendations that have thus 
far been proposed within the context of current debate regarding the future of the 
WHO, the IHR, and broader global health governance reform.  
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LESSONS FOR GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE 
 
Even before the 2014 EVD outbreak, opinions on how to reform WHO were as varied 
as they were numerous. Post-Ebola, WHO reform is now at the center stage of the 
global health governance debate, with recommendations from at least four different 
independent assessments critically examining WHO’s performance during the 
outbreak.  This includes an independent panel of WHO-appointed experts (which 
released its final report in July 2015), an external independent panel organized by 
Harvard Global Health Institute and the London School of Hygiene & Tropical 
Medicine (Harvard-LSHTM Panel) (which recently published a set of 10 essential 
reforms in the Lancet) a multi-stakeholder expert commission with National 
Academy of Medicine as its Secretariat, and the Kikwete Panel organized by UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.  Though a full analysis of the current and pending 
recommendations made by these various panels is beyond the scope of this 
commentary, several reform measures address priority challenges as identified in the 
Liberia EVD case study (see Table 1 for summary of select 
responses/recommendations.)   
 First and foremost, the EVD outbreak response in Liberia demonstrates the 
need for state governments, the USG, and the international community to bolster the 
WHO’s financial and political independence so that it can fulfill its international 
mandate as a global leader in directing and coordinating international health efforts, 
a presence clearly lacking during the 2014 EVD outbreak.  Central to this challenge is 
the fact that the WHO only controls a fraction of its budget as the majority of its 
financing comes in the form of “voluntary” contributions that are earmarked for 
special donor-funded projects, undermining its flexibility to meet rapidly changing 
health threats.42  This is important as global health preparedness is contingent upon 
the immediate availability of funding and human resources that WHO currently lacks 
due to a freeze in necessary increases to member state assessments to its “core” 
budget that supports its normative functions.11,43,44  
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1:  Key Challenges Highlighted in Liberia Case Study 
 
 WHO budget needs more flexible funding mechanisms to respond quickly as 
well as instituting a proposed emergency fund 
 WHO’s decentralized structure inhibited its ability to act coherently, 
necessitating a critical evaluation of the WHO structure 
 Delays in declaring a PHEIC negatively impacted Liberia and necessitates a 
reevaluation of IHR criteria 
 Fragile health systems fuel the spread of disease and must be strengthened to prevent 
future epidemics 
 An emergency health workforce could have prevented numerous national healthcare 
worker deaths and helped interrupt the epidemic, highlighting it as a critical 
component of global health preparedness 
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Table 1:  Liberia Case Study Priority Challenges and Governance Responses 
 
CHALLENGE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE 
Flexible WHO 
budget and 
emergency 
fund 
1. Member states rejected proposed increase to WHO core 
budget but approved increase in voluntary contributions.  
Emergency fund agreed to in conjunction with formation 
of global health emergency workforce. 
2. Development of new financing model for assessed 
contributions in conjunction with streamlining and 
focusing on WHO core functions and implementing good 
governance reforms. 
Reform WHO’s 
decentralized 
structure 
No active or current commitment to reforms/reorganization 
Reevaluation of 
IHR PHEIC 
criterion  
1. IHR Review Committee will explore possible changes, 
including an intermediate level of alert. 
2. Proposal that the IHR be revised to position emergency 
declarations within a politically protected Standing 
Emergency Committee chaired by WHO DG. 
Address Fragile 
Health systems 
1. Proposal to develop a cost plan to develop core capacities 
for all countries and partnering with the World Bank to 
develop financing mechanisms. 
2. Calling for a clear global strategy to ensure investment in 
core capacities to detect, report, and respond rapidly to 
outbreaks and mobilizing external support to supplement 
efforts in poorer countries supported by a transparent 
central system for tracking and monitoring of results. 
Establish 
emergency 
workforce 
Agreed establishment of a contingency fund to be funded by 
voluntary contributions and plans by WHO to launch a global 
health emergency workforce by January 2016. 
 
Sources:  68th World Health Assembly; WHO Ebola Interim Assessment Panel; Harvard – LSHTM 
Independent Panel 
 
As a clear example of WHO’s lack of capacity and necessary resources to 
respond to global health events, in 2014, WHO was put in the precarious situation of 
dealing with four Level Three humanitarian crises as well as three outbreaks 
(including EVD.)   However, instead of ensuring adequate funding to support WHO’s 
increasing responsibilities and mandates, stakeholders have focused on how to 
pursue institutional reform of the WHO and reassessing its fundamental role in 
global health without any additional funding to actually carry out necessary reforms. 
This is reflected by a rejection by member states of a proposal to increase WHO’s 
core budget by 5% during the most recent 68th World Health Assembly, instead 
opting for an approval of an 8% increase in voluntary contributions.43-45  
 Further, the lack of sufficient personnel to scale-up coordination during a 
public health emergency needs to be addressed should WHO continue in its role as 
the lead health emergency response agency (as recommended by the interim panel 
appointed by WHO.)46 Establishing a global health emergency workforce as has been 
proposed, backed by a contingency fund, could accelerate efforts following a declared 
PHEIC and provide an incentive for WHO and its regional offices to declare a PHEIC 
in a timely manner. This solution was actively discussed during the 68th World 
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Health Assembly, resulting in initial commitments to establish a contingency fund to 
be funded by voluntary contributions and plans by WHO to launch a global health 
emergency workforce by January 2016.47  This initiative would leverage the backbone 
of WHO’s existing networks including the Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network, the Global Health Cluster foreign medical teams, international non-
governmental organizations, and its own outbreak and emergency response units, 
though its implementation remains to be seen.10,44,46  
 Failure to build national health system capacity also violates the fundamental 
principles of the IHR and left Liberia unable to effectively detect, assess, report, and 
respond to the EVD epidemic. In response, a health systems fund dedicated to fixing 
Liberia’s structural health deficiencies, and those of other countries with similar 
vulnerabilities, may help avert future epidemics and enhance overall global health 
security. Recommendations to bolster health system capacity in the wake of Ebola 
have primarily focused on developing, building, strengthening, and sustaining IHR 
core capacities.  This includes recommendations by the WHO Independent Panel to 
propose a plan measuring the cost for IHR core capacity development and partnering 
with the World Bank to explore financing options.46 
 Recommendations by the Harvard-LSHTM Panel also emphasized the need to 
develop a concrete plan to ensure that states invest in building and sustaining 
national core disease surveillance and response capacities, including under the 
IHR.11  The report also highlighted the pragmatic need for mobilization of funding 
and exploration of investment mechanisms to provide external support for 
developing countries in these activities.11  In response, the GHSA may represent a 
viable vehicle to fill this critical funding and IHR implementation gap, but only if 
sufficient international commitment and participation is achieved post-EVD.  
However, GHSA may also suffer from certain systematic deficiencies, including the 
voluntary nature of the initiative and its lack of a binding mechanism to ensure 
sustainable financing.    
 Most crucially, WHO urgently needs to explore changes to its PHEIC criterion, 
including further exploration of the concept of establishing an intermediate level of 
alert that would act as an earlier warning mechanism in lieu of a full PHEIC 
declaration, which was critically delayed and hampered international mobilization to 
the EVD outbreak.47  According to leaked documents obtained by the Associated 
Press, fear of economic damage to affected countries was a key factor leading to the 
inexplicable delay by WHO HQ in issuing an EVD PHEIC declaration, although it 
was clear the outbreak was rapidly spreading out of control.48 Hence, beyond the 
challenges of lack of health system/disease surveillance capacity and absence of 
funding for implementation, the EVD outbreak reveals a more fundamental 
challenge faced with the IHR: mainly balancing competing interests of public health 
responses with disruption on trade and economic growth.   
 Specifically, even if WHO and international partners establish an intermediate 
alert level and are able to secure increased funding in order to implement IHR core 
capacities, unwarranted disruptions in trade and travel that were unilaterally 
imposed against the most heavily impacted countries will undoubtedly hamper IHR 
compliance.  Lessons should be learned from SARS and H1N1, where economic 
considerations also played a critical role in reporting and country responses to 
outbreaks.16 Responses should include renewed focus on revising the IHR to ensure 
it has the necessary enforcement powers to disincentive countries and private parties 
from issuing unwarranted trade and travel restrictions and establishing a mechanism 
of trade or economic recourse for countries adversely impacted.16    
 
MACKEY, LESSONS FROM LIBERIA 68 
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, VOLUME X, NO. 1 (SPRING 2016) HTTP://WWW.GHGJ.ORG 
CONCLUSION 
 
The 2014 EVD outbreak represents an unparalleled global public health emergency 
that has claimed the lives of more than 11,000 people globally, led to widespread 
devastation of social, economic and health systems in the most severely affected 
countries in West Africa of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, and further 
demonstrates the uncontrolled threat posed by the globalization of infectious 
diseases.49,50  Lessons from Liberia provide a roadmap for core governance reform 
measures that require prioritization by the WHO, its member states, global health 
stakeholders, and the broader international community in order to prevent the next 
global pandemic.  Only time will tell if these governance reforms will be adequately 
adopted, financed and implemented in order to ensure that the countless lives lost 
and sacrifices made in Liberia and the greater Western African region lead to the 
urgent change needed for 21st century global health and not just another case study 
of failed global health governance. 
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Let’s not make the same mistake again:   
A political economy analysis of Sierra Leone’s Cholera and Ebola 
epidemic responses 
 
Rosalind McCollum and Miriam Taegtmeyer 
 
 
The Ebola epidemic in West Africa resulted in calls for universal health coverage and 
revision of global health governance for emergency response.  This political economy 
analysis identifies structural reasons why Sierra Leone and the international health 
community failed to respond in a timely and effective manner to the Cholera and 
Ebola epidemics or to translate learning from the Cholera epidemic to the Ebola 
response. The analysis considers how structural factors interact with stakeholder 
institutions’ interests and power dynamics before it identifies potential solutions.  We 
urge national and global decision makers to take concrete action to tackle underlying 
inequity within the global health system and address the root causes of populations’ 
vulnerability to future infectious disease outbreaks. 
 
 
FAMILIAR FAILINGS 
 
Upon first observation Cholera and Ebola are vastly differing diseases. Cholera is a fast 
spreading disease, easily prevented by modern water treatment and health care.  
Meanwhile, Ebola is slower moving but not as easily treated.i However, both diseases 
have the ability to spread rapidly among poor populations who live in cramped, 
overcrowded homes, with inadequate access to clean water and sanitation.  The poorest 
and most disadvantaged population groups have borne the brunt of the burden for both 
Cholera and Ebola.  These are diseases of inequity, spreading rapidly in ill-prepared 
communities served by health systems with inadequate public health capacity.  Cholera, 
a waterborne infectious disease and key indicator for lack of social development, is 
endemic among Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia.  Sierra Leone is the worst affected 
country in the region experiencing it’s largest Cholera outbreak in over 15 years in 
2012.ii  
Underlying the disease trajectories of both epidemics lie common failures and 
response features which resulted in delayed effective responses.  This commentary will 
adopt a problem-driven political economy analysis based on the framework developed 
by Fritz, Levy and Or,iii see figure 1, which adapts and modifies the framework to 
respond to the question ‘Why did Sierra Leone and the international community fail to 
respond to Cholera and Ebola epidemics in a timely and effective manner?’      
The problem-driven political economy analysis focuses on identifying underlying 
structural factors which contributed to the delayed responses, identifying leading 
institutions and considering how these factors interact with stakeholder’s interests and 
power.  Finally, solutions will be identified, based upon lessons learned from common 
weaknesses in Sierra Leone’s Cholera and Ebola responses and from review of proposals 
for revision of roles for leading global health actors.   
 
 
MCCOLLUM AND TAEGTMEYER, LET’S NOT MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE AGAIN  72 
 
GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, VOLUME X, NO. 1 (SPRING 2016) HTTP://WWW.GHGJ.ORG 
STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
 
This commentary will focus on three main structural and institutional factors: 1) Weak 
health system   2) Lack of community trust in the health system 3) Failure of national 
and international health communities to rapidly recognise the scale and implications of 
the Cholera and Ebola outbreaks and to institute required technical expertise. 
 
1. WEAK HEALTH SYSTEM 
 
Sierra Leone’s civil war between 1991 and 2002 destroyed the health system.  In the 
following years, Sierra Leone has sought to reform and reconstruct it’s health system.iv  
However, maternal and child mortality rates remain alarmingly high (maternal 
mortality ratio 1165/100 000 live births and under five mortality rate 156/1000 live 
births based on Demographic Health Survey 2013).v  Manifold gaps persist within all six 
health systems building blocks.   
In the event of disease outbreak, there is need for pre-existing effective disease 
surveillance and vigilance, with effective health information systems and laboratory 
capacity to rapidly identify and diagnose cases and an ability to rapidly deploy contact 
tracing teams to line list contacts.   
Cholera revealed Sierra Leone’s limited availability of diagnostic facilities, 
challenges in data collection and reporting due to remoteness resulting in under-
reporting of cases, poor surveillance communication among stakeholders, and limited 
community surveillance and notification capacity.vi 
The failure to address these gaps was exposed with the arrival of Ebola.  Despite the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) publishing confirmation of an Ebola case in 
neighbouring Guinea on 23rd March 2014, Sierra Leone did not immediately institute 
heightened surveillancevii, providing time for the virus to spread unimpeded.  Even as 
late in the response as January 2015 Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF) reported there was 
‘almost no information sharing between the three most-affected countries’ creating risk 
of cross border spreadviii.  Weak surveillance and contact tracing allowed continued 
transmission, through delayed early identification and isolation of cases during the peak 
of the outbreak and facilitated ongoing transmission during the many months of the 
fight to reach zero.  As recently as 6th May 2015 Sierra Leone identified nine new cases 
in the preceding week, only two of which were identified as registered contacts of a 
previous caseix.   
Despite tripling the number of health workers between 2005 and 2010x Sierra 
Leone continues to be a human resources for health crisis country with only 0.2 
physicians per 10,000 population and 1.7 nurses/midwives per 10,000 population 
(World Health Statistics 2014 cited)xi, with the burden of the health worker deficit 
primarily borne in rural areas.  In addition, while overall staff numbers increased there 
was actually a reduction in the number of disease control staff over the 2005 – 2010 
timeframexii.  Not only this but health workers were inadequately prepared and trained 
to respond to an infectious disease outbreak.   With a critical need identified for 
improved infection prevention and control (IPC) across all facilities and orientation of 
health workers in disease outbreak response and training and  safe handling of dead 
bodies following the Cholera outbreak.xiii 
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Sierra Leone’s lack of progress towards these IPC recommendations can be 
assumed to have directly contributed towards the infection of 304 health workers and 
the tragic death of 221 health workers from Ebolaxiv.    
During the Ebola epidemic low absolute numbers of health workers limited the ability to 
respond to the Ebola epidemic and to continue to provide routine health services.  
Health workers were placed in an extremely difficult position of having to decide 
whether to continue to provide their patients with health services, despite having 
inadequate IPC training and a lack of personal protective equipment (PPE).  Many 
health workers put their lives at risk, heroically providing services, despite the absence 
of protective measures. In October/November 2014, 5-6 months after the Ebola 
outbreak was declared in Sierra Leone, only 19% of peripheral health units (PHUs) had 
the minimum supply of essential IPC items, including PPE, and only 7% of PHUs had 
required IPC structures in place.xv  This was despite lack of IPC supplies, absence of 
distribution plans and limited communication for supply chain having been identified as 
a major gap post Cholera epidemic.xvi Other frightened health workers stopped 
attending for work, rightly fearing for their safety.  As a consequence some health 
facilities were forced to close.   
 
2. LACK OF COMMUNITY TRUST IN THE HEALTH SYSTEM 
 
Research conducted prior to the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone revealed a pervasive 
lack of accountability in the health sector at all levels, with women and children 
routinely having to pay for services despite being entitled to free care through the 2010 
Free Health Care Initiative.xvii 
The absence of accountability and participation between community and health 
system was apparent during the Cholera outbreak.  Involvement and mobilisation of 
local councils, district and chiefdom structures was deemed inadequate and the need for 
advance preventive activities (in areas as yet unaffected), with messaging and materials 
available in local languages was identified as a leading area for improvement.xviii 
As a consequence of low accountability, the Ebola epidemic revealed the lack of 
trust between communities and their Government and health system, with people 
disbelieving official explanations about the existence of Ebolaxix, avoiding health 
facilities and actively resisting public health teams. xxxxi  
The Government of Sierra Leone responded with a range of authoritarian tactics 
such as ‘cancelling Christmas’, introducing curfews, lock-downs, house-to-house 
searches and enforced quarantines of entire regions.    The top down messaging ‘Ebola is 
real’ and authoritarian interventions did not engage with underlying reasons for 
community mistrust and disbeliefxxii.  This initial response often blamed communities 
for continuing unsafe practices, such as avoiding treatment centres or conducting unsafe 
burials, without dealing with underlying cultural and religious beliefs and practices 
which explained reasoning for decisions.  Subsequent reports have described how it was 
later in the response (when communities were engaged with in planning and there was 
collaboration with local stakeholders) that the approach of communities radically 
changed, with self-imposed quarantines organised by communities playing a significant 
role in stopping the epidemicxxiii.   
Following the onset of Ebola many patients feared attending health facilities and as a 
consequence the health implications spread far beyond the deaths directly resulting 
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from Ebola (a 20% increase in under-five mortality and 19% increased maternal 
mortality have been predicted as a result of health service interruptions).xxiv   
 
3. FAILURE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES TO RAPIDLY RECOGNISE 
THE SCALE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHOLERA AND EBOLA OUTBREAKS AND TO 
INSTITUTE REQUIRED TECHNICAL EXPERTISE 
 
Both disease outbreaks have been associated with delayed national (and in the case of 
Ebola International) recognition of the severity and scale of the outbreak.  Figures 2 and 
3 highlight the weekly case load for Cholera (figure 2) and Ebola (figure 3) in Sierra 
Leone.  In both figures, the delayed National declaration of an emergency is visible, 
occurring only after cases had already started to increase.  In 2012’s Cholera outbreak 
President Koroma’s declaration of a public health emergency and request for technical 
assistance did not occur until over eight months into the emergency, by which time the 
disease had already surged and risen exponentially with 12 out of 13 districts already 
reporting Cholera cases (Government of Sierra Leone 2012).  
Similarly, during the Ebola epidemic the first case was confirmed in Guinea in 
March 2014 and subsequently spread to Sierra Leone, where the outbreak was declared 
on 26th May 2014.  However, it was not until over two months later on 31st July, 2014 
with over 500 cumulative cases nationallyxxv that President Koroma declared a 
national state of emergency.  It was over a week later on 8th August 2014 that the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern, by which point cumulative cases in Sierra Leone had already 
surged to over 700xxvi.  Districts reporting cases increased from 2/13 districts in June 
2014 to 9/13 districts in August 2014 (district data unavailable for July 2014).xxvii 
Failure to replace inexperienced staff within Government of Sierra Leone 
Ministry of Health and WHO in position at the onset of the outbreak, with more skilled 
technical expertise hampered the early stages of the response.  Reliance of Government 
of Sierra Leone on advice from a stakeholder with no prior experience in responding to 
an Ebola outbreak, resulted in underestimation of the scale of the outbreak and failure 
to respond appropriately during crucial early stages.   Basic disease outbreak response 
measures, such as contact tracing were not conducted during this crucial timeframe, 
resulting in many cases going undetected and allowing the disease to spreadxxviii. 
Delayed acknowledgement of the severity of these outbreaks created a knock-on 
effect for mobilisation of international funds, with limited availability of funds during 
the early stages of the response  (most funds for Cholera were released only after the 
President declared an emergency by which point the epidemic had already peaked 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2012)).    
Meanwhile, the lack of a contingency fund for emergencies allowed Ebola to 
escalate.  By the end of July 2014, only $7million had been contributed.xxix  While 
international donations were subsequently pledged, by the end of December 2014 $2.89 
billion had been pledged, but only $1.09 billion actually paid.xxx   
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INSTITUTIONS, STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS AND POWER 
 
There are a range of stakeholders operating 1) within Sierra Leone and 2) 
internationally, whose interests, level of power and interactions have exerted influence 
over the response as identified in the structural features section.   
 
1. STAKEHOLDERS WITHIN SIERRA LEONE 
 
Leading stakeholders in Sierra Leone include the Government of Sierra Leone, Ministry 
of Health and Sanitation (national and district levels), private companies, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and community leaders.   
The Government of Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Health and Sanitation’s initial 
response to Ebola displayed a lack of urgency, with limited precautionary measures put 
in place prior to confirmation of the first case.  The strength of pre-existing relationships 
resulted in the Government continuing to trust the advice of a small company with no 
previous experience in Ebola responsexxxi over the advice of MSF, an international NGO 
which has responded to Ebola outbreaks for decades.  The Minister of Health for Sierra 
Leone in place at the start of the outbreak demonstrated lack of capacity to coordinate 
and respond to a disease outbreak of this severity.xxxii  However, President Koroma 
continued to back her (until 29th August when she was fired), rather than quickly 
putting in place someone with the skills and experience necessary to manage a response 
of this scale.xxxiii  In addition, WHO were reported not to have addressed the lack of 
capacity, as a result those lacking capacity did not step aside to allow those with 
appropriate knowledge and skills to coordinatexxxiv.  Furthermore, pre-existing 
disconnect between central and district health systems levels and poor central support 
to districts (such as limited human resource for health (HRH) management at district 
level, imprecise payroll resulting in non-payment of some health workers and delayed 
payment for performance) may have contributed to some of the response failings.xxxv   
Previous research has documented that chronic government underfunding of 
district health management teams has created reliance on international NGOs for 
support.xxxvi  Some scholars have theorised that heavy NGO involvement (within 
Liberia)  may be a potential reason for delay in the control of the Ebola epidemic as a 
consequence of parallel communication channels from national to local health posts, 
with little strengthening of a centralised mechanism to channel information upwards 
and create a comprehensive surveillance mechanism.xxxvii  This is in keeping with 
findings from the Cholera response which identified that response measures were ad 
hoc, driven by NGOs and that opportunities to support Sierra Leone’s disaster 
management capacity and disease surveillance systems was partially missed 
(Government of Sierra Leone 2012).    
Community leaders and community members – such as chiefs, traditional 
healers and religious leaders - were initially not regarded as key stakeholders and were 
inadequately engaged in the Ebola response.  At the community level the lack of trust in 
government officials undermined initial attempts to control the outbreak, with 
communities doubting the truth of official explanations and continuing traditional 
practices.   
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However, community leaders and community members proved to be the most 
effective agents of change for community response.xxxviii  Once engaged, communities 
instituted their own successful measures to control and stop the spread of Ebola.   
 
2. INTERNATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS 
 
WHO, World Bank, donor States, private companies, military and international NGOs 
have all been identified as playing influential roles in the response.   
During the Ebola outbreak the initial response was largely led by MSF, who issued 
urgent calls for recognition of the scale of the problem and international assistance.  
However, these calls were at first ignored creating months of delays and resulting in the 
loss of many lives. xxxix 
The WHO’s delay in declaring a global health emergency, due to fear of damaging 
the economies of affected countriesxl, has been widely reported and criticised.  When an 
emergency was finally declared previous WHO budget cuts resulting in loss of technical 
staffxli and internal limitations over budget control further hampered it’s ability to 
respond.xlii   
With delayed declaration of a global health emergency donor States initially 
delayed in mobilising funds and sending health workers to respond.  Ebola was 
recognised as a threat to global security following spread outside West Africa 
(subsequent to confirmation of infection of two American medical missionaries on 26th 
July 2014).  Ebola cases continued to surge and donor State’s finally mobilised in 
fulfilling their duty to safeguard their population’s health and to share international 
responsibility to fill capacity gapsxliii, with military troops deployed from September 
2014 (over ten months after the outbreak had originally begun).xliv 
 
ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 
Ebola has highlighted the need for a new approach to global health governance both at 
national and international levels. At national level, countries must incorporate lessons 
from the failings in response to Cholera and Ebola epidemics in Sierra Leone and learn 
from the relative successes of the Ebola response in Nigeria, Mali and Senegal, who had 
the benefit of hindsight forewarning their responses, following international declaration 
of an emergency.  Structural weaknesses within health systems must be addressed 
through long-term commitment and investment in training, equipping and providing 
timely payment for health workersxlv, heightened vigilance and disease surveillance, 
establishment of laboratory resources for rapid identification and diagnosis and pre-
existing infrastructure and technologies to allow for rapid and rigorous contact tracing 
in the event of a disease outbreakxlvi.  Any future response must include early 
community engagement with community leaders and community members which 
emphasizes community-led disease preventionxlvii. In addition, those in national 
positions of leadership must ensure that pre-existing staff who lack requisite skills and 
experience to coordinate an outbreak response step aside to allow technical experts to 
coordinate the disease outbreak response as required.  Rapid release of emergency 
funds to facilitate timely response activities will be vital to facilitate these actionsxlviii.  
However, adopting only these lessons will not combat underlying inequities in access to 
public health and essential medical services existing in Sierra Leone.  Universal health 
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coverage requires that countries deliver effective health services that all people can 
access.  Sierra Leone (Guinea and Liberia) have high poverty levels, fragile state systems 
and have neglected public health, making them vulnerable to health shocksxlix.  For 
example according to 2012 data only 13% of Sierra Leone’s population used an improved 
sanitation facility and only 60% used an improved drinking water source (World Health 
Statistics 2014 cited)l.  The Sierra Leone Government had not invested in adequate 
public financing for health with government expenditure for health making only 16.2% 
of total expenditure (World Health Statistics 2014 cited)li and as a result could not 
provide effective health coverage, leaving the population vulnerable to Ebola.  Given, 
increasing global interconnectedness the availability of accessible and universal health 
coverage in all countries must form the first line of defence against threats to health,lii 
because  ‘when it comes to the threat of infectious diseases, the world is only as secure 
as its weakest link’. liii  
Sierra Leone must go further even than providing its citizens with universal 
health coverage.  It must tackle the underlying lack of accountability between 
community and government (including health services).  This will mean corruption 
must be addressed and investments need to be made in infrastructure, clean water and 
sanitation, agriculture, education and increasing the availability of employment in order 
to tackle underlying social determinants of health.   
Internationally, there has been debate around ‘options to strengthen global, 
regional and local systems to better prepare, detect and respond to epidemic diseases’liv, 
including the need for an emergency contingency fund, global health workforce reserve, 
strengthened international health regulations and reform within WHO. lv 
Throughout the Ebola pandemic there have been a large number of national and 
international responses.  It is vital that this time lessons learned by those working to 
combat Ebola are captured effectively, shared globally and incorporated within health 
system planning worldwide to ensure better resilience when the next infectious disease 
outbreak occurs.  Ebola has exposed frailties both within Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
Guinea and within the global health community.  Opportunities to synergise with the 
new sustainable development goals should be exploited and accountability structures 
built so that every community is empowered to demand their right to health.  Ebola has 
revealed the extent of global inequities which resulted in the deaths of over 11 000 
people (World Health Organisation 2015) and the urgent need to ‘strive for a world that 
is just, equitable and inclusive’.lvi 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Ebola outbreak that began in late 2013 in West Africa resulted in 28,637 cases and 
11,315 deaths as of January 3, 2016, according to the World Health Organization 
(WHO).1 Along with direct mortality from Ebola, the outbreak exacerbated food 
insecurity and severely weakened already strained health infrastructure within heavily 
affected countries.2 The World Bank estimates the outbreak cost the three heavily 
affected countries 2.2 billion dollars in economic growth.3  
Effective interventions could have reduced morbidity and mortality from the 
disease, reassured the public, and helped health systems continue to function. When the 
outbreak began, there were no available approved drugs, vaccines, or rapid diagnostic 
tests for Ebola. Drugs or vaccines could have protected health workers, at least 418 of 
whom died caring for patients during the outbreak, and eased their deployment to 
outbreak-affected areas (if health workers were guaranteed access to such 
interventions).4  Rapid point-of-care diagnostic tests could have facilitated triage at 
overwhelmed Ebola treatment centers, simplified screening of travelers, and helped 
keep airlines, ships and borders open and operational.  While health technologies are no 
panacea for managing outbreaks and epidemics, the absence of such technologies 
exacerbated the large-scale regional and global crisis set off by Ebola in 2014. 
There are two key reasons why Ebola has not attracted major R&D investment 
from public or private research funders. First, there was no clear market for health 
technologies to combat Ebola because the virus had previously affected very few people, 
in relatively short-lived, sporadic outbreaks, primarily in the poorest countries of the 
world in central Africa.  Prior to the 2014 outbreak, there were fewer than 500 cases 
reported per year, with no cases reported between 1979 and 1994.5 For-profit 
pharmaceutical companies invest in research for products that are profitable.6 Between 
2000 and 2011, only 4% of new therapeutic products and 1% of new chemical entities 
(NCE’s) were registered for diseases affecting the world’s poorest populations.7 Ebola 
offered no prospects of a profitable market and entailed high risks.  
Second, there was little incentive for public or philanthropic research funders to 
invest in Ebola.  Other diseases, such as tuberculosis or malaria, affected far greater 
numbers of people. The sporadic nature of Ebola made it difficult to conduct clinical 
trials and caused the disease to slip from the public eye.8  
The absence of available interventions at the beginning of and during the 
outbreak has spurred proposals for solutions.  In particular, there is growing 
momentum behind calls for a research and development (R&D) financing facility 
supported by public and philanthropic funds for technologies to address outbreak-prone 
diseases, including but not limited to Ebola. An important unanswered question is: what 
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other pathogens merit investment by such a financing facility? This article offers a 
method for thinking systematically about which diseases should be included in the scope 
of such a financing facility. It does so by analyzing different conceptual framings of 
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), its epidemiological characteristics, and pre-existing lists 
that draw similarities between EVD and other diseases.   
 
POLICY PROPOSALS AND DEBATE 
 
The Ebola outbreak reinvigorated efforts to create new sources and modes of financing 
for R&D, most notably the creation of a global R&D financing facility.  Prior to the Ebola 
outbreak, the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Consultative Expert Working Group 
on Research and Development: Financing and Coordination (CEWG), established by the 
World Health Assembly in 2010, called for the creation of a global R&D fund in its final 
2012 report.  The CEWG called on WHO Member States to develop a global framework 
to improve efficiency, coordination, accountability and financing of R&D, with a focus 
on diseases occurring in developing countries. Within this framework, the CEWG 
proposed an R&D fund to sustainably finance needs-driven R&D, in which priorities 
would be based on public health needs rather than market potential.  The CEWG 
proposed that funds be generated through binding Member State commitments to 
contribute 0.01% of GDP to create push funding and pull-incentives for R&D. Needs 
driven R&D represents a broad categorization with substantial latitude to narrow which 
diseases fall within its scope.9  
There have been multiple calls in the last year from various stakeholders for the 
development of an R&D mechanism. In February 2015, a report for the UK Government 
called for an international fund for R&D in antimicrobial resistance in light of limited 
market incentives for pharmaceutical companies to invest in this research.10  In May 
2015, Balasegaram et al. (2015) called for a global biomedical R&D fund to address the 
lack of R&D for Ebola and emerging infectious diseases, neglected diseases, and 
antimicrobial resistance.11  Plotkin et al. (2015) followed with a July 2015 article 
outlining a vaccine development seed fund for emerging infectious diseases and 
improving the efficacy of existing vaccines.12  The October 2015 Oslo consultation on 
Financing of R&D Preparedness and Response to Epidemic Emergencies, a step in the 
development of the WHO’s R&D blueprint for epidemics and health emergencies due to 
be submitted to the 2016 World Health Assembly, included a proposal for a financing 
facility.  The proposal emphasized global coordination of public and private 
stakeholders to finance R&D for diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential for which 
the market has failed.13  In November 2015, the UK government, in partnership with the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, committed one billion pounds to the newly 
launched Ross Fund for the control of and research into diseases with epidemic 
potential including Ebola and malaria.14  Also in November of 2015, the joint Harvard, 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) Independent Panel on the 
Global Response to Ebola proposed a global financing facility “for research and 
development for health technology relevant for major disease outbreaks” (Moon et al., 
2015) as one of ten recommendations for improved prevention and response to disease 
outbreaks.15   
Key considerations regarding such a financing facility include the types of 
technologies it should cover, and as implied by the various fund proposals outlined 
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above, the scope of diseases the fund should include.  Which diseases a funding facility 
should prioritize is not only a technical or financial question.  The potential answers 
have implications for who would contribute, how it might operate, what it might deliver, 
and ultimately, who will benefit. 
Several efforts have recently been made to identify priority diseases for potential 
investment. As part of WHO’s development of an R&D blueprint for epidemics and 
health emergencies, it released a list of diseases “likely to cause major epidemics” that 
have no approved treatment or vaccines.16  In addition, in January 2016, Science 
published a list of ten priority diseases for vaccine development identified through a 
survey of fifty experts who assessed candidates based on scientific feasibility, morbidity 
and mortality, and societal or economic impact.17   In December 2015, the Foundation 
for Vaccine Research published a provisional list of priority target diseases for a vaccine 
R&D funding facility.18  Both the Science list and the Foundation for Vaccine Research 
list focus specifically on vaccines.19  Diseases prioritized for vaccine development may 
not be the same diseases prioritized for development of drug or diagnostic technologies, 
and vice versa, underscoring the need for further analysis.  This article offers an 
additional systematic method for setting disease priorities for a pandemic R&D funding 
facility, without focusing on one particular type of technology.   
 
POLICY RELEVANCE 
 
The Ebola outbreak highlighted the need for alternate mechanisms to finance and 
reward R&D for health technologies when the market does not offer appropriate 
incentives. Market failures in health technology R&D are widely recognized as 
applicable to anti-microbial resistance, emerging infectious diseases, orphan diseases, 
and neglected diseases, among others.  
In the literature, Ebola is defined as both an emerging infectious disease (EID) 
and a neglected tropical disease (NTD).20  As Jackson & Stephenson (2014) describe, 
EIDs and NTDs are socio-political constructs: EIDs are constructed as national security 
threats and consequently, drug development for these diseases is framed as an 
investment in protecting national security.21  In contrast, NTDs are framed as diseases 
of poverty and, quite literally, neglected populations.  Financing for research into NTDs 
has primarily come from donor countries’ development aid budgets and philanthropic 
organizations such as the Gates Foundation or Wellcome Trust.22  
In fact, Ebola has characteristics of both EIDs and NTDs: it invokes fear and may 
have the potential to be wielded as a biological weapon.  At the same time, prior to the 
West Africa outbreak, Ebola was isolated within remote populations in low-income 
countries, primarily fragile states. These dynamics also played out during the Ebola 
outbreak: the three heavily impacted countries were low-income, with relatively recent 
conflicts. The sheer volume of cases and high mortality rates, along with spillover to 
neighboring and high-income countries starkly illustrated the risk Ebola presented.  
Although Ebola has been framed as an NTD, it is not actually included in the 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) list of NTDs.  Mackey and Liang’s (2012) list of 
emerging and re-emerging infectious neglected tropical diseases (EReNTDs), which is 
based on inclusion in both the WHO’s NTD list and US Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s (CDC) list of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases, does not 
include Ebola, presumably because the disease is not categorized as an NTD by the the 
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WHO.23  Ebola is included in three high-profile EID-oriented lists: the WHO’s Pandemic 
and Epidemic Disease list, the CDC list of Emerging and Reemerging Infectious 
Diseases, and the US National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases’ (NIAID) 
Category A list of priority pathogens for biodefense research.24  All three lists are framed 
in terms of health security or defense.  Arguably, within the EID-oriented lists, the 
WHO’s Pandemic and Epidemic Disease list and the CDC’s list are slightly more 
oriented towards public health and pandemic potential while the NIAID list of Category 
A diseases is defined as pathogens with potential for bioterrorism, and is more oriented 
towards biodefense.25  
The way in which Ebola is conceptualized and categorized is not merely a 
semantic question.  It has implications for which solutions are advanced to address the 
above-mentioned R&D gaps, as well as who is likely to support these solutions, 
contribute financing, and have a claim on the resulting technologies. The NTD framing 
lends itself to voluntary contributions by actors traditionally associated with 
development assistance including philanthropic foundations (such as the Gates 
Foundation and Wellcome Trust) and development agencies of national governments 
(such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development (DFID)).26 This framing also lends itself to 
voluntary financing mechanisms as well as provision of technologies at or near cost to 
ensure access for low-income populations.27 The pharmaceutical industry may be 
involved in NTD research projects as an act of corporate social responsibility and/or 
with financing from philanthropic or development aid sources.  
In contrast, the EID framing, focused on security and pandemics presenting a 
global threat, may attract scientific and security oriented institutions, such as the CDC, 
the United States National Institutes of Health (US NIH), and the US Defense Advance 
Projects Research Agency (DARPA).28  The EID framing leads away from philanthropy 
towards public financing, as defense and national security are broadly understood to 
require public monies.29 In fact, prior to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, most funding for 
Ebola technology research was from defense-oriented agencies and oriented towards 
vaccines.30  Access to technologies developed to counteract bioterrorism may be tightly 
controlled by countries who develop these for their security interests. Therefore, the EID 
framing also raises critical but politically-sensitive questions regarding which countries 
and populations will have priority access to drugs or vaccines in the event of an 
outbreak.31  
 
AN APPROACH TO THINKING SYSTEMATICALLY ABOUT DISEASES IN SCOPE 
 
If a new global R&D financing facility is created in the wake of Ebola, which diseases 
should be targeted in the short to medium term? The characteristics of the West Africa 
Ebola outbreak shaped our analysis of which pathogens ought to be considered potential 
priorities: the outbreak moved relatively quickly, impacted a large number of people, 
had high mortality rates, and devastated countries and communities with weak health 
systems and infrastructure.  In other words, we sought to identify diseases with the 
potential to create similar large-scale loss of life and social havoc, for which no effective 
drugs or vaccines exist.   
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To determine this set of diseases we used a two-step process.  First, we developed 
a series of criteria based on Ebola’s biology and epidemiology.  Second, we analyzed 
existing disease lists against these criteria.  Using existing lists is advantageous both 
because the lists represent previously narrowed groupings of disease and because these 
categories are currently in use.  As a result, these lists have both practical utility and, as 
outlined above, conceptual associations.  However, these existing lists are still fairly 
broad and inclusive of diseases with many different features. Applying a set of criteria to 
these lists helps to develop a much more narrow list of diseases with similar features. 
One limitation of this approach is that there may be important diseases that are not on 
any pre-existing list, which this process would not consider.  The process outlined here 
could be applied using different criteria, resulting in a different list. The proceeding 
sections outline, in detail, a process to determine a narrower, priority set of diseases.  
 
CRITERIA BASED ON EBOLA’S BIOLOGY AND EPIDEMIOLOGY 
 
Ebola virus is a low-incidence, high-consequence pathogen.32  It is highly pathogenic, 
and is historically associated with devastating episodic outbreaks.  Case fatality rates 
range from 25% to 90%.33  The virus is transmitted through human-to-human contact 
or contact with infected bodily fluids on other materials.  Ebola is a zoonotic disease that 
can be passed to humans from monkeys, bats, or bush meat.34 
 
Based on this biology and epidemiology, we developed the following pre-condition and 
three criteria for potential inclusion in a priority list: 
 
Precondition: no current approved, clinically effective treatments or 
vaccines: We considered diseases as candidates for inclusion if they had no clinically 
effective treatment or treatment was limited to “supportive therapy.” (With regards to 
Ebola, the CDC defines “supportive therapy” as available treatments for symptoms, but 
no clinically effective approved treatments for the disease.35)  When determining if a 
disease has a clinically effective treatment, we did not require that the treatment cure 
the disease.  For example, there is no cure for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 
but anti-retroviral drugs can effectively control the virus.36  As a result, HIV does not 
meet the pre-condition for inclusion in our priority list. 
 
1. High fatality rates: Diseases included have fatality rates at or above 
approximately 10%.  This threshold could be moved up or down to generate 
shorter or longer priority lists, respectively.  
2. Easily Transmissible (e.g. airborne or human-to-human 
transmission): In the absence of appropriate safety measures, transmission of 
these diseases can occur in a short period of time through casual, person-to-
person or airborne contact.   
3. Market incentives likely inappropriate: The market failure condition 
includes diseases that meet one of two conditions: being limited to low-income 
populations or occurring primarily in episodic outbreaks.  Both of these 
situations cause market failure and result in diseases prone to lacking effective 
technologies to treat them.   
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a. Predominantly impacting lower-income populations: Diseases that 
occur exclusively in low-income countries or in low-income (often rural) 
populations within middle- or high-income countries, as outlined in the WHO 
or CDC page on the disease. 
b. Occurring Primarily in Episodic Outbreaks: Diseases that occur only 
in periodic outbreaks, not through ongoing or generalized transmission, were 
also considered to have met the market failure condition. Because the 
location, timing, and scope of an outbreak is difficult to predict, the result is a 
highly risky market for technologies.37 Such diseases may also disappear 
easily from public view, reducing the political pressure to develop 
interventions to control them.   
 
Diseases that meet the above pre-condition and criteria – absence of effective 
technologies, high fatality rates, easily transmissible, and market incentives likely 
inappropriate– are likely to cause serious social and economic disruption, and lead to 
the type of large-scale global emergency witnessed during the Ebola outbreak. 
Therefore, they are strong candidates for increased global public R&D investment. 
  
APPLYING THE CRITERIA TO PRE-EXISTING DISEASE LISTS 
 
We applied these criteria to four existing disease lists, outlined in Figure 1.  Using the 
criteria, we examined each disease in the list using the CDC and WHO pages for the 
disease.  
 
Figure 1: Disease Lists Utilized 38 
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WHO Neglected Tropical Diseases 
 
There are two, not mutually exclusive, ways to look at Neglected Tropical 
Diseases.  One is through the WHO’s list of 17 specific diseases, which excludes Ebola.39  
The other is through the conceptual framing of NTDs, described above, as diseases of 
poverty and market failure, which is how Ebola is associated with NTDs.40 The WHO list 
is well-defined, clear and inclusive of diseases for which there is market failure (see 
Table 1).  The effects of the diseases on this list vary: some cause temporary illness, 
others disability, others death. Similarly, the epidemiology of diseases varies 
considerably.  Many of the diseases in the list are not episodic or outbreak prone.  Most 
of the diseases on this list do not have rapid transmission patterns or high mortality 
rates.  The list’s underlying rationale is based on market failure, not on biologic and 
epidemiologic features.  Thus, none of the 17 NTDs fit our criteria.  
 
CDC List of Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases 
 
This CDC list includes a wide-range of fifty diseases including parasitic, viral, 
bacterial, and fungal infections as well as prion diseases.41  Four diseases in this list 
(Nipah, SARS, Ebola, and Marburg, see Table 1) meet our criteria, and all four are also 
on the WHO list of Epidemic and Pandemic Diseases.   
 
US National Institutes for Allergy and Infectious Disease Category A Diseases  
 
The US NIAID’s list of category A diseases has formal inclusion criteria and is 
relatively condensed, consisting of seventeen diseases, twelve of which are viral 
hemorrhagic fevers.42  Three diseases in this list (Ebola, Marburg, and Machupo) meet 
our criteria.  
 
WHO List of Epidemic and Pandemic Diseases  
 
Like both the NIAID’s and CDC’s list, the WHO’s list of epidemic and pandemic 
diseases includes diseases with a wide range of transmission patterns.  The list includes 
13 diseases and three groups of diseases, including viral hemorrhagic fevers and 
coronaviruses.  Six diseases in the WHO’s list meet our criteria (and also comprised all 
of the diseases on our final list) (see Table 1).43  
 
REVIEWING THE LISTS TO DETERMINE THE DISEASES 
 
Six diseases meet our criteria: Ebola Virus Disease, Machupo virus, Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola, Nipah Virus, and 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (see Table 1).  The following outlines how 
these criteria were applied (except for Ebola, which is handled earlier in the paper).  It is 
important to note that anti-microbial resistance was not included in this analysis as this 
is a problem rather than a specific disease.   
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Machupo virus 
 
Machupo virus, also known as Bolivian Hemorrhagic Fever (BHF), is in the 
Arenavirus group of viral Hemorrhagic Fever indigenous only to Bolivia.  The disease 
first appeared in 1959 and manifested in a series of rural outbreaks through the 1960s.44 
The most recent reported outbreak was in 2008, when two hundred people were 
infected.4546 
 Precondition:  There is no vaccine and the only available treatment is supportive.   
1. High fatality rates: The case fatality rate is about 30%,  (142/470) based on 
outbreaks up to 1971, although fatality rates for the more recent outbreaks are 
lower, at around 6% (12/200).47 
2. Easily Transmissible: The disease is spread through person-to-person contact as 
well as through contact with rodent droppings.48 
3. Market incentives likely inappropriate: The disease meets both of the market 
failure criteria: it occurs primarily in episodic outbreaks and impacts rural, 
lower-income populations. 
 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) 
 
MERS is a coronavirus first reported in Saudi Arabia in 2012.  The disease has 
since spread to several other countries, including the United States. Most MERS 
patients develop severe acute respiratory illness with symptoms of fever, cough and 
shortness of breath. There have been 1626 laboratory confirmed cases reported to the 
WHO. The largest known outbreak of MERS outside the Arabian Peninsula occurred in 
the Republic of Korea in 2015.49 
 Precondition: There are neither vaccines nor approved treatments 
recommended for MERS-Cov infection.50  
1. High fatality rates: The disease has a 30-40 % fatality rate.51 
2. Easily Transmissible: The exact transmission method of MERS-Cov is 
unknown, but it is likely spread through person-to-person contact via an 
infected person’s respiratory secretions, such as through coughing.  The CDC 
recommends standard transmission prevention procedures employed for 
airborne disease. 
3. Market incentives likely inappropriate: The disease meets one of the two 
market failure criteria, as it occurs primarily in episodic outbreaks.   
 
Marburg Hemorrhagic Fever 
 
Marburg hemorrhagic fever (Marburg HF) is a rare but severe hemorrhagic fever 
that affects both humans and non-human primates. The reservoir host of Marburg virus 
is the African fruit bat, although the illness is asymptomatic in bats. The largest 
outbreak was in 252 people with a 90% fatality rate (Angola, 2004-2005).52    
 Precondition: There is no approved treatment or vaccine for the disease. 
1. High fatality rates: The case-fatality rate for Marburg hemorrhagic fever is 
between 23-90%.53 
2. Easily Transmissible: Although it is unknown how Marburg moves from the 
host to humans, once in humans it spreads through person-to-person 
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contact.54 
3. Market incentives likely inappropriate: The disease meets both market 
incentive criteria.  It occurs primarily in episodic outbreaks and primarily 
impacts rural, low-income populations, although it was initially identified 
after an outbreak among scientists.55 
 
Nipah Virus  
 
Nipah virus causes encephalitis and is associated with symptoms such as 
headache, confusion, coma, respiratory illness, and occasionally pulmonary symptoms. 
Outbreaks have been reported in South and Southeast Asia, with outbreaks occurring 
almost every year in Bangladesh.  The largest outbreak was among three hundred people 
in Southeast Asia.56  There have been several outbreaks of between 200 and 300 people 
in South Asia.57 
 Precondition: There are no approved treatments for Nipah virus, and 
although one drug (ribavirin) has shown effectiveness against the virus in 
vitro, data on its clinical effectiveness are limited and inconclusive.   
1. High fatality rates: During the initial outbreak in Malaysia and Singapore 
when researchers identified Nipah, 100 of the 300 reported infections led to 
fatalities, a case fatality rate of over 30%.58  In South Asia, the average case 
fatality rate is 74.5%.59 
2. Easily Transmissible: Transmission occurs from close contact with infected 
bats, pigs, or humans, with families and caregivers of infected patients being 
the main source of human-to-human transmission. Transmission through 
person-to-person contact has been reported only in India and Bangladesh.60 
3. Market incentives likely inappropriate: The disease is outbreak based, but 
does not exclusively impact low-income populations, meeting one of the two 
market incentive criteria.61 
 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)  
 
SARS is caused by a coronavirus and was identified in 2003 during an outbreak 
that spread from Asia to more than 20 countries across North America, South America, 
and Europe.62 Within approximately eight months, the virus infected over 8,000 
people.63 
 Precondition: There is no approved treatment or vaccine for the disease. 
1. High fatality rates: According to the CDC, the case fatality fate for SARS is 
9.6%.  According to the WHO, it is 10-15%.64  
2. Easily Transmissible: The virus causing SARS is spread through person–to-
person contact via respiratory droplets produced during coughing or sneezing, 
so anyone who comes into close physical proximity of an infected person can 
acquire the disease.65 
3. Market incentives likely inappropriate: The disease occurs primarily in 
episodic outbreaks and meets one of the two market failure criteria.66  
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Borderline cases 
 
In applying our criteria to the diseases, some diseases fell at the border of a 
criterion.  These cases presented questions of how to accurately apply the criterion and 
whether the disease should be prioritized differently once the criterion was applied. 
Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), for example, did not meet the precondition 
of an absence of an approved, clinically effective treatment, based on the following from 
the WHO: “The antiviral drug ribavirin has been used to treat CCHF infection with 
apparent benefit. Both oral and intravenous formulations seem to be effective.”  
According to the CDC, the drug is effective for in vitro for CCHF and in patients 
“reportedly with some benefit.”67  CCHF appears to have a clinically effective treatment, 
but exactly how effective is not clear.  Similarly, Machupo was included within the final 
list based on current understanding that person-to-person transmission is likely, 
although the disease’s exact transmission mechanisms are unknown.68  In these 
borderline cases, multiple sources were consulted. Additional criteria could help to 
assess these cases.  Alternatively, diseases at the border of a criterion could be 
considered second tier priorities.   
 
NEWLY IDENTIFIED DISEASES WHICH MEET CRITERIA 
 
An important feature of the lists reviewed here, particularly the emerging infectious 
disease lists, is that they are adjusted to encompass newly recognized diseases. 
Similarly, we recognize that newly emerging diseases  -- or diseases that re-emerge with 
previously unknown features, such as Zika – may meet the outlined criteria and may be 
important to include within future priority lists. 
   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on review of the four disease lists from WHO, CDC AND US NIAD, we produced a 
list of six priority diseases (see Table 1). We sought to illustrate in this article an 
objective, rational approach to identifying priority diseases for a potential global R&D 
financing facility intended to address the types of market and policy failures exemplified 
by Ebola. This is a process based on both the biologic and epidemiologic characteristics 
of the disease as well as on existing disease categories with which Ebola has been 
associated. 
The biologic and epidemiologic criteria ultimately act as a prioritization 
framework to focus funds on a relatively small set of diseases.  If a new global R&D 
financing facility is created, it would likely begin as a pilot initiative tightly-focused on a 
relatively small number of target pathogens.69  The list developed here has significant 
overlap with, but is not identical to, the priority list recently published by the WHO for 
the development of its R&D blueprint.70  This analysis has shown that developing such a 
priority list can be done by identifying several key criteria and building on pre-existing 
lists. While a real-world process for identifying funding priorities may ultimately adopt 
different criteria, resulting in a different list, we have shown in this analysis the 
implications of using a certain set of criteria based on the Ebola experience.   
The end result of applying these criteria is a list that, like Ebola, incorporates 
aspects of both the EID and NTD framings.  This serves as an example of how a set of 
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criteria, when applied to existing lists, may encompass different framings.  The Oslo 
high-level consultation on Financing of R&D Preparedness and Response (2015) 
underscored the need for improved approaches to R&D to address diseases framed as 
either NTDs or EIDs, and to draw on a broad range of stakeholders: 
 
It is imperative for all countries to contribute, whether high-, middle- or low-
income to both protecting their own populations as well as populations in other 
countries. There is a need to pay particular attention to the needs of vulnerable 
populations since they are prone to higher risks and have less means to prepare 
and respond to crises. The challenge is a health security, a public health and a 
development issue. It must be met by a holistic governmental response by 
relevant ministries, including foreign affairs, security, science & technology, 
health and development, and build on the involvement of both public agencies 
and institutions, private sector and civil society. 71 
 
A priority-setting process such as that described here, using set criteria and existing 
disease lists, could attract diverse R&D stakeholders by encompassing different 
interests.  
 This method has several limitations. One is that there may be relevant diseases 
that are not included in any of the lists we identified.  Another is that the modes of 
transmission of newly emerging diseases may not be fully understood, rendering the 
“easily transmissible” criteria less useful.  Further, we did not take into account the 
scientific feasibility of developing vaccines, drugs or diagnostics for each disease; 
mobilizing such knowledge would surely strengthen this analysis.  
We have illustrated an approach to tightly defining a set of priority diseases. 
While we identified one set of diseases, a different set of diseases could result from 
different criteria, different weights to individual criteria, or different lists. This list used 
Ebola’s epidemiology and biology as a starting place for developing the list, an 
alternative approach may use the characteristics of another disease, such as Zika, to 
form very different criteria using the same process.  Alternately, it may be advantageous 
to define a priority list of diseases more broadly, as this may attract different funders, or 
funders with multiple interests.  
Ultimately, it is critical to mobilize new and appropriately structured public 
financing for R&D to counteract future potential pandemics. The approach to disease 
prioritization described here offers a way for a future global R&D financing facility to  
start with a tightly focused mission and perhaps a greater likelihood of success. 
 
  
Table 1: Diseases Reviewed which Meet Pre-Condition of No Vaccine or Treatment, Including Final List of Priority 
Diseases (information sourced from CDC and WHO websites) 
Diseases in 
Final List 
Disease 
1. High 
Fatality 
Rates (if 
untreated) 
2. Easily 
Transmissible 
(Airborne; 
human-to-
human contact) 
3. Impacted by Market Failure List 
Episodic, 
Outbreak-
based 
transmission 
Isolated to 
low-income 
populations 
WHO 
PED 
CDC 
EID 
NIAID 
Cat. A 
WHO 
NTD 
 
Mad Cow Disease 72 Yes No Yes No 
 
x 
   
Hantavirus 73 Yes No Yes Yes x x x 
  
Norovirus 74 No Yes Yes No 
 
x 
   
West Nile Virus 75 No No Yes No 
 
x 
   
Guinea Worm 76 No No Yes Yes 
   
x 
 
Hendra Virus 77 Yes No Yes No x x 
   
Dengue 78 No No Yes No x x x x 
 
Chikungunya 79 No No Yes No x x  x 
 
Lassa Fever 80 Yes Yes No Yes x x x  
 
Guanarito  81 Yes No Yes Yes x  x  
 
Chapare 82 Yes Unknown Yes Yes x  x  
 
Lujo 83 Yes Yes Yes Yes x  x  
Diseases on Final List 
1 
Nipah Virus 84 Yes Yes Yes No x x 
  2 
SARS (Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome) 85 Yes Yes Yes No x x 
  3 
MERS (Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome) 86 Yes Yes Yes No x 
   4 
Ebola 87 Yes Yes Yes Yes x x x 
 5 
Machupo 88 yes Yes Yes Yes x 
 
x 
 6 
Marburg 89 Yes Yes Yes 
Yes (along with 
lab-based 
outbreaks) x x x 
 7 
Newly Identified Diseases which meet criteria 
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The Ebola Crisis and Health Systems Development 
 
Alexandra Kaasch 
 
 
The Ebola outbreak has led numerous global policy actors to call for strengthening 
health systems. This article discusses these developments employing a global social 
policy approach. The article shows the contributions by major global social policy 
actors to tackle the Ebola disease and discusses these in the context of insights of, 
and strategies to, strengthening health systems in a development context. The 
article concludes that the Ebola crisis showed some of the consequences of weak 
health systems. The emerging ‘renewed’ global awareness that health systems 
matter, can draw on substantial global knowledge and ideas about health systems, 
and should be approached by multi-level policy making. Nevertheless, recent data 
suggests that the Ebola crisis could not be successfully used for the purpose of real 
commitments to the strengthening of health systems, or only to a limited extent. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
At the time of this article’s submission, in December 2015, it looks like the so-called 
“Ebola Crisis” that started in 2014 is over.1 The 2014-15 Ebola outbreak was the worst 
outbreak since the discovery of the disease. More than 11,300 people were killed by 
the virus and more than 28,000 confirmed, probable, and suspected cases have been 
reported.2 The inability of the most affected countries to cope with the situation is, 
amongst other things, linked to weak health systems. The lesson is obvious, and has 
been expressed in many political statements. The “Future Charter” of the German 
government, developed with a view on hosting the G7 in 2015 reflects common 
knowledge: 
 
If we are to prevent epidemics such as the current Ebola crisis, we must 
focus on the problematic relationship between health care services and 
social security systems in fragile states, […] We must help the poorest 
developing countries to expand and strengthen their health care systems 
so that they too can meet relevant health targets. Our goal is to ensure 
good health for all.3 
 
The Ebola crisis has re-focused the attention of global policymakers on the key role of 
health systems in developing contexts. It is a broadly shared view that many lives 
could have been saved and much global concern about the spread of the Ebola virus 
could have been prevented if the most affected countries had been able to rely on 
better health systems, including the provision, financing, stewardship in health 
systems, and situation of health workers.4 
The situation after this crisis is even weaker health systems in addition to 
economic, labor market and other social damages caused by the Ebola outbreak, 
particularly in the countries that had been affected most, namely Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. This implies, amongst other things, that the countries (and the world) 
will not be better prepared in case of another Ebola outbreak – or that of another 
comparable disease –than they were in early 2014. 
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This article engages with the question: To what extent has the common 
knowledge about health systems been translated into real support to health systems? 
The argument is based on more general global discourses on health systems, and 
global governance constellations. The global discourse on health systems has – first – 
been strengthened through the Ebola outbreak. Looking at the international 
emergency response for Ebola-affected countries, it is analyzed to what extent the 
emergency aid considered health system strengthening. Following this, it is discussed 
to what extent this “re-focus” is sustainable in the sense of facilitating better support 
to health systems development. 
 
A GLOBAL SOCIAL POLICY APPROACH TO STUDYING THE EBOLA CRISIS 
 
A global social policy and governance perspective5 appears particularly useful to 
understand the meaning of global emergency responses to major infectious disease 
outbreaks. In contrast to related studies in the field of medicine that are often mainly 
concentrated on the provision of health services, or health economics that ask 
questions about the financing of health systems, the particular value of a global social 
policy and governance perspective is its specific combination of analyzing the 
meanings, similarities, and differences between ideas and strategies provided by 
various global social policy actors. On the one hand, the provision, financing, and 
regulation of health systems are understood as in relation to each other.6 On the 
other hand, global social policy approaches contextualize health issues within a 
broader concept of social protection and thereby broaden our view of the social 
implications of health emergencies, as well as the meaning of comprehensive and 
sustainable health systems as part of preventive and protective social systems. This 
literature also emphasizes the role of international actors of different types in the 
making of global social policies that respond to various global social problems, 
including public health problems. Furthermore, a global social policy perspective 
allows considering multiple levels of policymaking in trying to understand the 
development of national and transnational health systems. 
This article takes its starting point from the literature on global ideas about 
health systems, which describes several decades of global multi-actor engagement 
with health systems. Global actor sets in the field of health systems have been most 
usefully mapped by Koivusalo and Ollila, Lee and Goodman, and Kaasch.7 There are 
also contributions about the role of particular global health actors, such as the World 
Health Organization (WHO),8 the World Bank (Group),9 public-private 
partnerships,10 and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.11 Such 
actors have been instrumental in generating and disseminating knowledge and 
normative ideas on health systems. The global discourse on health systems has been 
particularly characterized by a high degree of complexity on the content, a 
considerable degree of uncertainty regarding best models, and fluctuating global 
attention to the issue. There is, however, more or less consensus between the major 
global social policy actors on the broad lines of what is necessary to make functioning 
health systems.12 In a nutshell, in functioning health systems, there should be 
universal care (at least for basic health care, but more often beyond that); health 
financing should happen in the form of big risk pools; and the financing and 
provision of health care should either be realized through insurance or taxation 
models, acknowledging that one size does not fit all countries and contexts. In the 
field of health care provision, that usually implies a mix of public and private 
providers, with some differences here between actors on the extent to which private 
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providers should be given a role. Financing should be public and guided by pre-
payment, not out-of-pocket payments.13 
Despite that common knowledge, particularly for the world’s poorest countries, 
the improvement in strengthening health care systems is often disappointing. As the 
Ebola-affected countries are some of the lowest income countries worldwide, they are 
recipients of official development assistance (ODA) and other forms of global 
support. Improving the health of people is an objective in many aid projects and 
initiatives. Nevertheless, the poorest countries are frequently not those who benefit 
most from ODA,14 and global aid in health tends to be vertical (i.e., focused on 
particular diseases) and geared to emergency care in situations such as the Ebola 
outbreak or other forms of health crises. As these programs are extremely targeted in 
scope or time, they often fail to support the development of more comprehensive and 
sustainable health systems simultaneously. 
 
THE EBOLA OUTBREAK IN A CONTEXT OF WEAK HEALTH SYSTEMS 
 
When, within a few months in the first half of 2014, a dramatic increase in cases of 
the Ebola virus occurred in particular regions of West Africa, the outbreak soon 
became considered to be a global health threat, and WHO Director-General Margaret 
Chan declared the Ebola outbreak a “public health emergency of international 
concern” in August 2014.15 That was more than just a statement, or means of 
rhetoric. It implied that a particular case of health emergency occurred that qualified 
as a health risk to other states, and required a coordinated international response.16 
This combination of a shared problem and a coordinated international response calls 
for global governance mechanisms to respond. 
Following this classification of a “public health emergency of international 
concern,” the international community was quick in realizing that not only was the 
kind of infectious disease a problem, but so too was the inability of some of the 
countries’ health systems to cope with the number of patients. There was awareness 
of the weakness of the affected countries’ health systems, and their inability to 
respond in order to control the spread of the disease. In the case of Ebola – for which 
there is no cure – the key task of health systems is to prevent further spread of the 
virus. In particular, the health systems in the most affected countries (Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone) had already been very weak and fragmented before the 
Ebola outbreak. Appropriate health infrastructure was missing. The Ebola outbreak 
intensified the problem in multiple ways: hospitals were quickly filled to overflowing 
and could not accept all potentially infected patients. The means to diagnose the 
virus were limited, or completely unavailable. Numerous health workers were 
infected and died from Ebola themselves, which made the care situation even worse. 
These are only a few of the problems the health systems faced, which led to a lack of 
information in affected communities, limited means to isolate infected people, and a 
system overwhelmed with necessary contact tracing. In the first weeks, the situation 
was made even worse as many development organizations left the most affected 
countries, only increasing the need for support.17 
 
INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL ACTORS RESPONSES TO THE EBOLA CRISIS 
 
In the months following the outbreak of Ebola, the international community, in the 
form of many different actors, made major commitments and raised significant 
resources to fight the spread of Ebola. They did this successfully; now, in December 
2015, there seem to be no new cases of infection. According to data collected by the 
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Financial Tracking Service,18 by early November 2015, national governments, 
international organizations, regional organizations and private organizations had 
committed a total of over US $3.6 billion to fight Ebola. 
 
Donor governments 
 
The most important group of actors in terms of emergency aid was national 
(donor) governments. They committed money and in-kind aid in various ways, both 
individually and collectively. A “public health emergency of international concern” 
calls upon the reaction of the world’s major economies in at least two ways. On the 
one hand, these countries provide development aid to developing countries on a 
permanent basis, and are connected by multiple trade, financial and other links. It 
goes beyond the scope of this article, though, to critically following up all of these 
links and dependencies. On the other hand, infectious diseases may spread quickly 
around the globe given extensive movement of people between countries. 
Accordingly, many developed countries reacted with emergency aid packages and 
developed strategies and committed aid at international gatherings, such as G7/8 or 
G20 summits. It is the latter issue that this article focuses on. 
As an immediate reaction demonstrating the global awareness of the extent 
and threat of the Ebola outbreak, in summer 2014, the G7 issued a joint declaration. 
Here, the G7 foreign ministers said: “We urge the international community to bring 
high-quality medical care to Ebola patients…We underscore our willingness to 
provide relief to the countries ravaged by the virus and emphasize our common 
understanding that Ebola is a common global threat to peace and security.”19 When 
numbers of reported cases had already gone down considerably, the G7 agenda still 
included the issue of Ebola and health systems at their Schloss Elmau Summit in 
June 2015 in Germany. The website of the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development states that there is a focus “to draw lessons from the 
fight against Ebola…[and that now] the G7 have made a commitment to actively 
strengthen health systems…because crises such as Ebola are much less severe when 
there are functioning health systems.”20 This was promising as the Ebola crisis was 
clearly coming to its end and politicians could have ignored the issue. In contrast to 
previous summits, this was clearly still viewed as important. For example, at the last 
summit in Germany (Heiligendamm 2007), health had been more or less kicked off 
the agenda after climate change became the key global issue just prior to the 
conference. Some governments, particularly the Japanese government, had in the 
past used the G7/G8 gatherings to emphasize the importance of health systems,21 but 
it was difficult to see how it mattered. 
Among the high-income countries, governments have reacted to the Ebola 
outbreak by providing substantial amounts of emergency aid (see Table 1). The aid 
was provided and channeled in different ways. National development institutes like 
the German GIZ and the United Kingdom’s (UK) Department for International 
Development (DfID) got involved. The German GIZ, for example, supported the 
building of an isolation unit in a children’s hospital in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and 
provided medicines. GIZ also engaged in the provision of food, among other ways.22 
UK DfID launched an Ebola Emergency Response Fund (DEERF) to improve Ebola 
treatment and support isolation unit beds and laboratory testing.23 Some countries, 
such as the US, the UK, and China, used their military to support affected countries.24 
In general, aid concentrated on health care provision, including Ebola Treatment 
Centers (ECTs), isolation/treatment beds, and medical teams; knowledge, including 
technical assistance and education of health personnel; and laboratory testing (see 
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also Table 1). Not all countries contributed in the same way. Some of them channeled 
most of their contributions through other agencies. For example, the Dutch 
government argued “The Netherlands has provided organizations such as the UN, the 
Red Cross, and MSF with financial support. These organizations specialize in 
emergency aid. They know best what resources and personnel are needed.”25 
Nevertheless, from the reported data, it is also obvious that the share of 
support that went beyond the concrete fight of Ebola infections and spread is 
remarkably small. Out of the over US $1.7 billion of the donations included in this 
analysis, less than US $20 million was directed to more general health system 
support. The three most affected countries, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, all 
benefited to some extent. Looking at the donor side, apart from a rather small 
contribution from Germany and Switzerland, France provided all of that support.26 
 
International (governmental) organizations 
 
However, this limited support of health systems coming directly from national 
governments might not be the whole story. It is obvious that much of the national aid 
has been channeled through international organizations, including those with a long 
history of generating knowledge about, and issuing guidance on, the development 
and reform of national health systems, particularly  WHO. It was mainly WHO, the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP), but 
also the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the Security 
Council (SC), UN Women, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and 
other UN organizations that received contributions for their activities for Ebola-
affected countries and societies. 
Given its mandate on the “attainment by all peoples of the highest possible 
level of health,”27 WHO has traditionally been the main actor in reporting and 
alerting the world to major infectious disease outbreaks, including previous Ebola 
outbreaks. WHO also convened a first international emergency meeting with the 
intention to tackle the Ebola epidemic in August 2014.28 The Ebola outbreak caused 
“the largest emergency operation the [WHO] has ever undertaken,”29 and the 
organization has supported and coordinated a significant part of the measures to 
fight this Ebola outbreak by sending technical experts, providing protective 
equipment, deploying epidemiologists for disease detection, training health workers, 
and so on.30 Furthermore, WHO coordinated the Global Outbreak Alert and 
Response Network (GOARN) with over 500 experts. 
Nevertheless, as with other infectious disease outbreaks in the recent past, 
WHO was criticized for how it responded to this global health emergency. It was 
blamed for its weak and slow reaction.31 However, and particularly concerning issues 
of more general health systems strengthening or horizontal approaches to 
development aid in health, WHO initiatives and concepts have been crucial. WHO 
has run and supported various initiatives to strengthen health systems so as to make 
societies less vulnerable in case of specific health emergencies. Over the past decades, 
a considerable number of reports on health systems have been produced and 
disseminated by, or in collaboration with, WHO that could now serve as useful 
starting points to conceptualize a longer-term approach to globally strengthening 
health systems.32 The WHO’s 2015 Strategic Response Plan is not fully convincing on 
this point, however. The annex of this document mentions as output 3.4 “Support 
planning for the establishment of future resilient health systems,” but it is not 
particularly clear about what that implies for future health systems strengthening. In 
terms of its mandate and resources, it is questionable if there is much more WHO 
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can do. As reported in WHO’s 2015 Strategic Response Plan33, the organization has 
still over 700 staff in Ebola-affected regions. It describes three phases of response, 
the first of which was focused on tackling the increase in cases as quickly as possible; 
the second concerned “the rapid scale-up of case finding, contact tracing, and intense 
community engagement to interrupt residual transmission chains,” and the third 
phase is about “driv[ing] the number of cases to zero.” In this context, WHO was an 
important coordinative player at the international level. 
The Ebola outbreak was also considered threatening enough to lead the UN 
Security Council to declare Ebola a threat to peace and security internationally. As a 
consequence, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established a special UN mission, 
the so-called UN Mission for Emergency Ebola Response (UNMEER). This was a 
temporary measure to tackle the Ebola outbreak. It went into operation in September 
2014, and phased out in summer 2015. Furthermore, a UN Foundations Ebola 
Response Fund has been founded to raise money for the fight against Ebola. While 
important in facilitating the fight against this particular Ebola outbreak, this is 
clearly not part of a strategy to make more comprehensive health system for the 
prevention of future outbreaks. However, the World Bank says “the World Bank 
Group, the World Health Organization, and other partners, are developing a plan for 
a new Pandemic Emergency Facility that would enable resources to flow quickly 
when outbreaks occur.”34 Such a mechanisms could include elements of health 
system strengthening. 
The World Bank (Group) has brought together a substantial monetary amount 
(US $1.62 billion) for the affected countries. Following the US, this was the highest 
amount of aid provided by a single actor. The World Bank, in the past, has produced 
important work on health systems,35 which makes one wonder to what extent the 
Ebola response is embedded in, or linked to, broader approaches to the development 
of health systems within World Bank work and initiatives. The grants and loans from 
the World Bank were designated to rebuild health systems, social safety nets, and 
agriculture. In information that was provided to help the most Ebola-affected 
countries, “strengthening health systems and front line care” is mentioned as one of 
the five priority areas.36 The World Bank’s Statement of the Meeting Convening 
Partners, “From Ebola to More Resilient Health Systems,”37 proves that in this case, 
indeed, there seem to be a more practical commitment to health systems. The World 
Bank announced “it would provide at least US $650 million…to help Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone recover from the impact of the Ebola crisis and advance their 
longer-term development needs. The priority areas of this new funding will be 
strengthening health systems and frontline care,…cash transfers and other social 
protection programs.” Nevertheless, this is again a rather small amount for a huge 
task, especially when compared to the over US $1.5 billion in World Bank financing 
for Ebola response.38 
 
Groups of Countries as global social policy actors  
 
There are yet other instances of transnational social policies, namely groups of 
countries or world-regional associations. In the global social policy and governance 
literature as in other related fields, the BRICS as a group of emerging economies has 
come more into focus. On the one hand, this reflects the increasing economic power 
of the BRICS countries; on the other hand, there are also discussions about a new, 
alternative form of development aid. Particularly China has emphasized the value of 
its specific approach to development aid.39 Indeed, when the extent of the Ebola 
epidemic became evident, also the BRICS considered appropriate responses. That 
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was partly due to the fact that there are significant economic exchanges between the 
BRICS and the affected countries. However, the BRICS also have some joint 
understanding of the importance of strengthening health systems formulated in their 
2011 Beijing Declaration, namely that “[the] strengthening of health systems and 
health financing in developing countries in all regions must be the central goal of the 
global health community.”40 In statements given at the end of 2014, the BRICS 
countries acknowledged a more important role for themselves in global health 
matters, and in particular with regard to Ebola.41 In a contribution to International 
Health Policies, Guanyang Zou comments “[i]n comparison to former colonial 
powerhouses such as the US and the UK, BRICS countries have played a constructive 
but secondary role in responding to Ebola emergency.”42 To what extent this had any 
reflection in the concrete response of BRICS countries is difficult to see. Overall, 
apart from China, the Ebola aid from BRICS countries appears rather modest. 
The African Union (AU) also benefitted from some of the donors’ 
commitments, channeled through this regional organization.43 Important here is, for 
example, inter-regional support structures, such as those from the European Union 
(EU) to Africa. In the second report on EU Ebola Coordination, it is reported that the 
EU pledged €1.38 billion, of which €415 million came from the EU budget, in support 
of the fight against Ebola. However, the focus is primarily on “getting to zero,” not 
quite on a longer-term perspective for strengthening health systems.44 Even though, 
at a High-level Meeting on “Ebola: The Road to Recovery,” the EU statement was 
“The EU has aligned its development projects to national priorities of Ebola affected 
countries, focusing on budget support and key sector such as health, education and 
agriculture…These projects will support the recovery and development of health 
systems,”45 out of the projects listed in the Financial Tracking Service database from 
aid from the European Commission, only one project of US $36.9 million was 
explicitly dedicated to health systems, including health services, water and 
sanitation, food security. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS: FROM A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO LESSONS FOR 
THE FUTURE 
 
This article has shown that the outbreak and spread of Ebola in 2014, leading to a 
“public health emergency of international concern,” reminded the international 
community of the importance and meaning of strong health systems but that the 
response to Ebola, so far, has not been impressive regarding general health system 
strengthening. The links between Ebola and health systems appear to be rather 
rhetorical ones; the share of commitment is very much limited and only visible for 
very few donor countries. 
To be fair, the global efforts to fight the disease have now proven to be 
successful. Currently, there are no new infections of Ebola reported. However, this 
only solves part of the problem – the economies, social protection, and health 
systems of those countries that were most affected have suffered in multiple ways, 
and were not been strong at the outset. The data presented in this article shows how 
little there is in terms of “real” commitment to supporting long-term processes to 
develop health systems. As has been illustrated, it is not only very few donors that 
have explicitly allocated funds to strengthening health systems; the few who have, 
mainly France, Germany and the World Bank, have committed only a small share of 
their total spending on Ebola to health systems. 
This neglect of strengthening health systems contradicts with public 
statements from the beginning of the Ebola crisis onwards that emphasized that the 
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dramatic spread of the disease was strongly connected to the inability of local and 
national health systems to respond appropriately; and with open support for the idea 
that better health systems are needed to improve the living conditions of people in 
the poorest countries as well as to prevent similar infectious disease outbreaks. 
The shock and fear that came with this unprecedented spread of the Ebola 
virus clearly had the potential to change things. The Western world was considerably 
alert to and worried about the threat of having the disease spread across the globe – a 
disease that nobody has a cure for, not even those countries with the best health 
infrastructure and medical procedures. Economic interests, trade links, and real 
senses of global solidarity also nurtured the efforts to tackle the disease. 
From that perspective, this global health emergency certainly had a potential 
to change global health policies. The fact that health systems in some of the affected 
countries were completely overwhelmed in controlling the spread of the Ebola virus 
at an early stage struck a nerve; countries may receive ODA on a permanent basis, 
they may host numerous development organizations, many of them in the field of 
health, and yet the development of health systems is very limited. This hints at a 
number of issues, situated at different levels of social and health policy making in a 
development context. 
Despite long and better knowledge about the importance and value of 
sustainable health systems, most global health initiative continue to target particular 
diseases and groups (“vertical programs”). Horizontal approaches, including claims 
to direct development aid for health into the public budgets of countries in order to 
build better public health systems are not new,46 but frequently overlooked. 
At a regional level, there is the problem of the potential of mutual support in a 
context of common development needs and a common crisis situation. If the regional 
funding of social and health policy support is dependent on external donors, this 
limits the control over appropriate measures by regional decision-makers. At a global 
level, the symptomatic weakness and criticism of WHO continues to be an issue. In 
such discourses, multiple donors and potential global health actors may be ignored 
when the focus is on the shortcomings of WHO. 
Furthermore, what needs to be considered is that, due to the difficulties in 
controlling the spread of the disease at an early stage, the Ebola outbreak generated 
multiple crises with several social and economic hardships extending to far more 
parts of the population than the Ebola-affected communities. When the Ebola virus 
began to spread in some of the least developed countries, fiscal deficits increased in 
countries with severe structural vulnerabilities and very limited economic growth. 
Furthermore, imposed travel and trade restrictions caused by the Ebola outbreak put 
another burden on national economies. Coping with these problems in a situation 
that, according to a report of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (2015), “calls 
for heavy public spending on health to contain the disease, while social protection 
needs grow quickly” 47 is a very difficult task. It alerts us, though, to the fact that 
“getting to zero” is not the end of the story. 
This “renewed” global awareness, if taken seriously, can draw on substantial 
knowledge and ideas that have been developed over the past decades in a number of 
international organizations and that are supported by many other global social and 
health policy actors. The Ebola outbreak created a window of opportunity to get 
global health policies and actors more committed to supporting health systems to 
prevent similar future crises, and help the countries that have been strongly affected 
by the outbreak in multiple ways to recover and improve. Unfortunately, despite even 
recent statements such as at the G7 in summer 2015, there is not much evidence that 
there will be much of such a real commitment. 
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Therefore, taking the global social policy and governance perspective 
seriously, the health and other needs of the poorest countries, the fragmentation of 
health systems, and the uncertainty regarding appropriate health systems48 need to 
be contextualized and addressed in multi-level policy settings. The broad consensus 
on the problem and the danger of weak health systems only illustrated, and have 
been made worse, by the Ebola crisis. It would need to be turned from a collaborative 
emergency response to a multi-actor, multi-level long-term commitment. This could 
draw on important conceptual work done within WHO and World Bank and involve 
social redistribution of resources at different levels (local, national, regional and 
global). This is what should be at the core of re-constructing global social and health 
governance, and the Ebola crisis could be the beginning of such a process. 
What is at stake is reserve funds in the anticipation of future health 
emergencies and global insurance institutions that provide crisis support in a quick 
and de-politicized manner. A type of insurance, though with a more general focus on 
inequality, has also been thought about by Robert J. Shiller as an “innovative 
scientific finance and insurance, both private and public, to reduce inequality, by 
quantitatively managing all the risks that contribute to it.” He continues to explain 
that “[i]nequality insurance would require governments to establish very long-term 
plans to make income-tax rates automatically higher for high-income people in the 
future if inequality worsens significantly, with no change in taxes 
otherwise…inequality insurance…addresses risks beforehand.”49 
An alternative funding/insurance idea in case of health emergencies was 
suggested in the form of an International Health Systems Fund, situated at WHO.50 
Such a fund would have combined emergency response mechanisms with support to 
health system development. A significant allocation of aid money, though, would 
need to be committed – the proposal mentions a “multibillion dollar investment 
channeled to low-income countries”.51 A similar proposal was made by the World 
Bank for a pandemic emergency facility that would have money available for future 
pandemic response, conceptualized as an insurance model.52 
In light of all that, growing out of the Ebola response, it would be welcome to 
see a more intense engagement with the strengthening of health systems in the 
framing of the post-2015 development agenda. While the three health MDGs have 
supported rather vertical approaches, the SDGs have the potential to more systemic 
change. Target 8 of the proposed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) includes 
the achievement of “universal health coverage (UHC), including financial risk 
protection, access to quality essential health care services, and access to safe, 
effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.”53 A number 
of proposals about UHC have been produced and disseminated for some time now, 
preceded and accompanied by various other concepts, ideas, reports and 
recommendations on the role of health systems. While this may “represent an 
important addition to the agenda and has widespread backing from countries and 
global health institutions,”54 the question remains if we will see a change at last. And 
whether Ebola, at last, will make a change. 
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Table 1: National contributions and pledges to respond to the Ebola crisis 
 
ETCslv 
or 
related 
items 
Technology. 
assistance 
Educating 
health 
personnel 
Medical 
teams 
Isolation/ 
Treatment 
units/beds 
Medicines 
Medical 
equipment 
Treatment 
Laboratory 
testing 
Support to IOs 
Support to 
regional 
organisations 
Support to NGOs 
Amount in 
US$lvi 
Explicit 
health 
system 
support 
Australia +  +       UNICEF, 
WHO, SClvii 
 Caritas, WVI, Plan, 
RedR 
38 million  
Canada  +        IFRClviii, 
OCHAlix, 
WHO, 
UNICEF, SC, 
WFP 
 ACFlx, OXFAM, 
CARE, MSFlxi, 
Plan, Samaritan’s 
Purse 
78 million  
China  +lxii + + + + +  + WHO, WFP AU   47 million  
France  + +  +   + + WFP, 
UNMEER, 
WHO 
  108.4 million 
(+28 million) 
4.8 
million 
(Liberia) 
12.3. 
million 
(Guinea) 
1.5 million 
health 
care 
continuity 
Germany +    + +    WFP, 
UNICEF, 
WHO, 
UNICEF, SC 
Ebola Trust 
Fund 
German Doctors, 
MSF, Help, Plan, 
SOS Kinderdorf, 
Oxfam, Diakonie 
Katastrophenhilfe, 
Caritas, ICRC, 
THW 
165 million 
(13.4 million) 
890.930 
(Sierra 
Leone)  
India       +   WHO   10.7 million 
(+2.05 million) 
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Japanlxiii + +     +   UNICEF, 
IFRC, WFP, 
WHO, OCHA, 
UN Women 
  79 million  
Netherlands          UNICEF,WHO   IFRC, MSF, Oxfam 72.9 million  
Norway          WFP, 
UNICEF, 
WHO 
 Plan, MSF, IFRC 40.7 million  
Russia          WHO, 
UNICEF, 
World Bank, 
WFP 
  20.5 million (+ 
8 million) 
 
Sweden    +      WFP, SC, 
UNICEF, 
WHO, OCHA, 
UNMEER 
ACF RC, Plan, MSF 87.4 million (+ 
12.9 million) 
 
Switzerland          UNICEF, 
WFP, 
UNMEER, 
FAO 
 RC, Oxfam, MSF, 
IFRC 
31.3 million  
UKlxiv +   + +  + + + WFP, SC, 
WHO, 
UNMEER, 
OCHA, 
UNICEF, IOM 
 MSF, IFRC, Plan 363.8 million 
(+147.6 
million) 
 
US +  + + +    + UNICEF, 
WHO, IOM, 
OCHA, WFP 
ACF, AU Oxfam, Plan, 
Christian Aid, 
IFRC, Care, 
Samaritan’s purse 
1.75 billion  
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